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ABSTRACT
The Failure of the Surveillance State:
Observation, Narrative and Identity
in American Literature and Culture Since the Cold War
Jeremy C. Justus
This dissertation examines an aporia in Michel Foucault’s analysis of ideological
panopticism. Foucault would likely suggest that the contemporary widespread use and
acceptance of second-generation surveillance technologies exemplifies the discursive
circulation of panoptic ideology. To the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence that
suggests that such technology can be used for, to borrow Steve Mann’s phrase,
sousveillance (or, literally, “to watch from below”). By drawing from Niklas Luhmann’s
and Gregory Bateson’s examinations of the inherent “blind spots” of observation systems
(both literal and metaphorical), this dissertation suggests that sousveillance posits a
challenge to the theoretically “neat” (according to Foucault) ideological function of
surveillance. Moreover, this dissertation draws from Chilean biologists and systems
theorists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s concept of autopoiesis, or selfcreation, in order to examine how the second-generation surveillance camera facilitates
opportunities to discursively express and forge identities that are not so neatly explained
by the limited possibilities of ideological interpellation.
This project approaches these issues by examining a triangulated, discursive
relationship between surveillance, narrative, and subjectivity as it manifests in
contemporary American culture, and it locates examples of this triangulated relationship
in both the form and content of various postmodern, cultural products such as Don
DeLillo’s novel Cosmopolis, Anna Deavere Smith’s stage play Twilight: Los Angeles,
1992, Hasan Elahi’s digital art installation Tracking Transience, and David Simon’s
HBO series The Wire. The Failure of the Surveillance State ultimately posits that
panoptic power does not function as neatly as Foucault proposed and that the failures and
blind spots of contemporary surveillance systems provide significant possibilities for
reconsidering and reconstructing theoretical models of subjectivity, agency, and
narrative. It concludes by asserting that these failures have become embedded in
emerging narrative frameworks that have moved away from the authority of a singular
narrator to a practice that mirrors an infinite regress of secondary observers in multiple
points-of-view narrative frameworks (as in the case of Jennifer Egan’s novel A Visit from
the Goon Squad).
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Justus, Chapter One 1
Chapter One: The Failure of the Surveillance State
In most metropolitan areas, one can pass through precious few public places
without also passing through the field of vision of several public cameras. With greater
and greater frequency, surveillance cameras are appearing atop traffic stoplights, in and
outside of consumer spaces like gas stations and grocery stores, inside of ATM machines,
and so on; and in each of these locations, the cameras ostensibly function to monitor and
regulate the public from a position vested with institutionalized authority. In short, to use
Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth century model popularized by Michel Foucault in
Discipline and Punish, these cameras ostensibly are, or are meant to appear to be,
Panoptic. All-seeing technological eyes perched in physically elevated positions and
charged with hierarchical, or “top-down,” ideologies, modern surveillance cameras are
theoretically manifestations of overwhelmingly pervasive, regulatory ideologies that seek
to regulate and control all who pass through their field of vision.
But this perspective is charged with an equally pervasive brand of cultural
paranoia that has been with us at least since McCarthy’s Communist witch-hunts (and
this cultural paranoia has been a prevalent social force in America for much longer than
that). This paranoia informs both our urge to survey and our interpretations of what we
“see,” so that narrative accompaniment to visual information discursively conditions and
recreates how we understand the mediation of a camera and what passes through the
camera’s visual field. In other words, and as I discuss in greater detail later in this
chapter, our “reading” of what occurs within the visual field is ultimately a narrative
practice that has much in common with the narrative framework of conspiracy theory.
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Critics such as Pat O’Donnell, Alan Nadel, Mark Fenster, and John Johnston have
provided useful models for understanding the ways in which paranoia can impact the
ways in which we interpret historical events and theoretically objective information. The
narrative framework of conspiracy theory can, as Fenster asserts, be productive;
particularly insofar that such models retroactively assemble a storyline that leads to an
inevitable conclusion: the assassination of JFK, for example, or the apocalyptic end of
the earth. In these cases, conspiracy theory generates new narratives and new modes of
understanding and interpreting information. Similarly, targeted surveillance practices
carry certain aims and specific assumptions that influence how we “read” the visual
information they generate. If, for example, the presence of a surveillance camera
regulates and protects what falls within the visual field, then all who pass through a
targeted surveillance area are potential suspects of yet-to-be-committed crimes.
Narrative interpretations of surveillance footage carry these implicit assumptions so that
we read visual information in much the same way that a JFK conspiracy theorist would
read Lee Harvey Oswald’s diary: All information can be plugged into a narrative
framework that points towards a seemingly inevitable conclusion. Thus, in a conspiracy
theory narrative framework, information becomes the occasion for narrative. Ostensibly
objective information provided by visual surveillance becomes the information for a
narrative structure similar to that of most conspiracy theories. Moreover, by placing
viewers in the position to interpret and narrate what happens in the visual field, the
surveillance camera also puts us into the position to reinscribe ourselves into a cultural
script that adds the authority of objective information to the ongoing and always
incomplete process of assembling a subjective identity. And so narrating what we see
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within the camera’s field becomes a discursive act of describing and inscribing
subjectivity. In other words, visual surveillance provides seemingly objective
information that can be “plugged into” postmodern identity formations.
The problems with this approach to understanding subjectivity are many. And
many of these problems manifest in the American social psyche. For instance, brothers
Joel and Ian Gold recently identified and described a contemporary realization of an old
psychosis that they call “The Truman Delusion.” In reference to Peter Weir’s 1998 film
The Truman Show, “The Truman Delusion” (also called “The Truman Show Delusion”),
describes a distinct brand of psychosis which is underpinned by persecution fantasy and
paranoia: one’s life is being watched and filmed (or broadcast) by unseen forces for the
entertainment of unseen masses. The “sufferer” of this delusion believes that she is the
center of an essentially completely orchestrated, ongoing narrative, and that the ongoing
story of her life is merely a reality-television ruse. A typically metropolitan malady (by
virtue of technological necessity), the Truman Delusion allows its sufferers to make sense
out of the massive proliferation of cameras – both public and private, institutional and
personal – in that these cameras are the tools and technologies that are used to keep the
show going, so to speak. Perhaps more importantly, it also helps sufferers understand
their feelings of living in a seemingly fabricated world where the possibilities for agency
are circumscribed by the parameters of social scripts that have a deterministic effect on
behavior. The Truman Delusion thus helps some make sense of the problematic
relationship between surveillance, visibility, and subjectivity in the context of the various
constraints surrounding the expression and construction of identity.
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The Truman Delusion also describes how the current cultural and social milieu
creates the occasion and opportunity for pre-existing psychoses to express themselves,
but even so, it is easy to understand how and why someone might be inclined to be
heavily suspicious of the seemingly exponential spread and circulation of mechanisms of
surveillance. The Truman Show depicts at least two common cultural fantasies: it is at
once the narcissist’s fantasy of being the subject of attention and the fantasy of innocent
or naive self-articulation, or, as it is in Truman’s case, of spending life blissfully unaware
that so much of one’s public life has been scripted. Accordingly, sufferers of the Truman
Delusion may not only desire to be the center of a scripted farce, but to be so without
knowing it. Moreover, such sufferers may also be keenly aware of the ways in which
various parameters – which range from ideology to spatialized demands for performative
acts to the limits and social scripts associated with race, class, gender, and sexual
orientation – influence or determine who one is in the world while freeing the sufferer to
also behave as if this is not the case
Thus, the paranoia of the Truman Delusion is that one may be acting in accord to
a scripted context that severely circumscribes the parameters of possibility for agency and
self-actualization. Similarly, the paranoia that permeates the field of surveillance studies
is typically connected to issues of agency and subjectivity. If, as many theorists suggest,
surveillance is an extension of a regulatory apparatus such as the state or of a more
encompassing ideological apparatus, then it serves to undermine agency and circumscribe
the subject within tight parameters of possibility for action, thought, and selfactualization. Surveillance does sometimes function this way, and so the associated
paranoia feels intuitive.
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For example, in two studies conducted in California, researchers found that
surveillance systems in high-crime neighborhoods typically do deter crime. In fact,
research suggests that signs containing the word “surveillance” placed in public areas
may be as effective as the presence of actual surveillance cameras in deterring violent
crime and theft.1 Regarding issues of agency, we might say that even the suggestion of
surveillance in public areas does limit one’s ability to decidedly enact his will upon
others. Thus, the subject’s agency is severely undermined by modern surveillance
practices. Moreover, once the ideological function of the cameras is perceived,
understood, and internalized by those who regularly pass through or inhabit surveillance
spaces, subjects are right to be suspicious of the camera’s authority and purpose.
This “automatic function” of ideological surveillance – that it works once subjects
understand and internalize its aims – is essentially the crux of Foucault’s aforementioned
application of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon to a topological, ideological structure that
can be mapped onto Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). In Bentham’s architectural
structure, the Panopticon is a circular prison with a central tower in the middle. All cells
within the circular structure have walls that open to both the outside, letting in light, and
the inside, enabling guards to observe prisoners in their cells. The observation chambers
of the central tower are dimly lit, preventing inmates from knowing whether or not the
central tower is inhabited and thus preventing them also from knowing whether or not
they are being observed; thus the purpose of the Panopticon functions automatically when
inmates assume that they are being watched. In so assuming, they internalize the
function of the Panopticon and theoretically realize that their “visibility is a trap,” to use
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Foucault’s words, that limits their ability to enact their will. Along these lines, the
Panopticon can be topologically mapped onto public, surveilled institutions and spaces.
Ideologically, the ongoing spread of surveillance technologies should guarantee
the automatic functioning of this so-called visibility trap: public surveillance cameras
may and often do provide information for the prosecution of crime, and they thus inform
the narrative framework of courtroom testimony. But, as we’ll see later, this information
must ultimately be inscribed into a narrative framework wherein the problem of
prosecution informs the ways we “read” this information. Furthermore, the spread of
second-generation surveillance technology – particularly handheld cameras and cell
phone cameras – destabilizes the theoretical hierarchy upon which Foucault’s formulation
depends. As I argue later, second-generation surveillance technology does not so much
represent the internalization of panoptic ideology so much as it lends the theoretical
objectivity of visual information to lateral perspectives. The result is that hierarchical
surveillance practices are undermined by second-order observation.
Foucault does acknowledge that surveillance practices need not just be top-down
in order to function as both a practical and ideological method of regulation: “for
although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations
from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top [a practice dubbed
sousveillance by Steve Mann] and laterally” (Discipline and Punish 176).
Unsurprisingly, Foucault predicts the lateral spread of surveillance: although we can
assume he was speaking of the ways in which both the ideology of surveillance and the
practices of watching from a designated central position (such as the tower in the
Panopticon) function when they are internalized and practiced by its subjects, this
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statement works as well in the context of the contemporary proliferation of surveillance
technologies. What does not work so well is the second half of the above sentence: “this
network ‘holds’ the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power
that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised” (176-177). In other
words, while Foucault was able to imagine the effects of centralized power being spread
through its subjects, he was unable to see – largely because he didn’t live long enough to
see the practical realizations of his theories on surveillance – that the mechanisms of
capturing “bottom to top” and lateral perspectives challenge and undermine the
centralized force about which he speaks.
Later, Foucault describes mechanisms of centralized surveillance as “the circuits
of communication [which] are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of
knowledge” (217); however, such mechanisms only work as such if there is a central
power to which agents of this process report. Instead, the proliferation of visual
information recorded by modern surveillance technology and circulated through various
digital conduits – from the DVD to the internet – has the opposite effect. Rather than
suggest that we are always on the visual record, it suggests that images of what we do,
where we go, how we act and so on are distributed in a disjointed, miasmic
conglomeration. Even if we are to imagine that there is a central agency responsible for
collecting and collating this information, we must also see that the massive amount of
visual information generated by modern mechanisms would probably do more to clutter
the hyperbolic eye than inform it.
And so this brings us to an aporia in Foucault’s theory: If the mechanisms and
ideological functions of surveillance are carried out by its subjects, then the force of the
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centralized power is destabilized, particularly when the ostensible authority of the State is
“borrowed” by the use of second-generation surveillance technology. In other words, the
ostensible authority attached to the captured image lends itself to lateral, and often
marginalized, perspectives. When this authority is borrowed to watch the watchers (in
acts of sousveillance) or to record the actions of others who fall outside of the
hierarchical order (in acts of recording lateral perspectives), this information does more
to record the many blind spots of centralized surveillance systems than it does to regulate
subjective expression. And so the spread of surveillance techniques, technologies, and
supporting ideologies ultimately undoes itself. Thus the surveillance state is the failure of
the surveillance state.
But this failure of centralized surveillance is also a success. Since we are now
ostensibly equipped to borrow the camera’s authority in representations of subjective
perspectives, the subversion of centralized surveillance is our empowerment. This
empowerment is not just theoretical: Later in this dissertation, I will discuss examples of
State authority being called into question by visual information recorded by marginalized
subjects. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter Three, during the case of the killing of
Oscar Grant III by an Oakland police officer, police testimony was undermined by a host
of videos and still images taken by spectators and circulated via various social media
spaces such as YouTube and Facebook. Added to eyewitness testimony, the technology
of surveillance brought, and continues to bring, the authority of recorded information into
the hands of those who use it.
Surveillance, Spectacle, and Celebrity
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I am certainly far from the first to critique Foucault. In Techniques of the
Observer, Jonathan Crary notes that “Foucault’s opposition of surveillance and spectacle
seems to overlook how the effects of these two regimes of power can coincide” (18).
Foucault examines Eighteenth Century instances of public torture and execution of
political transgressors as examples of presenting the body of a transgressor as symbolic
of all transgressors. The spectacle of public torture and execution, then, serves a
regulatory function: when subjects observe what happens to the body of a transgressor,
they learn to fear transgression. With the development of methods of surveillance – from
keeping record of those infected with disease through the design and application of the
Panopticon – the method of juridical control shifted from the spectacle of corporeal
punishment to the ideology of surveillance. What Crary rightly observes is that Foucault
presents these methods of control as mutually exclusive.
But collisions of these two “regimes of power” are prevalent. When, for example,
during one of Lindsay Lohan’s infamous courtroom trials, she wrote the words “Fuck
You” on her middle fingernail, and when this was recorded by media cameras that were
allowed into the courtroom, it became clear that Lohan has been made into a symbolic,
spectacular figure – a “stand-in” for all that she ostensibly represents – who is also
clearly aware of the constant surveillance to which she is subjected. In other words,
Lohan both symbolically represents the body of the social transgressor, and she
represents the subject under surveillance. Appropriately, Crary’s critique also points out
that “Foucault relentlessly emphasizes the ways in which human subjects became objects
of observation, in the form of institutional control or scientific and behavioral study; but
he neglects the new forms by which vision itself became a kind of discipline or mode of
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work” (18). So when, for example, the images of Lohan’s fingernail are circulated
widely through various means of digital circulation (or, most commonly, through
channels of “social media”), it becomes clear that techniques of observation vary widely
and that the supposed ideological functioning of Panoptic surveillance is undermined by,
among other things, the culture of spectacle, of celebrity.
Other social theorists occasionally highlight other “real world” examples of the
failure of panoptic practices. For example, in Fred C. Alford’s empirical account of
surveillance in American prisons, Alford notes that “if you control the entrances and the
exits [of the prison], you do not have to look” and that “[i]f you [or prison guards] have
to look, you have already ceded a measure of power, the power not to look and not to
care” (127). Even as panoptic practices in the prison have shifted to what Alford calls
“nonoptic,” so to does Foucault’s panoptic formula fail as a measure of ideological,
architectural (as it was for Jeremy Bentham), and technological visual surveillance
outside of the prison. Foucault would have us accept that State power has become
completely dependant upon Panoptic practices – “should any part of this universal gaze
chance to slacken, the collapse of the State itself would be imminent” (“Questions on
Geography,” 72); however, in practice, this is clearly not the case. As a method of
juridical control both in and out of the prison, the Foucauldian formula doesn’t function
as “neatly” as Foucault claims.
Part of the problem with Foucault’s formula is, in de Certau’s words, that
“[b]eneath what one might call the ‘monotheistic’ privilege that panoptic apparatuses
have won for themselves, a ‘polytheism’ of scattered practices survives” (author’s italics,
48). And so “[i]t remains to be asked how we should consider other, equally
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infinitesimal, procedures, which have not been ‘privileged’ by history but are
nevertheless active in innumberable ways in the openings of established technological
networks” (49). In other words, and as I have suggested already, there are many methods
of surveillance, of watching, that fall outside the hierarchical, panoptic order, and that
may be far more productive, at least insofar that they record information that ultimately
becomes reinscribed into popular narratives.
The example of media cameras in the courtroom in one of Lindsay Lohan’s many
hearings for illegal social behavior illustrates a collapse of the two “regimes” of power:
that spectacular figures are often surveyed for the purpose of regulatory control through
ostensibly making an example of symbolic transgressors and that one can garner attention
and fame for this very purpose (see, for example, Paris Hilton, Britney Spears, Miley
Cyrus, and Jersey Shore’s Nicole “Snooki” Polizi). While it would appear from such
examples that surveillance of such spectacular figures has the secondary function of
regulating femininity, it is more often the case, as Laura Mulvey suggested in the mid1970s, that the subject of the camera is feminized by an ostensibly male gaze (see “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”). In other words, sometimes surveillance emasculates its
subjects and replaces the illusion of their agency with the spectacle of their public
performances.
When lateral surveillance is used to turn a transgressor into a symbolic figure, we
see that one of the problems with the ways in which popular, heteronormative narratives
are mapped onto the visual field. Such was the case for eighteen-year-old Tyler
Clementi, a student at Rutgers University who jumped from George Washington Bridge
into the Hudson River on September 22, 2010 after his roommate Dharun Ravi advertised
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(on Twitter) and broadcast (through live, streaming video) Cleminti’s private encounter
with a fellow male student. On Ravi’s Twitter page, Ravi posted that his “[r]oommate
asked for the room till midnight. I went into molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I
saw him making out with a dude. Yay.” Both this “tweet” and Ravi’s actions are now
being debated in terms of a hate crime, which could carry a 10-year prison sentence if
Ravi was charged accordingly. In any case, Ravi’s actions cannot, of course, be undone.
And so we can easily see that the collapsed systems of surveillance and spectacle
can, at times, have disastrous effects. In Clementi’s case, a method of lateral surveillance
– Ravi’s webcam – served an ideological function: to regulate heteronormative
expressions of sexual desire. And so Ravi could be said to have carried out the
ideological function of Panoptic practice. Ravi, as a conduit of institutionalized
heteronormativity, internalized the Panoptic purpose of subjects watching each other to
regulate behavior. Moreover, Ravi used his webcam to create a “visibility trap” to
ensnare his roommate and to theoretically turn Clementi in a symbolic figure – the bodily
representation of a social transgressor. It could be said that Clementi’s suicide is a direct
result of the collision of the two regimes of power: The internalization of ideological
surveillance “naturalized” the transmogrification of Clementi’s body so that Clementi had
to finish the disciplinary work that Ravi started.
And Clementi’s is far from the only case wherein lateral surveillance is conducted
and broadcast in matters of policing behavior that falls outside of the dominant social
order. Cyberbullying continues to be a high-profile issue for teens and their parents. At
the age of self-discovery and self-creation, one should have the freedom to experiment
with one’s own identity without fear of condemnation or attack. But as we’ve seen many
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times, a triangulated system of social networks (like Facebook and MySpace), social
media (like YouTube), privatized surveillance technologies (like cell phone cameras),
and heteronormative scripts becomes a recipe for disaster for all those who transgress the
norm and do so within the visual field. One of the aims of this dissertation is not to
ignore such instances – I will later look at other examples of public surveillance being
used to regulate private behavior and subjectivity – but I will also examine ways in which
the tables can be turned.
For example, in response to the rise of GLBT teen suicides that stem from
bullying, Dan Savage founded the “It Gets Better Project” – a YouTube channel that
hosts videos of GLBT adults providing messages of hope and support for the victims of
bullying. In this example, a growing collection of videos representing perspectives that
fall outside of the hierarchical, social order undermine the authority and legitimacy of the
ways in which private surveillance can be used to circulate heteronormative messages.
Perhaps most notoriously, Texas Councilman Joel Burns has lent his voice to the “It Gets
Better” movement by publicly sharing stories from his own struggles growing up as a
questioning youth in a homophobic Texas community. He used time allotted for
announcements and discussion during a filmed council meeting to offer this message.
And in so doing, he effectively borrowed the system of legitimacy created by the camera
and by television broadcast. Burns has since created “The Tyler Project” – a 24/7 hotline
and chatroom for GLBT or questioning youth – in memory of Tyler Cleminti; and the “It
Gets Better” project, which went “viral” in the first few weeks of its existence, has
become one of its top referring sites.
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It is a central aim and my sincere hope that this dissertation will illustrate that
turning the camera around, so to speak, can be liberating for those who fall outside of the
dominant social order. In other words, rather than embrace the paranoia commonly
associated with surveillance and surveillance studies, I want to look at potential
empowerment demonstrated by subversive acts of counter-surveillance – call it
sousveillance, or lateral surveillance, or the act of recording the blind spots of the primary
observing system. And I want to examine the ways in which the narrative structure of
conspiracy theory, another product of cultural paranoia, is similar to the narrative
structure that often accompanies surveillance footage in order to further examine the
ways in which this narrative structure manifests in cultural products like television, film,
drama, and literature. My ultimate aim is to illustrate that in both the practice of visual
surveillance and in narrating what happens in the visual field, significant blind spots are
opened for lateral perspectives.2 As a result, so too are opportunities created to legitimize
marginalized perspectives. In other words, the surveillance state creates the blind spots
that undo its own central authority. And thus, again, the surveillance state is the failure
of the surveillance state.
The Problem with Paranoia: Conspiracy and Narrative
I wrote it once before, but it bears repeating: surveillance studies, like common
reactions to public surveillance systems, are typically characterized by a pervasive
cultural paranoia. This paranoia appears to be charged with both narcissism (“everyone
is watching me; I’m that interesting”), as in the case of the Truman Delusion, and
suspicion of State Power and other controlling forces. And thus this paranoia reveals a
deep, cultural anxiety regarding agency. The so-called “Eye of Power” is but the means
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of observation of forces that would circumscribe both the spaces through which we move
and the possibilities of enacting our will in such spaces. This, in part, is Foucault’s
problem: if we operate so neatly according to an internalized Panoptic ideology, then we
are essentially automatons. If, however, the very means and methods of surveillance can,
in the hands of marginalized subjects, subvert both the practical and ideological aims of
hierarchical surveillance, then we see that there is yet room for agency. Along these
lines, it is also a central project of this dissertation to examine ways in which surveillance
fails as an ideological apparatus, particularly when it undoes itself.
In Empire of Conspiracy, Timothy Melley discusses paranoia and conspiracy
theories as symptomatic cultural manifestations of underlying, but pervasive, anxieties
about social control. His phrase “agency panic” describes “intense anxiety about an
apparent loss of autonomy [and] the conviction that one’s actions are being controlled by
someone else or that one has been ‘constructed’ by powerful, external agents” (vii).
“Agency panic,” Melley explains, “therefore, may be understood as a nervous
acknowledgment, and rejection, of postmodern subjectivity” (15). In other words,
agency panic is the postmodern subject’s reaction to pervasive cultural and ideological
forces that circumscribe the parameters of possibility for the construction and expression
of subjectivity or identity. As Patrick O’Donnell puts it “[w]e are paranoid because
[paranoia] is the last refuge of identity so aware of itself as a construct and as constructed
by desires assembled for it that it becomes a parody of itself” (9). It would seem, then,
that if postmodern formulations of identity are correct, then agency panic and paranoia
are ingrained into our subjective formations.
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Later, I will discuss other methods of understanding subjectivity wherein the
awareness and acknowledgement of socially constructed parameters and scripts for
subjectivity aren’t necessarily linked to paranoia and panic. For now, I want to examine
the ways in which paranoia provides a productive model for understanding our reactions
to the practices and mechanisms of public surveillance. Specifically, conspiracy theory,
as one cultural manifestation and subjective outlet for paranoia, offers us a useful
narrative structure for understanding our urge to provide narrative accompaniment to
visual information. Melley writes that conspiracy theories “have flourished in an age
supposedly marked by the disappearance of grand explanatory schemes and master
narratives” (8). The aforementioned destabilization of centrally regulated surveillance
likewise illustrates a move away from “grand explanatory schemes.” Nonetheless, our
urge to narrate what we see is still invested with a compulsion to give an account of
ourselves.
Before examining how we read or narrate subjectivity within the visual field, I
would like to examine the larger issue of narrating subjectivity itself. I want to posit that
“giving an account” of one’s self (a phrase I take from Judith Butler’s short text of the
same name) is essentially what one does when one “reads” or interprets visual
information of one’s body within the visual field. Regarding subjectivity or identity
formation, the urge to give an account is at once invested in the scene of address, or the
context for the account, and the audience for whom such an account is made. Butler
explains that “[g]iving an account thus takes a narrative form, which not only depends
upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions but also
draws upon narrative voice and authority, being directed toward an audience with the aim
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of persuasion” (12). In other words, giving an account of oneself presupposes that
articulating one’s subjectivity is done so within a certain set of parameters, for a real or
imagined audience, and in a distinctly traditional narrative form. Moreover, such
accounts are articulations that are seemingly predetermined by the constraints of
overlapping parameters of subjective possibility. In other words, in giving an account of
one’s self, one essentially tells a story that pieces together the narrative underpinnings for
the social scripts associated with identity categories like gender, sexual orientation, race,
and class. These stories are further filtered through various ideological lenses. It is these
parameters – the scripts charged by the imperatives of categorical identity formulations,
the ideological frameworks that contextualize these scripts, and their bodily enactments
or manifestations – that, together, create the illusion that the postmodern subject is highly
and complexly constructed and that he therefore lacks agency.
It thus feels intuitive that these parameters for the construction of identity are
most often examined in these contexts: as products of ideological apparatuses (as in the
work of Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben); as socially scripted,
performative demands charged with the imperatives of gender (Judith Halberstam, Judith
Butler, etc.), race (Charles Mills, David Theo Goldberg, Kwame Appiah, etc.), class
(Marx, Hegel, etc.), and sexual orientation (Lee Edelman, Leo Bersani, etc.); as being
subject to the demands or expectations of a real or imagined “other” (Lacan, Zizek, Fuss);
and, more recently, as techno-modern / “post-human” assemblages (Hayles, Harraway,
etc.). We can see very quickly that the possibilities for self-actualization and selfarticulation are severely circumscribed by these overlapping parameters of constructed
subjectivity, and so it looks like the act of narrating one’s self is merely a regurgitation of

Justus, Chapter One 18
the various social scripts embedded in each of the above contexts and identity categories.
Moreover, as Diana Fuss suggests, even one’s choices in identification (or “finding
oneself” outside of one’s self), are severely limited by the various social contexts
associated with the above categories (see Identification Papers). In short, giving an
account of oneself looks less like agency and more like an involuntarily followed
imperative.
Giving an account thus may be a compulsion to use narrative to traverse time in
the suturing of self to various identity categories: a retroactive act that places the
development of one’s identity on a timeline of chronological causality wherein each
component of subjectivity intuitively feels inevitably drawn from seemingly essentialized
articulations of gender, race, and sexuality; wherein class and styles of consumption are
spatialized (as in the case of Goldberg’s periphractic spaces which I discuss in Chapter
Three); wherein one’s worldview seems similarly spatialized and essentialized (as in the
case where one thinks of oneself as having been born into a religious belief system, a
political and ideological leaning); and so on.
It is this urge to suture self to categorical identity via narrative that informs our
urge to provide narrative accompaniment to the images and video generated through
surveillance technologies and practices. But, of course, narrative has its own problems.
In much the same way that the narrative accompaniment to visual information is often
charged by the ideological lens through which it is perceived, so too are the stories we
generate about our own identities. Moreover, in both cases, narrative is subject to
embellishment, exaggeration, faulty memory, and so on.3 Add to this the inherent blind
spots of surveillance – both literal blind spots (or places that fall outside of the visual

Justus, Chapter One 19
field) and metaphorical ones (subjects or situations that surveillance fails to comprehend
because they fall outside of the hierarchical order) – and we can see that identity in the
visual field is terribly unstable and subject to many conundrums. Thus the relationship
between surveillance and subjectivity synecdochically represents the broader conundrums
of identity formation itself.
Our tacit acknowledgement that subjectivity is ultimately a complex construction
that manifests itself in spatialized contexts charged with various performative demands
(such as those associated with race, gender, class, and so on) ostensibly triggers the
aforementioned agency panic (see also Melley); and, given the constraints of this
particular perspective, rightly so. As I’ve already suggested, one reaction to this panic
regarding the assemblage of one’s self is often externalized culturally through the
constructions of conspiracy theories, whose shifting but always accommodating narrative
framework often mirrors the narrative structure we employ to explain our selves to
ourselves. If a conspiracy theory is essentially a story whose end is known and towards
which any information can be made to point, then identity as such is one in which the
result (the “who I am now”) is known, and all information that we choose to fit into this
narrative framework can be viewed as pointing towards an inevitable conclusion.
While this model of understanding identity is certainly interesting, and perhaps
occasionally practical, I would like to take a different approach: one that suggests that
recording the blind spots of centralized power from marginalized positions is an act of
agency unfettered from the restraints of paranoia or agency panic. For this model, I will
draw from systems theory – particularly the writings of Niklas Luhman (Social Systems),
Gregory Bateson (Steps to an Ecology of Mind), Cary Wolfe (Critical Environments), and
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Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (The Tree of Knowledge) – to examine
identity as an autopoietic (literally, self-creating) product that results from overlapping
social systems that work within the context of a specific environment (be it literal, as in
the cases of spatialized performative imperatives, or metaphorical, as in the case of
creating oneself inside the parameters of identity categories like race, gender, sexual
orientation, and class).
“Everything begins from now—I am reborn”: Susan Sontag and Autopoiesis
Systems theory tells us that the perspective of any system contains blind spots
visible only to another observing system. In other words, you see things that I don’t; or,
to paraphrase Niklas Luhmann’s anecdote (and anecdotes in Luhmann’s massive and
dense Social Systems are rare, so perhaps it’s worth mentioning), this is why the marriage
made in heaven goes to hell in the automobile (I’m guessing that Luhmann was married
to a back-seat driver). Moreover, second-order observation does not just see what firstorder observation misses, it also observes the fundamental difference between a system
and its environment. In Kate Hayles’s words, it is through second-order observation that
we “make the cut,” or that we differentiate between a primary system and its
environment. Without this distinction, system and environment are entangled in a “mass
of undifferentiated tissue” (“Making the Cut,” 71).
A system, having been distinguished from its environment, becomes autopoietic:
a phrase coined by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in their study on selfreproducing, biological cells and appropriated most famously by Luhmann and Gregory
Bateson in their applications of the concept to social and communicative systems, the
phrase autopoiesis essentially means “self-referential, or discursive, self-creation.”4 The
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most common example of the autopoietic machine is the thermostat:5 a machine designed
to promote a homeostatic state (in this case, a constant temperature) by circulating
information (fluctuations in temperature) and taking its own output (heat) as input
(temperature). It is autopoietic insofar that it functions to perpetuate the conditions of its
own existence by circulating the “difference that makes a difference” (Bateson’s phrase)
or the information upon which its operation is contingent. The continued and evolving
existence of living systems can be discussed in this way as well: If survival is a
homeostatic state, then biological changes that occur within a species through adaptation
would constitute the information circulated by the system to promote autopoiesis.
In the words of Maturana and Verela, change within the autopoietic unity “occurs
in the unity from moment to moment, either as a change triggered by interactions coming
from the environment in which it exists or as a result of its internal dynamics” (74). In
other words, change within the system’s environment may effect a change within the
system, but this change only represents a modification of the system’s internal dynamics
that facilitate its own autopoietic perpetuation. While, then, the thermostat exemplifies
the mechanism that functions autopoietically, particularly insofar that it continually
interacts with its environment to regulate and perpetuate the conditions of its own
existence, the thermostat does not replicate itself. Thus it is autopoetic only insofar that it
creates the output that it takes as its own input: temperature, or heat. And in this way,
the thermostat represents a closed system. As an example of an autopoietic system that is
both self-perpetuating and self-regulating, we might consider the virus (both the human
virus and the computer virus work for this example, but I will focus on the human virus).
The virus is a closed system that exists within a specific environment (the human body)
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whose environmental changes (such as white blood cells) become the occasion for the
virus to make necessary internal, structural changes which, while they do not affect the
organization of the unity, perpetuate a homeostatic state - survival (see Maturana and
Varela 74). Unlike the thermostat, however, the virus is also autopoietic insofar that it is
self-replicating.
I will later examine some of Susan Sontag’s work as an example of subjective
autopoiesis – or an identity formation that takes its own output as input in the process of
creating (and replicating) itself, but in order to further contextualize Sontag’s relevance to
a project on surveillance, I will first examine her approach to photography and the
circulation of photographic images. I should note that Sontag is significant for this aim in
two ways: First, Sontag’s brilliant polemic approach to the relationship between
photography and culture allows us to see how the two – photography and culture – have
shaped each other. And, second, Sontag also offers a model for understanding the
narrative accompaniment to visual information as a method of both interpretation and
second-order observation. Later, I will illustrate the ways in which Sontag functioned as
her own second-order observer in her personal journals.
Sontag’s brilliant book On Photography (1973) is characteristically prescient. In
it, she observes that “the camera record incriminates” and that “[i]n another version of its
utility, the camera record justifies,” or that it “passes for incontrovertible proof that a
given thing happened,” despite what distortions may be embedded in the still image itself
(5). She examines the “aggression implicit in every use of the camera” and the ways in
which taking “a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality,
vulnerability, mutability” (7, 15). And she notes that a caption that accompanies a
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photograph “is the missing voice, and it is expected to speak for truth. But even an
entirely accurate caption is only one interpretation, necessarily a limiting one, of the
photograph to which it is attached” (108-9). In other words, as I’ve already suggested,
verbal accompaniment to captured images is always interpretive and subject to the
problems and shortcomings of narrative.
Thirty years later, Sontag responds to On Photography with a follow-up: 2003’s
Regarding the Pain of Others. In it, she addresses the ways in which we have become
numb to the images of pain and suffering: that, where once the iconic images of, for
example, the Vietnam war triggered reactions of outrage, horror, and empathy, similar
pictures of America’s Twenty-First Century wars in the Middle-East have, contextually,
become more commonplace and tend to be comparably innocuous and ineffectual in
triggering public response. In her own words: “Flooded with images of the sort that
once used to shock and arouse indignation, we are losing our capacity to react.
Compassion, stretched to its limits, is going numb” (108). Additionally, Sontag observes
the ways in which television and social media has facilitated a “society of spectacle”:
“Each situation has to be turned into a spectacle to be real—that is, interesting—to us.
People themselves aspire to become images: celebrities. Reality has abdicated. There
are only representations: media” (109). In other words, Sontag suggests (as have others,
see for example, Zizek’s “Welcome to the Desert of the Real” and Anna McCarthy’s
Ambient Television) that the television mediates and often dictates our perceptions and
interpretations of the real. She also suggests (again, as others have) that television culture
has collapsed the regimes of surveillance and spectacle in a way that suggests we can all
be celebrities (one need only watch a single episode of the seemingly exponentially
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growing number of “reality-television” programs, including the early example and
appropriately named Big Brother, to see this at work).
I would add to this that these twinned phenomena – the dulling of our compassion
through desensitization and the rise of the cultural urge to act like idiots for the television
camera – are also products of self-circulating, autopoietic systems, or social systems of
perception and behavior that create and recreate themselves. In other words, “reality”
entertainment exists to perpetuate itself, and, much like a virus, its side-effects help to
secure the environmental conditions for its continued existence through self-perpetuation.
For example, the function of the nightly news is to circulate images of pain, suffering,
and loss not to shock, horrify, or arouse compassion, but instead to allow us to remain
numb to the pain of others. And the function of reality television is not as much to
promote the culture of celebrity as it is to replace our lost compassion for others with a
reptilian association or identification with the worst humanity has to offer. The pain we
feel for others is thus not in reaction to scenes of pain, but it is the delightful, voyeuristic
pain we experience in the face of “common celebrity.” These systems will continue to
perpetuate themselves in some form or another, and they will change or evolve when it is
necessary for their survival. In any case, they will remain self-creating systems that use
society as the environment for self-perpetuation.6
But other mechanisms of identification and subjectivity circulate themselves
through individuals or groups as well. One might say that one’s understanding of one’s
self, even as part of a narrative process, is simultaneously descriptive and creative. Just
as each act of narrating what falls within the visual field both articulates a subjective
perspective and creates new interpretive possibilities, so too does the act of perceiving
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and articulating one’s self also aid in the process of literally composing one’s self. In
other words, and for example, autobiography is part of a perceptual mode of subjective
autopoiesis. And once one realizes this, one can make deliberate choices regarding selfcreation.
As I discuss in much greater detail in Chapter Two, this is exactly the case for
Hasan Elahi, whose Tracking Transience project depicts a series of first-order
observations that, strung together, tell a visual story about where Elahi goes, what he
consumes, what he wastes, and so on. But, as I discuss in greater detail later, Elahi
highlights the blind spots of this system (Elahi’s own body disappears in these spots) and
toys with our urge to narrate what we see. In so doing, Elahi’s project offers us the
option of constructing a narrative in much the same way that conspiracy theories do:
There is a wealth of information that needs only be assembled together in a narrative
framework which can be made to point to a retrospectively inevitable conclusion.
And in other cases of autobiographical record, we can see subjective autopoiesis
at work. Sontag offers an excellent example of just this. Beginning in 1947, when
Sontag was just 14 years old, and going through 1963, her recently published personal
journals (published as Reborn in 2008) represent more than the evidence of the
development of an exceedingly brilliant mind; more than the chronicles of the discovery
of sexual desire and the forging of identity; and far more than a catalog of the events that
shaped Sontag’s personal development. Among other things, the journals represent a
history of a conscious self-creation that repeatedly illustrate that Sontag was writing for a
reader, and that this reader – imagined or projected – was meant to play a role in the
forging of Sontag’s identity.
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In the language of systems theory, Sontag’s journals primarily represent her firstorder observations. They begin with a catalog of beliefs which clearly come from a
mind far sharper than the typical 14-year old’s, and throughout, the journals contain lists
of books to read; reactions to lectures, literature, film, and music; musings on sexual
experimentation and desire; chronicles of a day’s events; definitions of popular slang
terms; and admonishments to herself which range from reminding herself to never
publicly criticize anyone at Harvard to shower at least every other day. Moreover,
Sontag’s retrospective marginalia makes it clear that she was also interested in recording
the second-order observations of her previously recorded primary perspective. For
example, on Christmas Day of 1948, Sontag writes “What, I ask, drives me to disorder?
How can I diagnose myself? All I feel, most immediately, is the most anguished need for
physical love and mental companionship—I am very young, and perhaps the disturbing
aspect of my sexual ambitions will be outgrown—frankly, I don’t care.” Her response,
written on May 31 of the following year is “Nor should you.”
While an analysis of Sontag’s journals represents a conceptual shift from
analyzing visual surveillance to examining textual self-surveillance, the recording of
first- and second-order observations is nonetheless significant. Sontag’s journals
illustrate the textual process of subjective autopoiesis. Representing an examination of
the self that is at once creative and interrogative; autopoietic and critically observational,
the journals are the record of the autopoietic process of forging an identity through
literally composing one’s self. Moreover, they are the evidence of a retrospective
perspective of this process that temporally dislocates Sontag from herself so that she
becomes the second-order observer of her first-order perspective. On October 24, 1956,
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Sontag writes that “[i]n philosophy the snake swallows its tail; thinking, about thinking—
two senses of ‘thinking.’ Thinking is philosophy; thinking1=the sciences.” Sontag’s
metaphorical application of the ouroborus to scientific thought coupled with her
metafictional marginalia suggests that she makes of herself the object of her own
scientific inquiry. She was often her own reader.
On December 31, 1957, in an entry entitled “On Keeping a Journal,” Sontag
writes “[s]uperficial to understand the journal as just a receptacle for one’s private, secret
thoughts—like a confidante who is deaf, dumb, and illiterate. In the journal I do not just
express myself more openly than I could do to any person; I create myself.” And I think
she does. Through an accumulative process of self-creation through second order
observation and meta-commentary, Sontag records blind spots through their omission.
And here, I mean that she records her blind spots first by leaving them out, and second by
retrospectively commenting on them. In this way, Sontag’s metacommentary on her own
process of self-creation creates a feedback loop in which Sontag herself functions as the
separation and suture of its two ends. The ouroroburus is thus the perfect metaphor for
this process of autopoietic composition.
Again, a system must close in on itself in order to be separate from its
environment. And it is this closure that creates blind spots. On one hand, it is as simple
as the fact that you literally do not see yourself from your own perspective; on the other
hand, it is as complicated as knowing that it takes an outside observer to see a system
apart from its environment, and so you never fully see this distinction that defines you.
For the project of Sontag’s self-creation to be complete, an outside observer is necessary.
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Through looking back, Sontag places herself in the role of a second-order observer, and
through her metacommentary, provides the externalized perspective upon which the
definition of the boundaries of her identity is contingent. And so we might say that
Sontag creates herself through the composure of her disclosure.
“How to ‘Facebook’ in Three Easy Steps: Self-Disclosure, Erasure, and You”
Opportunities for self-disclosure on Facebook quickly go viral once they’re
created – from memes like “16, 25, 50 or [whatever number you want] Random Things
About Me” to “My Top Five Favorite [fill in the blank],” the massive proliferation of
opportunities to share seemingly autobiographical information provides the willing
participant ample opportunity to narcissistically indulge in spinning the wheel of toomuch-information. This system places an imperative on the “tagged” readers to not only
comment on one’s “Random Things” but also to perpetuate the meme by writing 25
Random Things About Themselves. These memes have already been discussed as
mutating viruses, and, as such, are fairly autopoietic in their own right. The “Random
Things” meme, for example, started with the instruction to write 16 Random Things and
tag 16 friends who are then required to follow suit. Once its popularity began to decline,
and thus its life was threatened, it evolved into its 10, 15, 25, and even 100 random things
incarnations. And once “Random Things” were no longer enough to perpetuate the
meme’s continued existence, it evolved into “More Specific Things,” asking the
Facebook user to “randomly” list 15 favorite artists, musicians, authors, films, etc.
The meme as an autopoietic system itself is certainly interesting, but to push
forward into the consideration of the virtual expressions of identity, I want to consider the
ways in which these memes facilitate the illusion that Facebook is an appropriate and
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acceptable public venue for self-disclosure. See for example, Reiko Ohnuma’s 2008
Facebook SNAFU. A professor of religion at Dartmouth University, Ohnuma failed to
set her security settings to private and thus exposed some embarrassing confessions about
preparing for class by getting information on Wikipedia along with a few jabs at her
“blowhard” colleagues. I don’t want to make too much of Ohnuma’s indiscretion – we’re
all human, and may he who is without internet blunder cast the first anonymously posted
inflammatory comment – but I do want to note how freely and carelessly Ohnuma put
this information online. In fact, from the look of it, for some users anyway, Facebook
intuitively feels like an appropriate venue for full self-disclosure. And, I think we can
find evidence of excessive disclosure in Facebook in not just “notes” such as “15
Random things about me;” and not just in “Wall” comments and status updates; but also
in the host of other media incorporated into the Facebook framework.
In comparison to Sontag’s journals – in which she reminds herself to never
publicly criticize other academics – Ohnuma’s openness is striking. Where, in the case of
the former, Sontag uses a recognizably private venue to compose herself for the
possibility of public reading; in the case of the latter, Ohnuma uses a public venue with a
clear readership to make comments that should have been private. In both cases, I think,
we get a sense of a brand of autopoeisis through self-composure and disclosure; however,
underpinning the allure of opportunity for virtual disclosure is the common and
communal knowledge of the inherent fictions and falsities represented on Facebook. On
one hand, we see several diegetic instances of folks saying, “This is me. This.
Represents Me” along with many mimetic instances of folks essentially saying, “Look.
This is what I do. This is me, too.” On the other hand, we intuitively know that “This is
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also not me,” and so we understand that, on the level of metacommentary, Facebook
represents a metafictional take on the autopoietic process of self-creation. Where Sontag
had the privacy to imagine a readership that would take her self-creation through stylized
disclosure seriously, the virtual subject is forced to publicly acknowledge the inherent
disappearance of the self through public disclosure.
And so Facebook creates a hall of mirrors that erases identity through the
repetition of the representation of the postmodern subject. In other words, Facebook not
only provides a venue for autopoietic expression, but it also opens this expression to the
interpretive perspective of a network of second-order observation. Facebook does make
room for the idea that “if you put it out there, it becomes true,” or that, to some degree,
one does compose one’s self online; however, it also enables the Facebooker to circulate
such a massive amount of information – through diegetic mini-narratives about, for
example, the heternormative narrative arc beginning with who you dated in high school
and ending with whether or not you married the person you dated in high school – that it
begins to look more like a chaotic white noise of falsified, exaggerated, and heavily
groomed information. Moreover, the massive amount of video and images posted on and
circulated by Facebook does as much to scatter the subject’s body into a million tiny
pixels as it does to invite an infinite regress of second-order observation. And so the
allure of disclosure is also the invitation to disappear in a massive proliferation of
information (as Hasan Elahi does in his Tracking Transience project).
On The Office: The Blind Spot in the Corporate Body
To finish this introduction and to tie these various threads together, I want to look
briefly at NBC’s now long-running sit-com The Office. Adapted for American audiences
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in 2005 from the British version created by Ricky Gervais, The Office draws from filming
techniques and narrative structures popularized most notably by reality television. The
entirety of the show is filmed with what are meant to be handheld cameras by an unseen
crew, and much of what is filmed (and ostensibly edited) is narrated or explained during
“talking head” or “confession booth” moments wherein a central character talks directly
to the camera to interpret, explain, or comment upon the events that have just been aired.
Occasionally, the footage captured by the crew is supplemented by video footage from
surveillance cameras in the Scranton, PA business park, in which the Dunder-Mifflin
paper company (The Office’s office) is located, and other private sources, such as boss
Michael Scott’s handheld video camera which he repeatedly uses to record apology
videos and workplace instructional videos.
The conceit of the show has grown with every season: that there is a central
purpose for the presence of the camera crew in the office of a paper company. Early in
the series, viewers are meant to assume that the crew is there to record a documentary on
American office life. As the series continued, it became clear that The Office was meant
to parody the reality show genre and that the show The Office was itself the justification
for the presence of the cameras located in the fictional office. And so we viewers are
both the fictional audience for whom this fictional, documentary / reality show is
intended and the external audience aware of the central conceit. The Office puts the
viewer in the position to observe what happens in the office both from the viewpoint
inside the fictional world of the show and outside of that world. We are enabled to
observe our observations. And we can see that the camera crew need be neither fictional
nor “real.” It is both.

Justus, Chapter One 32
We viewers are thus put in an interesting position. We are asked to be complicit
with our role as insiders, or as the fictional audience for whom the show is ostensibly
intended, while remaining outside of The Office’s fictional world. We are thus also
second-order observers of two types: We can see inside the fictional world where others
can’t, and we can step away from that world to see what the others can’t: That the largest
blind spot created by the camera crew is itself the conceit that falls behind the cameras’
lenses. We are thus located at the point where the camera crew sutures reality and
fiction.
Our position in this narrative structure is that of the second-order observers of
both The Office’s fictional world and of the television show of the same name. As such,
we are invited to construct a reality based on our perspective of the inherent blind spots
circulated by the show’s camera crew. In Critical Environments, Carey Wolfe notes that
All systems […] are constituted by a necessary “blind spot” that only other
observing systems can see, and the process of social reproduction depends on the
“unfolding,” the distribution and circulation, of these constitutive paradoxes
(which would otherwise block systemic self-reproduction) by a plurality of
observing systems – not by observation but by “the observation of observation”
(66).
Katherine Hayles has similarly noted the necessity of “an infinite regress” of secondorder observation to approximate a perspective of the world that is consistent with a lived
reality. In other words, as second-order observers, we are in the position to do what one
does inside of the narrative framework of conspiracy theory: draw from the information
at our disposal to construct a story about what happens in the visual field. Our stories are
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then corroborated inside of the show during the confessional moments wherein the
characters speak directly into the camera. These confessions are meant to further
augment the material that ostensibly falls outside of the perceptual framework inside of
the show: In this regard, we are second-order observers alongside each individual
character in the show who can see the blind spots recorded both inside of the show and
out.
When hierarchical surveillance is conducted in the fictional world of The Office,
such as when the corporate offices demand that all email accounts be monitored
(“dataveillance”), or as when private images are accidentally spread through the
corporation’s listservs, another diegetic layer is added to the show’s format. When this
happens, we see characters “letting down their guard” for the fictional camera crew while
the “real” camera crew captures something that “feels” closer to their true character. And
so the presence of surveillance within this particular narrative causes the system to come
full circle: It is the occasion for the characters to cease being characters. In so doing, the
narrative’s verisimilitude is further bolstered.
The Office is one manifestation of a different but equally culturally pervasive
notion: that cameras are everywhere, and that this fact need not be the occasion for
paranoia. Instead, rather than be on a continual regulatory record, we are instead given
the hope of spreading our lateral perspectives through networks of visual capture and
circulation. What happens in the camera’s field of vision must be narrated or explained,
but not by authoritative voices. Instead, those inside of this visual narrative framework
are free to provide narrative accompaniment to captured footage. And, even so, we see
that there are still blind spots that only we viewers, as second- or third- order observers
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can see. The Office is thus a contemporary realization of much of what I’ll present in this
dissertation.
In Chapter Two (“The Body in the Blind Spot”) I examine the ways in which
privatized surveillance systems open blind spots that evacuate bodily representations of
subjectivity. In that chapter, I draw from the aforementioned Tracking Transience
project alongside Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis as contemporary examples of such
disappearances and erasures. In Chapter Three (“Institutionalized Surveillance and the
Regulation of Race”), I discuss the conflation of race and socio-economic status to
examine the ways in which race is surveilled in periphractic – or socio-ecomonically
marginalized – spaces (as depicted, for example, in HBO’s crime-drama series The Wire).
Perhaps more importantly, in Chapter Three I examine specific instances in which
borrowing the camera’s authority brings credibility to the articulations of racially and
socio-economically marginalized perspectives (as it does in the case of the killing of
Oscar Grant III) and the ways in which this phenomenon manifests in postmodern
narrative structures (as it does in Anna Deavere-Smith’s Twilight: Los Angeles, 1991). In
Chapter Four (“Private Parts in Public Places”), I examine the surveillance of gender in
public places (such as the public men’s room and the airport) and focus on the ways in
which such surveillance regulates heteronormative scripts for public behavior. In this
chapter, I focus on the central character of Jeffrey Euginedes’s Middlesex, Cal, as well as
issues regarding the transgender individual’s experience in the public airport to imagine a
beacon of hope for future developments in the political sphere that would ensure greater
equality for people who don’t neatly identify with gender binary categories. I finish this
dissertation in Chapter Five (“Dataveillance: DataNarratives in the Age of Information
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Proliferation”) by turning towards other methods of surveillance (such as dataveillance
and data-mining) to further discuss the subversive power of triangulating methods of
capturing information and subsequently disseminating it. I argue that this triangulation
has impacted both the form and content of emerging narratives, such as Jennifer Egan’s A
Visit from the Goon Squad (2010) and that has likewise had (and will continue to have) a
profound impact on the socio-political sphere (as it has in the Arab Spring and Occupy
Wall Street movements).

1

See University of California, Berkeley’s Jennifer King, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and Steven Raphael study of
“the effectiveness of the City of San Francisco’s Community Safety Camera (CSC) program” (6).
2
I have chosen to focus primarily on visual surveillance largely because I see the relationship between
visual surveillance and subjectivity to be most obviously synecdochic of the larger issue of subjectivity
construction and performance in the public sphere. For my argument, the process of narrating the visual
field is the connecting tissue between surveillance and subjectivity, so that the narrative framework of
conspiracy theory provides a model for the narrative framework of a process of identity formation wherein
visual information becomes the data for both expressing and understanding public subjectivities.
3
For more, see Linda Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism.
4
When Maturana and Varela coined the phrase autopoiesis in The Tree of Knowledge they were originally
speaking of self-reproducing, single-celled organisms. So, in the case of each human’s monozygotic
beginnings, a single cell splits into two equally parts, and each part splits again, and so on until the cells
begin to differentiate into the different parts of what ultimately becomes recognized as a human being.
Nicklas Luhmann most famously applies this concept to Social Systems. Gregory Bateson, in Steps to an
Ecology of Mind, uses the concept to discuss several social and psychological systems (most interestingly,
if not most entertainingly, Bateson interprets Alcoholics Anonymous as an autopoietic system). More
recently, Cary Wolfe continues the discussion of autopoiesis in the context of postmodern theory.
5
Nicklas Luhmann, in Social Systems, uses the example of the thermostat to describe the ways in which
social systems circulate and perpetuate the conditions of their own existence. This example is borrowed by
several theorists in the double issue of Cultural Critique (issues 30 and 31, Spring and Fall 1995) edited by
Carey Wolfe and William Rasch.
6
See Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems and Art as a Social System for more on the use of society as an
environment for the actualization and autopoiesis of a social system.
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Chapter Two:
The Body and Its Image: The Failure of Surveillance as a Narrative Apparatus
Translated from the French word surveiller, which literally means “to over see,”
“supervise,” or “watch from above,” the word surveillance both metaphorically refers to
the act of watching from a socially, economically, or politically hierarchical vantage
point and literally watching from an elevated physical space. Both metaphorically and
literally, what it seeks to capture is always perceived and articulated from a vantage point
that must necessarily ignore or dismiss lateral viewpoints. Physically, surveillance
cameras are typically placed in elevated vantage points that facilitate greater ranges of
visibility. Metaphorically, such cameras are also ideologically charged by the
hierarchical purposes they serve: to regulate visually circumscribed spaces. In this
sense, a surveillance camera’s physical placement replicates its ideological aims: to
protect visually circumscribed space, public and private, from theft and damage; to
monitor and regulate subjects within its visual field; and to “watch from above.”
Moreover, surveillance cameras “capture” the motion of bodies in and through
circumscribed space, and this capture may carry its hierarchical authority into what
ultimately becomes an authoritative narrative account (as it often is, for example, in the
courtroom) of the body in visually circumscribed space.
Thankfully, authoritative narrative accounts informed by the surveillance camera
can be undermined by contemporary shifts in surveillance practices as well as the
proliferation of privatized surveillance technologies: shifts from what Michel Foucault
describes as “Panoptic” practice to something seemingly more rhizomatic, or dispersed
and nebulously interconnected, as is often the case in the use of second-generation
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surveillance technologies. In the case of panoptic practice, a centralized and hierarchical
power structure that functions as a topological method of control is mapped onto
ideological state apparatuses (such as the factory, the hospital, the school, or the prison)i
that carry the weight of an unseen “eye of power” whose gaze ideologically regulates all
who come within its visual field. In the case of a rhizomatic approach, the widespread
distribution of second-generation surveillance technologies and systems facilitates the
illusion that they could be interconnected, even if, and at best, only retroactively so; and
thus a rhizomatic dispersion is less a strategic, topological structure informed by
hierarchical order and more of a shifting, tactical structure that can be implemented
regardless of space or ideology. While the dispersion of surveillance technologies
challenges the hierarchical, or “top-down,” model of surveillance, most theoretical
analyses of surveillance that consider this dispersion suggest that the ultimate aim of
surveillance is still invested in regulatory power.ii Although I concede that continued
consideration of surveillance in the context of regulatory control is important to the
ongoing discourse on surveillance and culture, I assert that the proliferation of visual
surveillance technologies – such as cell phone cameras and web cams – provides a
multiplicity of perspectives that undermine centralized and hierarchical approaches to
authoritative interpretations of visual information; and thus this dispersion also disperses
the regulatory power typically connected to hierarchical surveillance practices.
Moreover, I posit that the proliferation of lateral viewpoints, or non-hierarchical
perspectives, increases the amount of visual information from which we might construct
narratives that describe and interpret the visual field. The proliferation of surveillance
technologies and practices can thus be liberating and empowering.
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Despite claims that the proliferation of surveillance technologies broadens the
gaze of hierarchical power structures, the proliferation scatters and fragments the totality
of the gaze. It is only when disparate and scattered systems are retrospectively linked for
the purpose of reconstructing a narrative account does the observer see through the
mediated gaze of retroactively triangulated surveillance systems. Take, for example, the
story of Hani Hanjour, the terrorist pilot of Flight 77 who, on September 11, crashed the
hijacked commercial airliner into the Pentagon after taking off from Dulles International
Airport in Washington DC. Hanjour’s story goes something like this: After failing twice
to obtain a pilot’s license in 1996 and 1997, Hanjour was awarded the license – despite,
as reports tell us, his weak flying skills and poor English – by a branch of the Pan Am
International Flight Company in Scottsdale, AZ (Yardley A10).iii In the early days of
September 2001, Hanjour, along with five others who were themselves later identified as
terrorists aboard Flight 77, signed up for a week-long membership at a Gold’s Gym in
Greenbelt, MD, and, as the New York Times reports, paid $30 in cash from “a wad of
money” (“5 Terror Suspects” B4). Then, after being photographed by an ATM camera
along with the aforementioned five other terrorists – Hanjour’s penultimate known
appearance on camera which was later presented as positive proof that he was associated
with the other known hijackers – Hanjour traveled to the Dulles Airport on the morning
of September 11 following his fellow hijackers. Like his accomplices, he set off metal
detectors, but unlike most of the other hijackers, he was not subject to additional
screening (“Surveillance Video Shows” A19).
Taken from written reports and interviews of flight school instructors and
students, the guest registry of a public gym, an ATM camera snapshot, and images from

Justus, Chapter Two 39
the surveillance system at the Dulles airport security checkpoint, this is, from one
perspective, a story about a man who was a poor pilot, interested in working out, friends
with men who had ATM cards, and who passed through additional airport screening after
a magnetometer detected what was presumably the box cutter he carried (which, at the
time, was legal). Viewed retroactively as a timeline of chronological causality tainted by
the perspective of the “end of the story,” so to speak, the story is about a man who trained
to fly a commercial airliner into the Pentagon in an act of suicidal terrorism. Each detail,
from speaking poor English at flight school to paying for a gym membership in cash
rather than credit to being associated with the other hijackers, is plugged into this master
narrative that, in its internal structure, mirrors the framework of conspiracy theory. I
don’t mean to acquit Hanjour of his guilt nor lessen the severity of his actions: he was
most certainly responsible for a horrendous act of suicidal terrorism on September 11,
2001, and it would be both difficult and unnecessary to provide a reading of the visual
information that would suggest otherwise. What I do want to point out is that, ultimately,
the story of Hani Hanjour is a cautionary tale: even if only in retrospect, the postmodern
subject is always on the record, informed by visual information and interpreted into a
retrospective narrative framework, and this record ultimately becomes the authoritative
narrative account. Moreover, prevailing narrative trends tend to get retroactively
“plugged into” such narrative accounts. In this case, the pervasive American narrative
that casts Middle Eastern Muslims as terrorists becomes mapped onto the larger
explanatory narrative.
Such retroactive constructions of explanatory narrative usually link together
historical facts (or, as is the case for Hani Hanjour, ostensibly objective visual
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information) with predominant ideologies by imbuing them with current, pervasive,
ideological perspectives. This process, though, is arguably as much an act of
interpretation as it is explanation. In the words of Alan Nadel, “[i]n personal experience,
as it is in culture, the fissure between event and history is broached by narrative” (3). But
the linkage between event and history by narrative is problematic at best: narrative is
articulated from a limited perspective; it is subject to falsifications, exaggerations, faulty
memory, and conventions that sacrifice objectivity for the appearance of chronological
causality, and it ultimately fails to represent that which it intends to articulate, describe,
or otherwise give voice to. Simply put, narrative is an act of interpretation. As such, it is
also an act of translation, of passing information through the filter of subjective
mediation. As the story of Hani Hanjour illustrates, once the “end of the story” is known,
then interpretations of information become retrospectively charged with the imperative to
move towards this seemingly inevitable end. Visual surveillance technologies are thus
affected by the problems of interpretive narrative: their metaphorical and literal
hierarchical perspectives create blind spots that ignore lateral viewpoints from outside
perspectives, and the hierarchical perspectives are ultimately embedded in the narratives
they are used to generate. I would suggest, then, that the authority of the visual record
can thus be challenged, augmented, or undermined by a proliferation of privatized or
second-generation surveillance technologies that provide lateral perspectives. In other
words, the greater number of perspectives that fall outside of institutionalized and
hierarchical surveillance practices, the greater the possibility for challenging the authority
of the visual image and the greater the possibility for granting authority to perspectives
that would otherwise be marginalized by the dominant order.iv
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As the instance of the retrospectively triangulated surveillance system involved in
weaving together a narrative thread about Hani Hanjour further illustrates, the authority
of the camera and its relationship to the subject under surveillance often goes
unquestioned; however, particularly in recent years, the incredulousness of “reality”
television, the proliferation of “Photoshopped images,” and the massive amount of selfcirculated visual information via social media have called into question the stability of
the relationship between the mediation of the camera and its relationship to
interpretations of visual information. The instability of this relationship has become an
increasingly common concern expressed in American culture and its cultural products.
For example, in literature, Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy (1987) and his Travels in the
Scriptorium (2007) each depict characters for whom watching from a limited vantage
point determines the ways in which we “read” what they see;v and Don DeLillo’s
Cosmopolis (2003) offers a protagonist, Eric Packer, whose very being is so intertwined
with his privatized and massively dispersed surveillance systems that the visual story they
present about Packer ultimately accelerates and scripts Packer’s demise while calling into
question the privileging of visual information. In film, a tradition of the problem of
“reading” a closed perspective, ranging from Hitchcock’s Rear Window (1954) through
more recent films such as Vantage Point (2008) and Eagle Eye (2008), highlights the
cultural paranoia underpinning the breakdown of privileged perspective and authoritative
accounts. In cultural, virtual instantiations of autobiographical accounts that draw from
the camera’s authority as a storytelling device – and here I refer to social media spaces
such as MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube – we see that the privatization and
proliferation of visual surveillance technology turns everyone into a potential, visual
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storyteller. Cultural figures, such as the performance artists New York City Players, who
stage scenes in public surveillance spaces meant to be watched by those behind the
surveillance cameras’ lens, as well as digital artist Hasan Elahi, who uses the surveillance
camera to weave a vast narrative of the proliferation of visual information, highlight the
problem of the camera as an authoritative and seemingly objective narrative device.
Drawing from DeLillo’s Cosmopolis and Elahi’s ongoing self-surveillance project
Tracking Transience for examples of the postmodern character caught in a triangulated
system of visual surveillance, interpretive narrative, and performative imperatives, I
analyze the problematic relationship between seemingly objective visual information and
the stories we tell about the postmodern subject. Ultimately, I assert that, caught in a vast
network of visual surveillance, the postmodern subject is entrenched in a complex
narrative system broken into disparate and disconnected parts. Moreover, I posit that, in
surveillance footage, images of the body metonymically replace the presence of the body
to suggest that the body functions best as its image. First-generation surveillance
technologies carry the hierarchical authority that originally initiated the replacement of
the postmodern body by its image, while second-generation technology enables the
postmodern subject to further participate in this visual decorporealization.vi For example,
in the case of the protagonist Eric Packer of DeLillo’s Cosmopolis, we see that the
dispersion of a massive, first-generation surveillance system also disperses images of the
body, and that, depending on the perspective of the camera, the ways in which the body is
narrated depend upon the camera’s vantage point. In the case of Elahi’s Tracking
Transience project, we can see that the privatization of surveillance technology allows
the subject greater control of the role of his “avatar,” or digitalized visual representation.
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Specifically, in Tracking Transience, the body of the subject is only present in the visual
field through metonymies of bodily activity, such as travel and consumption, and we see
that the narratives we create from the visual information of bodily activity replace the
implied bodily referent. Where Packer’s body is evacuated through a virtual hall of
mirrors created by a massive dispersion of surveillance cameras, each watching both
Packer and each other, Elahi’s body disappears in the camera’s blind spots.vii
Paranoia and Conspiracy Theory as Interpretive Acts
Before examining Hasan Elahi’s Tracking Transience and Don DeLillo’s
Cosmopolis, I feel it is necessary to contend with the relationship between surveillance,
conspiracy, and paranoia. In part, a study on the relationship between surveillance and
identity itself risks sounding both paranoid and bit like conspiracy theory. And, perhaps,
since we suspect suspicion and avoid paranoia, we would be inclined to devalue a project
that resonates with these characteristics. Nevertheless, I assert that both paranoia and
conspiracy theory are interpretive acts that provide useful models for understanding the
narration of postmodern subjectivity from the perspective of the surveillance camera. For
example, studies on paranoia and the postmodern condition – studies I present in greater
detail below – have been useful for understanding the ways in which poststructuralism is
as much a cultural movement as it is a theoretical discourse, and they provide a method
of understanding some of the underpinning reactions to surveillance systems. Moreover,
paranoia, as Pat O’Donnell suggests, stems from postmodern subjectivity recognizing
itself as a social construction, and what else is a Foucauldian model of subjectivity under
surveillance if not a social construct? Similarly, conspiracy theory is also ultimately an
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interpretive act that turns relatively objective information into narrative in much the same
way that surveillance footage is often used as information for an accompanying narrative.
Critics such as Pat O’Donnell, Mark Fenster, Timothy Melley, and Alan Nadel
have posited that the paranoia embedded in the postmodern condition has been facilitated
by the breakdown of “Master Narratives” (in Lyotard’s famous formulation), perpetuated
by McCarthyism and the Cold War Communist witch hunts, and solidified by widespread
cultural knowledge of government conspiracies such as Watergate. Melley, for instance,
discusses paranoia and conspiracy theories as symptomatic cultural manifestations of
underlying, but pervasive, anxieties about social control. His phrase “agency panic”
describes “intense anxiety about an apparent loss of autonomy, the conviction that one’s
actions are being controlled by someone else or that one has been ‘constructed’ by
powerful, external agents” (vii). In the face of Foucault’s formulations of surveillance as
a mechanism of social control, it is unsurprising that the postmodern subject would, for
example, interpret the surveillance camera’s presence as a regulatory device and fear that
it replaces the autonomous perspective of the individual with an objective perspective
that undermines autonomy and agency.
Similarly, Fenster notes, as others have, that “within a presumably ‘postmodern’
era that marks the end of master narratives, conspiracy theorists posit highly and
imaginatively integrative analyses of individual pieces of evidence that do not provide
direct proof of conspiracy into an all-encompassing framework” (79). Along these lines,
conspiracy theory can be seen as not only a narrative strategy but also as an interpretive
practice wherein the ultimate aim is to get at the “truth” which is always “out there”
waiting to be discovered. Towards this end, conspiracy theorists “place links along an
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interpretive chain” (87) in an ongoing construction of the “truth” from what otherwise
may be disparate and only loosely connected materials.viii For the conspiracy theorist,
there is an ultimate solution to a conspiracy that objectively exists but remains hidden,
and the contextualized meaning and significance of each individual piece of evidence
becomes retroactively clear once the truth has been discovered. Ultimately, however, an
authoritative, reconstructed narrative that successfully solves the mystery of the
conspiracy would fail to qualify as a conspiracy theory, and thus would undo itself as
such. A conclusively “solvable” mystery cannot be a conspiracy. The “truth” of the
conspiracy is both what the conspiracy theorist desires but can never attain. As a circular
mode of interpretation, it is also, according to Fenster, productive – that is, it is “selfgenerating and forever flying through space and time” (95). As a productive mode of
interpretation, it may “tear the sign from its chain, to move, to produce new chains” (97).
In other words, the narrative practice of conspiracy theory generates a closed, internal
logic that, in turn, creates new and evolving situational meanings of signifiers and even
may generate new “objective” information.
It is tempting, then, to accept that paranoia is part of the postmodern condition
and assume that the familiarity of our “condition” would render continual subjection to
visual surveillance systems familiar – as an extension of the pre-existing condition, even.
Moreover, if we view conspiracy theories as narrative practices – recognizing that, as a
postmodern narrative framework, the logic of conspiracy theory suggests that “the truth is
out there” – then, coupled with the familiarity of continual surveillance, we might view
surveillance as an apparatus that assists in the collection of “objective” information that
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can be assembled into the construction of whatever truth we might seek, and thus it
would be yet another apparatus that facilitates what Melley calls “agency panic.”
However, as I previously posited, the distribution of surveillance technologies can
be both liberating and empowering for the postmodern subject: insofar as the
proliferation of second-generation surveillance technologies also increases the number of
perspectives, it also undermines the assumed hierarchical authority of first-generation
surveillance practices and replaces it with a multiplicity of authoritative viewpoints. The
postmodern proliferation of surveillance technologies provides the means of destabilizing
what has been perceived as the malevolent force of surveillance practices. Additional
streams of visual information provided by the privatization and distribution of
surveillance technologies opens multiple spaces and opportunities for non-hierarchical
perspectives to be presented with their own authority. In other words, the proliferation of
privatized surveillance systems adds authority to perspectives that have traditionally been
marginalized by hierarchical social and power structures. Moreover, the proliferation of
visual streams of information (and narrative interpretations and perspectives) also creates
a chaotic “white noise” of visual information in which, as Hasan Elahi illustrates, the
postmodern body has the opportunity to disappear. In sum, the proliferation of visual
information returns agency to those who are robbed of it by regulatory power and it
provides an excess of material for the construction of interpretive narratives. The excess
of interpretations and perspectives opens a space for the postmodern subject to either
borrow the camera’s authority or to disappear in a primordial ooze of visual information.
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The (Mal)Function of Surveillance in Cosmopolis
Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis presents a protagonist, Eric Packer, surrounded by a
vast, internally-connected network of surveillance technology. Truly rhizomatically
connected, Packer’s massive surveillance system facilitates the aforementioned “white
noise” of information, by providing a proliferation of multiple perspectives of a singular
subject (namely, Packer himself). The novel focuses on Packer’s limousine journey
through Manhattan on “A Day in April” in 2000, during the historical period of American
cultural and socio-economic affluence that Francis Fukayama famously calls “The End of
History,” or the period of the late Twentieth Century and the beginning of the TwentyFirst when the U. S. stock market was at its peak, the Cold War had ended, the war on
terror had not yet begun, and the U.S. experienced financial prosperity that seemed
virtually endless. In Cosmopolis the stock market and currency exchange have peaked
and are on the brink of decline,ix and so not only does Packer similarly straddle this
financial brink, but he also embodies the exaggerated, late Twentieth Century, American
sense of entitlement, prosperity and futurism. Beyond presenting a protagonist gifted in
American capitalistic pursuits and exploits, Cosmopolis depicts a character whose
surveillance systems provides him with technologically augmented and uncannily
prescient foresight; but Packer’s financial prowess and precocity crumble when his
advanced technologies fail, and these failures arguably initiate a chain of events that
ultimately lead to Packer’s death. On the surface, Cosmopolis questions the
technologically-mediated, commodified ontology of the postmodern subject; underneath,
however, it suggests that an unquestioning faith in the objectivity of visual information
can be deadly.
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DeLillo invites us to read Packer’s surveillance systems as prosthetic extensions
of his psyche, and so we are meant, I believe, to see Packer as what Kate Hayles and
others have called the “post-human,” or, in Donna Haraway’s phrase “the trans-human.”x
To point out the ways in which this is the case is a blatant act in articulating the obvious:
Packer’s surveillance and informatics systems are so ingrained into his functioning in the
world that the boundaries between Packer and his technology are blurred to a degree that
effectively renders “the machine” a part of Packer and Packer a part of his machine.
Moreover, the story is so imbued with the presence of these technological innovations
and Packer’s existence so defined by them, we are meant to “read” Packer’s surveillance
systems as decision-making prosthetics and sensory apparatuses that are both outside of
the body and representative of a disembodied self. Jerry A. Varsava notes that “Packer’s
interactions with various telecommunications and computer systems […] confer upon
him a sense of personal prestige, even moral redemption” (86). Packer’s advanced
technological apparatuses and systems do confer prestige and redemption, but beyond
redemption, Packer’s technologies present the possibility of a technologically-mediated
afterlife in the novel’s recurring promise that people will ultimately be absorbed into
“streams of information,” to use DeLillo’s phrase.
The transliteration of the visual image into pure information is merely illusion,
since all visual information is accompanied by interpretation that usually takes the form
of narrative. At best, visual surveillance facilitates the aforementioned problematic chain
of secondary observations necessary for the appearance of objectivity; at its worst, its
failure to provide narrative objectivity undermines the socially constructed authority of
the visual image. So while Cosmopolis foregrounds a postmodern American identity
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formation decentralized and mediated by rhizomatically dispersed, privatized systems of
visual surveillance, it also suggests that these same systems ultimately represent failed
approaches to greater narrative objectivity. This failure is represented in a few ways in
the novel: 1) the attempt to blur boundaries between physical interiority and exteriority
in collapsing the distance between the two through visual representation does more to
undo the authority of the image than bolster it; 2) the suggestion that the camera presents
an endless “stream of information” that facilitates a technological afterlife for the
postmodern subject is really just another way of suggesting that “the body functions best
as its image”; and 3) when there are discrepancies between the perspective of the camera
and the perspective of the subject, the camera’s authority undoes itself by arguably
prescribing impossible performative demands.
“A Surface Separates Inside from Out and Belongs No Less to One than the Other”:
Permeable Boundaries
The relationship between interior and exterior, or, in the terms of systems theory,
between a system and its environment, and the potential permeability of membranes
separating the two are recurrent themes in the novel. As Packer notes while staring at the
enormous building in which he lives: a “surface separates inside from out and belongs no
less to one than the other” (9). Like the reflective wall of his building, Packer’s body is
depicted as a penetrable membrane. For example, Packer gets a medical exam during
which he is connected to an echocardiogram, and as Packer sees the image of his beating
heart, he ponders both the closeness and distance of what the image represents: the
exteriorized image of his most vital of vital organs (44). “The image,” he observes, “was
only a foot away but the heart assumed another context, one of distance and immensity”
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(44). Here the core of the body’s interior vitality is not only projected externally, but is
also separated from the body and sutured to the digital screen. Not only, then, is Packer’s
body fragmented and reconstructed as a network of interdependent systems, but also the
objective information about Packer’s body is separated from its bodily referent so that,
like the images of bodily activity in Hasan Elahi’s work, images of Packer’s physical
interior metonymically represent the body to which they refer.
During this same medical exam, the doctor, Ingram, investigates Packer’s
prostate, and Packer “fe[els] the pain. It traveled the pathways. It informed the ganglion
and spinal cord. He was here in his body, the structure he wanted to dismiss in theory
[…] It [the body] was convertible to wave arrays of information. It was the thing he
watched on the oval screen” (48). Virilio notes that the camera helps organize distance
into illusions of traversable possibility, or the idea that “Everything I see is in principle
within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, marked on the map of the ‘I can’”
(author’s italics, 7). And, as Anna McCarthy notes, the camera and the screen facilitate
“two modes of spatiality—distance and proximity—so that mediated images can seem
more ‘live’ than the person with whom we are sitting” (124). While, on one hand, the
mediated image facilitates a problematic possibility – in Packer’s case, the possibility of
examining and objectifying his physically interior space; on the other hand, it also
collapses distance and proximity and determines the parameters of a lived reality.
The problem, of course, is that the objectification of Packer’s pain, of Packer’s
body, is a fiction. The visual information that presents the “wave arrays of information”
of Packer’s body is not only mediated by the camera and screen, but through diegetic
layers of interpretation: That is, not only do we read Packer’s perspective, itself mediated
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by the narrator’s omniscient perspective, but we also understand that the image is being
presented in a very specific context – the physical exam – and in the presence of a
contextually authoritative perspective: the doctor’s. In this context, the visual
information is, of course, meant to simply provide factual information for a medical
evaluation, and so we see that Packer’s desire to render his body into “wave arrays of
information” is really just an internalization of the contextually authoritative perspective.
DeLillo thus offers a metafiction: a fictionalization of the fiction embedded in
interpretations of visual information. In the case of Packer’s medical exam, for example,
the fiction that although Packer is “here in his body” while he attempts to theoretically
objectify the associated pain that “travels the pathways” of the ganglion and spinal cord,
the visually mediated distance and proximity of the images of his body’s interior
facilitate a theoretical dismissal of the body itself.
This separation is necessarily also a suture: Packer physically embodies the pain
he externalizes, and thus the image of his body simultaneously distances, or separates,
himself from his bodily referent while suturing him to it. In her essay “The Will to
Evolve,” Jane Goodall quotes the performance artist Stelarc as suggesting that
“‘[e]lectronic images displace and even erase the body’” (15).xi As I have already
asserted, the displacement of the body by its image suggests that the symbol
metonymically erases or displaces its referent. Moreover, for both Stelarc and Packer,
the technologically mediated displacement of the body by its image suggests that the
digital image of the body is a cybernetic one. As Timothy Melley puts it, “by rejecting
the idea that the boundaries of the material body are the boundaries of the person,
cybernetic thinking offers, simultaneously, the exhilarating prosthetic extension of the
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person into other systems and the frightening effacement of the liberal subject” (88).
This “prosthetic extension” of Packer into his technological systems points towards just
such an effacement. It suggests that the difference between Packer and his image is not
that great: that, in fact, the very idea of difference suggests a separation that simply does
not exist. It suggests that Packer and images of Packer are essentially one and the same.
In this way, it also suggests that images of Packer’s body displace, erase, and evacuate
their bodily referent.
“The Creed of the New Culture”: Streams of Information
Early in Cosmopolis, the triangulated relationship between capital, technology,
and the body is introduced as another of the novel’s themes. In conversation with his
currency analyst, Packer asserts that the only thing left worth studying is the
inseparability of technology and capital (23). And later, during the same conversation,
Packer studies computer monitors depicting scrolling, “real-time,” financial information,
“streams of numbers running in opposite directions,” and he interprets the numerical
display in terms of organic aesthetics: “Here was the heave of the biosphere,” he thinks.
“Our bodies and oceans were here, knowable and whole” (24). That “our bodies and
oceans,” our “biosphere,” are reduced to “streams of numbers” suggests that nothing is
free from either the grip of technological mediation or the reducibility of all phenomena
to pure information. Similarly, the novel also suggests that the digital image – be it still
(photographic) or moving (video) – is also reducible to pure information. As such, it is
suggested that images of the body reduce subjectivity into “knowable and whole”
information without considering that visual information is always captured from a limited
perspective and interpreted within fairly narrow frameworks of subjective possibility.
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The translation of subjectivity into streams of information reveals a distinctly
postmodern concern with the fragmented and decentralized self. That is, if identity can
be potentially encoded into streams of information, there is thus no essential core from
which identity manifests.xii As artists like Hasan Elahi have illustrated and theorists such
as Donna Haraway have argued, the body, by virtue of operating in an already
technologically enhanced cultural and socioeconomic framework, is already
technologically augmented. While technological innovations in science and medicine
function, of course, to regulate and preserve the health of the body, public and private
technologies ranging from Automated Teller Machines to personal computers could be
said to occasionally function as technological enhancements for the postmodern subject’s
body. In this way, subjectivity becomes technologically augmented and agency operates
in the gap between interior subjectivity and exterior manifestations of identity.
O’Donnell reiterates that “both the postmodern condition and the condition of
language […] remains suspended in the increasing gap between all the ‘betweens’ of
signifier and signified, semiotic and symbolic, maternal materiality and paternal ideality”
(89). Moreover, and more importantly, he asserts that “residing (waiting) within this
state of suspended animation complies with the conflation of identificatory and capital
fluidity that constitutes a major aspect of the ideology of postmodernity” (89-90). The
link between “identificatory and capital fluidity” is intrinsic to the identity formation of
the postmodern subject.xiii In Packer, we see not only the link of the fluid identity
formation with capital fluidity, but we also see a shifting but ever-present technological
mediation between the two. For Packer, technology functions to symbolically suture the

Justus, Chapter Two 54
two together, effectively creating the illusion that identity and capital are intrinsically
linked.
O’Donnell also asserts that, in part, “we are paranoid because we are approaching
with increasing rapidity the commodification and virtualization of temporality itself” (9).
“‘Clock time accelerated the rise of capitalism,’” remarks Packer’s chief of theory Vija
Kinski. “‘[T]ime is a corporate asset now’” (79). But it is truly the advancing and
unending flow of information that facilitates the corporatization of the future as well as
the flux of cyber-capitalism. DeLillo himself notes in his essay “In the Ruins of the
Future,” published in December of 2001, that the “dramatic climb of the Dow and the
speed of the internet summoned us all to live permanently in the future” (33).
Accordingly, Packer views the streams of information to which he has unending access as
the acceleration of the future. Moreover, the constant real-time flow of information
functions as a sort of antithesis to the fragmentation of the self. From this viewpoint, the
only authentic narrative account looks something like an unceasing flow of pure
information: any thing else is necessarily a subjective interpretation or embellishment.
Cosmopolis also foregrounds a postmodern concern with the separation of event
and history and focuses on the failure of narrative to suture the two. Packer recalls the
time “when he was forecasting stocks, when forecasting was pure power, when he’d tout
a technology stock or bless an entire sector and automatically cause doublings in share
price and the shifting of worldviews, when he was effectively making history, before
history became monotonous and slobbering” (75). Here, then, we are able to view the
relationship between event and history – or, more specifically, between Packer’s
predictions and the “shifting of worldviews” – as one connected by a “monotonous and
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slobbering” narrative linkage. In what ways, then, are technology, capital, and the body
intertwined? Through narrative.
“‘Why am I seeing things that haven’t happened yet?’”: The “(Mal)function” of
Surveillance Technology
Packer’s is a first-generation surveillance system: a Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) system which consists of a rhizomatically dispersed network of cameras and
monitors placed in his home, his limousine, his workspaces, and even on his wrist (his
wristwatch contains both a miniature camera and a tiny viewing screen). This system has
these integrated central aims: to watch “from above” and to visually preserve, narrate,
and regulate Packer’s movements through, and interactions in, the world. Prior to
Packer’s switch to CCTV, the images captured by Packer’s surveillance system are
broadcast in real-time, twenty-four hours a day. These images become the narrative
visual biography of Packer, viewed, if by no one else, his obsessive assassin and former
employee Richard Sheets, a.k.a. Benno Levin. Levin views these images from a distinct
and emotionally charged vantage point, having been fired by Packer despite entering the
company with hopes of making his fortune. Here we see the inherent problem with the
construction of history as narrative: the observers play a role in its construction.
In Cosmopolis, only singular events, repeatedly displayed, carry the mythic
currency of objective history. As elsewhere in DeLillo’s work, scenes of tragedy –
particularly murder or execution – are obsessively, repeatedly aired in media
representations.xiv In the case of Cosmopolis we first see Arthur Rapp, “managing
director of the International Monetary Fund” assassinated in Nike, North Korea, “killed
live on the Money Channel” (32-3). The networks broadcast the assassination repeatedly
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“until the sensation drained out of it or everyone in the world had seen it” (34). As he
later reacts to the deaths of other professionals in his field, Packer reacts to Rupp’s death
by feeling refreshed and invigorated but obsessed with the murder’s continual televised
“reruns” to which he has boundless access. In effect, these continual repetitions both
externally displace Packer’s memory and continually bring the visually recorded past into
the present, folding the two – memory and recorded image as well as past and present –
into one another.
Continually broadcasted media images have an anachronistic quality. For
example, Packer watches the American President processional motorcade inch its way
through town, and sees an image of half of the president’s body, standing through a roof
window of a limousine. Packer looks “vengefully at the screen, thinking the image did
the president every justice. He was the undead. He lived in a state of occult repose,
waiting to be reanimated” (77). In this sense, the broadcasted image of the president’s
body functions symbolically, but it also separates the image from the person. The image
presents an unanimated and anachronistic version of the president. Nevertheless, Packer
resents the president for the virtual omnipresence that provides the president with virtual
immortality: absorption into a technologically mediated spatio-temporal omnipresence.
And when Packer watches Brutha Fez’s funeral procession in the “real” world and
in “real” time – unmediated by the camera and screen – he immediately notes, after Fez’s
casket passes by, that “[i]t did not seem right that the hearse had come and gone. He
wanted it to reappear at intervals, proud body open to the night, to replenish the sorrow
and wonder of the crowd” (139). Freed from quick and easy access to his technological
innovations, specifically, the video screens that mediate his interactions with the world,
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Packer longs for the control over the visual representation that his own surveillance
technologies afford him. More importantly, this exposure to the real world highlights
Packer’s reliance upon his surveillance technologies and reveals his vulnerability without
them. It is this same vulnerability that underpins Packer’s unquestioning reliance upon
the image as a source of pure information.
Early in the novel, in response to his inquiry regarding the malfunctions of his
surveillance equipment, Packer is told that his “‘system’s secure. We’re impenetrable.
There’s no rogue program’” (12).xv In the early malfunctions, the surveillance system
monitors display images of Packer’s immediate future, thus repeating the novel’s concern
with the anachronism of mediated images as well as furthering the suggestion that Packer
and his machines are intricately connected insofar that both are amazingly prescient.
David Cowart suggests that the “lags” in the “representation on the screens” that
foreshadow Packer’s actions are jokes played by DeLillo, calling these instances
“seemingly inconsequential” (“Anxieties,” 181). “[T]hese glimpses of what has not yet
happened culminate, ironically,” Cowart observes, “in the ultimate example of being
ahead of the curve: before the events actually transpire, the man who so prides himself
on commanding futurity witnesses on a tiny screen his own death and subsequent tagging
in the morgue” (181). These instances, however, are far from inconsequential. They
suggest much more than a glitch in Packer’s “commanding futurity”: these malfunctions,
I assert, reveal the intricate interconnectedness of Packer and his machines insofar that
the authority Packer invests in them determines the degree to which they set performative
parameters for Packer’s actions. Moreover, they provide the narrative of deathward
chronological causality: a seemingly predetermined, linear progress towards Packer’s
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assassination. But while we question whether the malfunctions in Packer’s surveillance
system present an inescapable futurity or information that informs decision, and here it is
worth noting that Gregory Bateson calls information “the difference that makes a
difference” in the functioning of an autopoietic system, we should first wonder if DeLillo
invites us to question the inevitability of Packer’s death. Does Packer have any real
agency once his surveillance system has predicted his future?
The first malfunction occurs fairly early in the text. As Packer and his currency
analyst Michael Chin talk in the back of the limo, Packer “watch[es] himself on the oval
screen below the spycam, running his thumb along his chinline. The car stop[s] and
move[s] and he realize[s] queerly that he’d just placed his thumb on his chinline, a
second or two after he’d seen it on-screen” (22). In this first instance, Packer’s actions
are prefigured by the technology that monitors them – presenting Packer with a
technologically mediated sense of déjà vu. He responds by again questioning the
penetrability of his security systems. He is reassured that the system is secure, and
replies to this by asking “‘why am I seeing things that haven’t happened yet?’” (22).
The second malfunction prefigures Packer’s second sexual climax of the novel.
In this scene, Packer verbally copulates with his chief of finance Jane Melman, bringing
her to orgasm simply by speaking the words describing what he would like to do her –
the act rendered unnecessary by its description. Just before their mutual climax, Packer
sees “his face on the screen, eyes closed, mouth framed in a soundless little howl” (52).
We’re told that Packer knows that “the spycam operated in real time, or was supposed to.
How could he see himself if his eyes were closed? There wasn’t time to analyze. He felt
his body catching up to the independent image” (52). While narrative – in this case, the

Justus, Chapter Two 59
verbal copulation between Packer and Melman – renders action unnecessary, the visual
image apparently does not.
During a downtown riot in which rioters beat, dent, rock, and graffiti Packer’s
limo, the internal surveillance system malfunctions for a third time: Packer’s “own
image caught his eye, live on the oval screen beneath the spycam. Some seconds passed.
He saw himself recoil in shock. More time passed. He felt suspended, waiting. Then
there was a detonation, loud and deep, near enough to consume all the information
around him. He recoiled in shock. Everyone did” (93). In this instance, Packer knows
that his surveillance system has again shown images from the immediate future. He
knows what is about to happen, and so “he [feels] suspended, waiting.” Like the previous
instances of inescapable futurity, Packer’s reactions are just that: purely automatic
reactions. In other words, Packer’s suspense has less to do with the question of agency
and choice and more to do with question of stimulus. Theoretically, if Packer sees what
he is about to do, he should have the choice of doing otherwise; however, in these three
instances, the scenes depicted by his surveillance systems do not depict the results of
autonomous choice. In this way, they maintain their authority as objective machines.
Also, in these three instances, the stakes are incrementally raised. That is, the
vital significance of each successive scene escalates—from Packer stroking his chinline
to the image of sexual climax to “recoiling in shock” after a bomb blast. It is as if
through these malfunctions the machine and Packer’s psyche become increasingly bound.
In much the same way that the arch or trajectory of a stream of information necessarily
contains within in itself both its own futurity and its logical end, so too does the
technology of visual surveillance systems, as a stream of information, contain its own
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futurity. In a traditional narrative framework, each story has an inevitable end towards
which a narrative moves. In the aforementioned conspiracy theorist narrative framework,
the end is already known and the narrative is constructed retroactively. Either way, all
narrative moves towards an inevitable point.
As Packer’s story and Levin’s coalesce towards the novel’s end, we see both
characters increasingly fall prey to the circumstances that bring them together. After
Packer’s final sexual encounter, the only one in the novel wherein he has intercourse with
his wife, he wanders into the streets, hears gunshots that sound like firecrackers, and
hears his full name called out (179-81). It is this scene that prefigures the final
malfunction of Packer’s surveillance technology. In the final malfunction, also the final
scene in the novel, Packer witnesses, in a series of fragmented scenes, the events that lead
to his murder:
He looked at his watch. He happed to glance at his watch. […] But the watch
wasn’t showing the time. There was an image, a face on the crystal, and it was
his. This meant he’d activated the electron camera unintentionally […] The
camera was a device so microscopically refined it was almost pure information. It
was almost metaphysics. It operated inside the watch body, collecting images in
the immediate vicinity and displaying them on the crystal. (204-5)
Packer looks back and forth between his watch and Levin several times. In the first
instance, the face of his watch shows a prone body, facedown on the floor. In his second
glance, he sees “the inside of an ambulance, with drip-feed devices and bouncing heads.”
In the third glance, he sees “ a series of small vaults,” a mortuary. Then he sees the tag
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on one of the open vaults which reads “Male Z”: “He knew what this meant […] Male Z
was the designation for the bodies of unidentified men in hospital morgues” (206).
In the words of Luhmann, “[a]utopoietic systems are the products of their own
operations” (“Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing,” 771). Taking their output as
input in a circulation of difference to promote homeostasis, autopoietic systems function
to perpetuate continued existence – the ultimate homeostatic state. And while, systems
theorists typically suggest that individuals don’t function as independent systems so
much as components of larger social, communicative, and, in many arguments,
evolutionary systems, Packer’s surveillance system functions as a tight system whose
condition for continued existence is intricately linked to Packer’s continued existence.
Leading up to Packer’s death, we are presented with two views of what might happen to
Packer upon his death: either “the world will end” or he will be “absorbed into a stream
of information.” While it is not my goal to present a Postmodern view of life after death
or to conversely present an essentialist view of Packer’s identity, I do want to suggest
that, for Packer, both options occur. Effectively, the world does end, even if only it is the
internal world of the closed system of narrative created by continual streams of visual
information. And, likewise, Packer is absorbed into a stream of information, even if only
we assume that the stream of information has been preserved – recorded to be endlessly
replayed as Packer’s life and death become anachronisms themselves. Along these lines,
we might consider Packer’s death as his entrance into a virtual eternity.xvi Both erased
and replicated, Packer enters a virtual “hall of mirrors” that destabilizes and perpetuates
his existence through the possibility of endless repetition.
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The Body in the Blind Spot in Hasan Elahi’s Tracking Transience
As I have suggested elsewhere, public reception of and reactions to the
proliferation of surveillance technologies are, generally speaking, twofold. First, there
are those who see the surveillance camera as a mechanism of control invoking an
Orwellian paranoia regarding subjectivity and personal, autonomous agency. For
example, an exaggerated form of this brand of paranoia has recently been identified and
named “The Truman Delusion” by Bellevue Hospital’s Dr. Joel Gold along with his
brother Ian Gold of Canada’s McGill University.xvii Second are those who embrace the
technology of visual surveillance as a facilitator of safety and community, such as those
in the aforementioned internet-based, virtual communities who use the camera as
everything from a grooming tool to a safety device. While the attitude of acceptance of
the latter group is disturbingly free from the paranoia that underpins the assumptions of
the former, perhaps the enlightened position is to assume that one is being watched for
the entertainment of unidentified masses, and to willingly, and perhaps enthusiastically,
participate. Hasan Elahi is one such enlightened figure.
Hasan Elahi, visual artist and assistant professor at San Diego State University,
was detained in 2002 at the Detroit Airport on a return trip from the Netherlands.
Informed by the FBI that he was listed as a suspected terrorist, Elahi was subjected to
hours of interrogation, and, in the course of a six-month investigation, underwent nine
polygraph tests before proving his innocence. Elahi, born in The People’s Republic of
Bangledesh and raised in the United States, travels extensively in promotion of his visual
art installations, and it was during one such trip that he was detained. Elahi’s case is not
so much one of misidentification as it is one of misunderstanding. Specifically, Elahi
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was fingered by an overzealous Florida citizen who observed Elahi moving materials out
of a storage facility on September 12, 2001. The erroneous report, clearly a reaction to
the terrorist acts of the previous day, suggested that Elahi’s storage bin was full of
explosives (Thompson par. 4). Moreover, Elahi clearly suffered the ill effects of the
larger, more pervasive, cultural narrative that cast people, like Hani Hanjour, who appear
to be of Middle-Eastern descent as potential terrorists.
Since clearing his name, Elahi continues to contact the FBI before every flight he
takes. Moreover, Elahi has, since 2002, voluntarily subjected himself to an ongoing, selfsurveillance project. The project, Tracking Transience, has taken a few forms: from a
massive digital image installation at a recent Sundance Festival to a traveling still image
installation to the Tracking Transience website, an ongoing and continuously updated
visual log of Elahi’s physical whereabouts and consumptive activities. In its web
incarnation, in three separate horizontal frames, Tracking Transience shows a scrolling,
still image of Elahi’s immediate environment; a satellite image map, hosted by Google,
of Elahi’s location (see figure 2.1) and a series of digital images representing various
categories of activity in these places, from eating to urinating to eating and urinating on
an airplane (see figures 2.2 and 2.3). Elahi personally photographs, typically using a cell
phone camera, all of the images that appear, which number beyond 10,000, on Tracking
Transience. Additionally, Elahi carries a GPS chip that continually monitors and
transmits his location to the aforementioned satellite image map. In effect, by rendering
himself a part of a mottled mass of visual information, Elahi disappears in the
proliferation of information he circulates.
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Figure 2.1. The Tracking Transience “splash” page.

Figure 2.2. A collage of images of public urinals.
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Rather than speak begrudgingly about his continual subjection to visual
surveillance or the necessity of using this as a perpetual alibi, Elahi speaks favorably
about the practice, asserting that his project affords him a great deal of privacy. As he
told Wired magazine, he has
“‘discovered that the best way to protect your privacy is to give it away’” (Thompson par.
5). Giving privacy away through the circulation of visual information allows Elahi to
flood a seemingly panoptic eye ultimately and create the chaotic, visual, white noise in
which his body disappears. We should note that images of Elahi himself are missing
from his project. Of course, operating behind the lens of the camera means that Elahi has
less responsibility to appear within its visual frame. Nevertheless, Elahi clearly makes
himself the ultimate subject of his own visual art, and he does so by scattering his bodily
presence through the series of images containing metonymies of bodily activity –
metonymies such as images of plates of food, airports, waste receptacles, and urinals.
The bodily acts to which these images refer are, themselves, metonymies of the body
itself.
Moreover, Elahi aesthetically depicts the evacuation of the body through the blind
spot of primary observation. One does not see one’s body other than in a mirrored
reflection or through the mediated gaze of the camera, and so one’s own body is always
in a blind spot. Of course, the
camera or mirror offers the subject the possibility of externalizing perception and thus
becoming the secondary observer of one’s self, but as Lacan, Mulvey, and others have
noted, such externalization effects both the separation and suture of identity and its bodily
referent.xviii In other words, seeing one’s own reflection or visual representation puts one
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Figure 2.3. Images of airline food.

Figure 2.4. Elahi’s only appearance in Tracking Transience.
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in the position of being on the outside of the body and looking in while simultaneously
identifying with the image as the visual representation of one’s self. Elahi avoids the
decentralization of the self through an externalized gaze by depicting his own primary
perspective rather than using the camera to “see” his own body. In only one instance
does any physical trace of Elahi’s body appear within the camera’s visual field: In figure
2.4, we see what are presumably Elahi’s shoes, jacket, and shadow standing before a
public urinal. Whether this was an oversight Elahi’s part or a deliberate, albeit brief,
exception, Elahi’s spectral appearance does more to support the illusion of primary
observation than to undermine Elahi’s bodily disappearance. Simply put: this is what you
see when you stand at a urinal. Elahi’s limited, bodily appearance bolsters the
verisimilitude of his depiction of first-order observation and invites the viewer to share
his perspective. In so doing, Elahi also invites the viewer to disappear through the blind
spot of primary observation and escape the regulatory power of visual surveillance.
It would be tempting, if not easy, to dismiss the possibility of subversion in
Elahi’s project as a manifestation of something very Foucauldian (and thus not at all
subversive). We could view Tracking Transience as a contemporary example of the
internalization of Panoptic practice: a juridical subject has internalized Panoptic ideology
and has voluntarily subjected himself to a continual, controlling, externalized gaze.xix If
this is the case, Foucault’s formulation is correct. Foucault asserts that panoptic practice
is a “superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a
minimal cost” (“The Eye of Power,” 155), particularly when the subjects of panoptic
power internalize its underlying ideologies and start watching themselves and each other
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in a dynamic system of regulatory control and disciplinary power.xx I submit instead that
Elahi effectively illustrates some of the problems with Foucault’s formulations.
Elahi’s functions as not only the initial subject of surveillance, but also as the
initial surveilleur as well as the initial implicit author and narrator of Tracking
Transience. In so doing, he tells a story about the story: a metanarrative about what it
means to tell a digitally mediated visual story about the body and its absence. The visual
“story” of Tracking Transience can be constructed in a “traditional” narrative framework.
In conforming to a traditional model of narrative, the narrator and protagonist are one and
the same, and so we see what our protagonist sees, or what he wants us to see. It is a
story about travel: we see images of airports and aircraft; neatly packaged airline meals
in containers that look like TV dinners; distinctively “ethnic” dishes from around the
world (curry in Bangalore; rice in Kuala Lumpur; various cured meats in Rome); and, of
course, the satellite imagery of Elahi’s current location. It is furthermore a story about
consumption: in addition to the images of food, we see lists of credit card transactions
and images of urinals, the waste receptacle of post-consumptive materials. And, as a
story about travel, consumption, and waste, it is also a story about the body – where it
went, what it bought, and what it consumed.
As a metanarrative, it offers commentary on what gets lost when visual
information is used to construct narratives about the postmodern subject in the visual
field: ultimately, the body itself gets dispersed and lost through its distribution as
information. The metonymic, visual representations of the body through references to
Elahi’s bodily activities essentially disperses the bodily referent into bits and traces of
information. Along these lines, Elia Zureik refers to the “decorporealization” of the body
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in terms of “its reconfiguration into binary digits (bits) of information,” and notes that
“the body is not captured in its totality as a unitary entity, but as a collection of discrete
pieces of information” (40). In Judith Butler’s words, “[t]here is a bodily referent,” but
surveillance systems “do not capture the body to which they refer” (38). In Elahi’s case,
not only is his body not visually captured, but also the trace of his body’s presence is only
suggested through the mechanisms of travel and consumption, themselves traces of their
use. An image of a urinal, for example, suggests, in no uncertain terms, urinary activity,
but omits the activity itself. In this way, an image of a urinal in Tracking Transience
becomes a trace of a trace, a metonymic image that hints at the bodily activity of a body
that is only present through suggestion.
Moreover, the visual metanarrative tells us that the subject of surveillance can get
lost in the proliferation of visual information: that, at least from Elahi’s perspective, the
only way to avoid continual, state surveillance is to subject oneself to continual
surveillance and to inundate the panoptic powers-that-be with too much visual
information. In this way, we see that Elahi rearticulates a common contemporary
position: that one may not only surrender to the demands of surveillance, but one may
also hide behind such surrender. On one hand, Elahi suggests that we can have greater
anonymity by being part of a larger community. On the other hand, Elahi’s assumptions
that we want to watch – assumptions not unlike those who suffer “The Truman Delusion”
– suggests that scopic pleasure is augmented through interactivity with a community of
watchers when the community is invited to interpret and describe what the camera
captures.

Justus, Chapter Two 70

Figure 2.5. Scenes from the Tampa Airport.

Figure 2.6. Rice in Kuala Lumpur.
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Elahi invites a community of “readers” to engage in an interpretive process not
unlike those who follow conspiracy theories: we are given information and may piece it
together, or “read” it, in a way that resonates with our understanding of the project itself.
Moreover, we are invited to supplement the visual information with something it lacks:
an accompanying narrative description or interpretation of the interconnectedness of the
imagery. The urge to narrate, interpret, and weave connections into the visual
information is ultimately an urge to impose upon the information a different, lateral, or
outside perspective; and when we interpret visual information through narrative, we add
to it our subjective perspectives by describing what we read “into” the information.
Subjectively, we bring to the information a lateral viewpoint that sees what the camera
might miss.
As systems theorists such as Niklas Luhmann and Gregory Bateson suggest,
observing systems have “blind spots,”xxi and blind spots are visible only to an outside (or
second-order) observer. Thus, through second-order observation, the blind spots of a
primary observation system are made clear. The second-order observer, however, also
has blind spots visible only to yet another observer. In order to approach anything close
to objective perspective, an infinite series of second-order observers is necessary. In this
way, we see that objective perspectives are made up of an intricate web of second-order
observations: that through a series of second-order observations of the blind spots of
first-order observation, some consensus of objectivity might be reached. However,
unless the chain of second-order observation closes into a loop – in other words, if the
first (or a primary) link in the chain, so to speak, is also the second-order observer of the
last metaphorical link – then this becomes a closed system itself, and thus has its own
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blind spots. Objective perspective, then, is nearly unachievable, attainable only through a
mass consensus of an infinite series of second-order observations.xxii
All observations, then, are subjective; and, thus, even second-order observations
that interpret and narrate visual information are also subjective. As Kate Hayles
suggests, even as narrative describes a system’s blind spots, it circulates blind spots of its
own (“Making the Cut,” 72). For Elahi, the camera documents first-order observation
while opening the opportunity for a “reader” to chronicle a lateral perspective. In this
way, the camera becomes a system of communication while circulating both first-order
observation and its own blind spots. In other words, the surveillance system in Tracking
Transience, first of all, facilitates a shared first-order perspective on Elahi’s consumptive
activities; but, secondly, it also opens the blind spot that invites viewer interpretation and
allows Elahi to slip through the metaphorical cracks of observation and narrative.
Elahi uses the camera to create a complex feedback loop in which his body is lost
at the separation and suture of its two ends. Elahi’s body disappears in the gap where
subjective perspective and the object of its gaze meet. This, too, is a failure of narrative,
for it is ultimately a failure to reinscribe difference – between perspective and object,
between first and second-order observation – into a fundamental historical contingency –
or along a timeline of chronological causality that circulates a logic of inevitability – that
places Elahi between, for example, an airport in Tampa and eating rice in Kuala Lumpur
(Figures 2.5 and 2.6). In other words, the failure of Elahi’s surveillance system – itself a
communicative system – to capture Elahi is also the failure of the implied narrative to
provide the logical connections between the fragments it presents. The burden of
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supplying this narrative is placed on the viewer, and that burden ultimately requires us to
“make something up.”
Elahi’s metacommentary on surveillance, along with his perspective on the
mechanisms of consumption, travel, and waste, is thus a self-reflexive and selfperpetuating (or, in the terms of systems theory, autopoietic) system. The conditions of
its autopoiesis are not just that Elahi simply continues to provide the environment for this
communicative and story-telling system, but that we continue to watch.xxiii By suggesting
through depiction the traces of bodily activity and visual bits of information that can be
put together in countless numbers of chains of chronological causality, Elahi’s system
asks us to assemble the narrative ourselves, in much the same way that conspiracy theory
allows the “theorist” to assemble bits of information into a larger, coherent narrative. In
this way, Tracking Transience invites “readers” or viewers into a discursive loop of
situational signifiers that the reader or viewer may assemble into a larger narrative
structure. In so doing, the reader’s activity in the construction of the narrative both
supplants and augments Elahi’s role as the storyteller, and further erases Elahi’s bodily
presence.
In addressing the ultimate imperative of visual surveillance, or by addressing the
questions “Where did you go?” and “What did you do?”, through providing visual
information about his whereabouts and activities, Elahi offers an answer that is no
answer. We know where he went and what he did by seeing these things from his
perspective, but we lack the bodily referent that would suture him to these activities. To
tell the story presented in Tracking Transience is to assemble a narrative out of disparate
bits of information in a narrative framework similar to the narrative framework effected
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by paranoia. In constructing this narrative, we are asked to interpret the disappearance of
the body through the blind spots of surveillance as either the erasure of individuality at
the hand of the Panoptic machine or the enabling of agency through the circulation of
information.
Conclusion
Ultimately, as the cases of Hasan Elahi and Eric Packer illustrate, we readers and
viewers are also second-order observers, occupying a space outside of the narrative and
looking in. Of course, we bring our own subjective interpretations to the narrative, but
we also necessarily see what falls outside of the narrative framework. So, too, does a
proliferation of surveillance cameras weave together a web of multiple perspectives. The
relationship between spectator and spectacle is as symbiotic as the relationship between
visual information and their ensuing interpretive acts of narration. Without
interpretation, and thus without narrators, visual information exists in a void. The fact
that there is now such a great proliferation of surveillance apparatuses, and thus such a
great proliferation of seemingly objective perspective, means that the postmodern subject
is liberated to join the growing enclave of interpreters and observers. While the
postmodern subject’s entrance into authority is contingent on the failure of surveillance to
provide objective narrative information, it gives greater voice to lateral perspectives
while undermining the illusion of authority invested in hierarchical, social orders.
Moreover, just as subjective acts of interpretive narration open blind spots
through which objectivity gets lost, so too does surveillance circulate visual information
through which the primary object of surveillance – the Postmodern subject’s body –
disappears. While Elahi illustrates through exaggeration the disappearance of the body in
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the blind spot of primary observation – wherein the viewer is invited to share the primary
perspective of the camera – DeLillo creates a metaphorical “hall of mirrors” wherein the
massive amount of visual information regarding the protagonist’s body – itself an
exaggerated allegory of the Postmodern body – is evacuated through endless repetition.
In this way, Packer’s death and loss of identity in the morgue metonymically represents
the loss of subjective representation through the proliferation of visual information. An
excess of visual information does less to provide an increase of objectivity and more to
create a virtual, chaotic “white noise” in which bodily representation and narrative
authority get lost.
Exploiting the literal and metaphorical blind spots in hierarchically-organized
observation systems is a pervasive phenomenon. For instance, in the regulation of crime,
state surveillance initiatives often function to push crime to unobserved areas, so that the
surveillance of affluent neighborhoods essentially serves to further push crime into socioeconomically marginalized areas (where crime rates already tend to be higher).
Moreover, the surveillance of socio-economically marginalized neighborhoods tends to
conflate class with race so that the targeted surveillance of non-whites is justified as a
measure to prevent crime in poor neighborhoods. I examine this phenomenon, along
with the more general surveillance of race (and its inherent failures), in Chapter Three.
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I take these examples from the seminal essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” written by
Foucault’s mentor Louis Althusser.
ii
For example, in his edited collection Surveillance as Social Sorting (and elsewhere) David Lyon
introduces the concept of the “synoptic” surveillance, wherein “the many watch the few” as opposed to
Foucault’s formulation regarding “panoptic” surveillance, wherein “few watch the many.” In both cases,
however, the focus is on the ways in which surveillance is used as a mechanism of social and regulatory
control.
iii
I mention the report of Hanjour’s “poor English” because it comes up in several news articles on
Hanjour. It an interesting, if not telling, note that, in retrospect, both the news reporters and those they
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interviewed found it important to point out Hanjour’s poor conversational English skills, as if this factoid
fits into the retrospective formulation of terrorist narrative.
iv
As I discuss in much greater detail, the subversive use of second-generation surveillance technology has
been an extremely important factor in 2011’s Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements.
v
For more on Paul Auster and second-order observation, see Joseph Tabbi’s Cognitive Fictions.
vi
Of course, most of the theoretical “control” offered by second-generation surveillance technology is
undermined by its popular use for depictions of the body that conform to the ideology of panoptic
authority. This is why, for example, privatized surveillance systems are so often used in the seemingly
autobiographical narratives presented in Web 2.0 social spaces like MySpace and Facebook. Nevertheless,
I posit the Elahi effectively illustrates an method of undermining the panoptic machine by vigilantly
controlling the circulation of his body’s image (or lackthereof).
vii
First-generation surveillance technologies facilitate second-order observations, while second-generation
technologies provide the opportunity to visually capture first-order observation. In other words, firstgeneration technologies always provide an external gaze looking at the subject; however, although secondgeneration technologies still may represent an externalized gaze, they can be consciously used to represent
subjective perspective.
viii
An excellent example of this is Christian eschatology, or the study of the Apocalypse. The “ending” of
the story is known – that the Christ will return and that the earth will be engulfed in flames – but the chain
of events leading towards that end is continually under construction. This is way in which venues ranging
from the 700 Club to The National Enquirer may continue to re-incorporate historical and contemporary
news events into what is essentially a closed narrative framework in which all information points towards
its “logical” conclusion (even if only according to its own internal, constructed logic).
ix
Varsava observes that “April 2000 is of symbolic value given that U. S. stock markets peaked early in
2000” (83).
x
See, for example, Kate Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman or Haraway’s
ModestWitness@SecondMillenium for a more in-depth treatment of the postmodern transhuman subject.
xi
Famous for the ways in which he presents the obsolescence of the body, Stelarc repeatedly introduces
transhuman concerns into both the academic and artistic realms. Beyond frequently displaying his body in
various forms of technologically implemented and regulated transformation, Stelarc effectively urges his
viewers and critics to consider the body as an intricate network of symbiotic systems functioning together.
Like Packer, Stelarc repeatedly surrenders his body to the public eye as it is technologically implemented
and discursively redefined.
xii
Along these lines, the postmodern, subjective identity is the symbiotic network of biological,
psychological, and social systems working together to produce one organism. In other words subjectivity
becomes more about the process of integrating fragments into an illusion of identity than the product of
such integration.
xiii
For excellent studies on the unstable and shifting postmodern identity formation, see Zygmunt Bauman’s
essay “From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity” and James Donald’s “The Citizen and the
Man About Town.”
xiv
See, for example, DeLillo’s Libra, Mao II, or Underworld.
xv
These “malfunctions” seem to be triggered by Packer’s own prescience. Packer’s machines predict the
future of time and space in much the same way that Packer predicts the futures of stocks and currencies. In
both cases, it is suggested that forecasting stocks and literally seeing the future are both the results of
Packer’s ability to organize and streamlinine information outside of temporal constraints
xvi
Others have written on representations of virtual space in DeLillo’s fiction. Laura Barrett, for example,
discusses such space as represented in DeLillo’s Mao II in terms of what William Gibson calls “consensual
hallucination,” or, as Barrett puts it, “a meta-world in which characters myopically, if not blindly, negotiate
among unfamiliar virtual landmarks, even the actual world offers myriad opportunities for psychological
tripping and stumbling” (789).
xvii
About “The Truman Delusion,” New York Times reporter Sarah Kershaw suggests that “The Truman
Delusion” is “fueling a chicken-and-egg debate in psychiatry,” noting that the delusion may simply be
“classic paranoia fed by the current cultural landscape” or that there may be something about “media like
reality television and the Internet that can push people over the sanity line” (par. 9). Similarly, Wired’s
Kim Zetter reports that “psychiatrists say such patients [as those who suffer ‘The Truman Delusion’] are
often mirroring -- albeit, to an extreme -- what is occurring in the environment around them” (par. 5).

Justus, Chapter Two 77

Brothers Joel and Ian Gold, co-authors of the forthcoming book on this brand of psychosis, suggest that
“[m]ost likely these people would be delusional anyway,” but that if a cultural environment “can make
people crazy, then we need to look at it” (Kershaw, par. 11).
xviii
See Lacan’s essay “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function” in Ecrits as well as Laura
Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.”
xix
See Foucault’s Discipline and Punish.
xx
I should note, however, that Foucault implies that the minimal cost applies to the State power more than
to its subjects. As I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Three, instances such as the cases of Rodney King,
Larry Craig, and others would suggest that the cost of the so-called “superb formula” is actually rather
great.
xxi
See Luhmann’s Social Systems and Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind.
xxii
Kate Hayles beautifully describes the problem of an infinite series of second-order observations and
objectivity in her essay “Making the Cut.”
xxiii
As Kate Hayle’s explains it, “[t]he organization of a system is constituted through the processes it
engages in, and the processes it engages in are determined by its organization. To describe the circularity,
he [Maturana] coined the term autopoiesis, or self-making” (“Making the Cut,” 74). Autopoiesis, then, is a
system’s recursive method of self-construction and perpetuation. As a paradigmatic example of the
autopoeitic system, Niklas Luhmann treats social systems and communication as autopoietic devices.
Through various social mechanisms, societies preserve themselves and ensure their own propagation. So,
too, does communication circulate the conditions for further communication. As a narrative device,
surveillance systems, I assert, also function autopoietically. If we can accept narrative as a function of
preserving cultural undercurrents that ensure the propagation of society and as an example of cultural
communication; and if we see surveillance as a method of circulating narratives about social behavior, then
one function of surveillance is to perpetuate itself as a narrative device.
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Chapter Three:
Institutionalized Surveillance and the Regulation of Race:
The Failure of Surveillance in Periphractic Space
In the early hours of New Years Day 2009, Oscar Grant III, a twenty-three year
old, black resident of Oakland, California, was involved in a fight that took place on the
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. The fight was reported to BART operators by
other train passengers who described the scene as a “barroom brawl.” Alerted by these
operators, five BART police officers were dispatched to the train’s next stop – the
Fruitvale terminal – where they pulled Grant and three others from the train and
forcefully restrained and questioned the young men. What followed happened very
quickly: all in the few minutes while the train was still stopped at the station and dozens
of BART train passengers watched what turned out to be a tragedy unfold.
Grant was shot in the back as he lie face down on the concrete at the station. The
bullet passed through his body, ricocheted of off the station platform concrete, and
punctured one of his lungs, fatally wounding him. His killer, Oakland police officer
Johannes Mehserle, who was only two years into his career, resigned from the police
department days after the shooting and has since been charged with murder – a charge
that, after Mehserle’s unsuccessful plea to have dropped or reduced, was finally brought
to trial in June 2010.i The charge comes not as a result of police or eyewitness testimony;
it comes from a wealth of video and still images taken by cell phone cameras, iPhones,
and personal cameras.ii These images illustrate that Mehserle undeniably killed Grant in
cold blood, and that Grant did little to provoke physical aggression.iii Moreover, the
images contradict the descriptions of the event made by the police officers on the scene,
particularly the testimony of Marysol Domenici, who, under oath, described the scene as
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chaotic enough to provoke her to think to herself, as she said during the preliminary
hearing, “Oh, Jesus Christ, if I have to, I'm going to have to kill somebody” (Bulwa,
“Cop,” par. 8), and Anthony Pirone who initially falsely testified that Grant kneed him in
the groin, provoking Pirone to force Grant to the ground.iv
The two most notorious videos taken of the incident were both posted to YouTube
almost immediately after the shooting and were donated to Grant’s family for the purpose
of putting together a case against Mehserle and the BART police department. The first of
these videos, taken and posted to YouTube anonymously, begins shortly after Grant and
crew were detained and forced against a concrete wall across from the stopped train. It
shows the officers acting physically aggressive towards the young men, while the young
men are clearly compliant and cooperative. At the beginning of the video, we hear a
woman’s voice say, “Honey, it’ll be fine. I’m just recording” and a man’s voice say that
“You gotta take pictures and shit,” just before the train passengers erupt into a cacophony
of yelling “Hey! Hey!” and “That’s fucked up!” and “That’s uncalled for!” in response
to the clearly elevated aggression towards the young men. We also see another handheld
camera repeatedly drift in and out of the frame, making it clear that the anonymous
videographer was not alone in her effort (see Image 1).
In this video, we see Grant verbally respond to the officers who are brutishly
restraining another young man. Pirone, another white officer, and Mehserle grab Grant
and force him to the ground: the former holds Grant’s head to the concrete with his knee
while Mehserle frisks the subdued Grant. After frisking Grant, Mehserle abruptly stands
up, draws his gun, says something to Pirone (which Pirone has claimed was Mehserle’s
command to step away from Grant), backs up a step, and fires a single shot into Grant’s
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back (Image 2). After the shot, Mehserle looks up as if in surprise, quickly and briefly
touches his forehead with both hands in a moment of apparent astonishment, and then
reaches back down to Grant as if to handcuff him (image 3).v At this point, we see the
train doors close while the passengers continue to yell in disbelief.
The second video, taken and posted by Karina Vargas, shows the scene from a
completely different perspective. For starters, the first, anonymous videographer viewed
the scene from within the train and to the left of the action. Vargas was much further to
the right, and throughout filming she gets off the train, approaches the scene, and retreats
back to the train just after the shooting. She is followed back to the train by a female
officer who clearly intends to confiscate her camera.vi The anonymous videographer
remained on the train, out of the range of sight of the police officers. Unlike the
anonymous videographer, Vargas has since offered verbal testimony to support the video,
and has appeared on San Francisco news stations to offer her testimonial accompaniment
to her video footage (“Home Video Surfaces”). Although her video doesn’t actually
show the shooting – Vargas was distracted by the detention of one of the other men – her
account adds to the interpretation of the event as being an example of police brutality.vii
In an exceedingly delayed response to the incident, three months after the
shooting, BART police chief Gary Gee agreed to a televised interview with KTVU, the
San Francisco news station that broke the story and first showed the witness videos. His
interview begins with his following words: “The truth does come but it can not come at
this time and not from me.” Further distancing himself from this “truth,” Gee says that
“it would be easy for three persons to watch that video and draw different conclusions
and that’s all.” In an instance wherein police testimony has been trumped by the
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perspective of citizens, Gee’s best strategic maneuver is to highlight the interpretive act
of watching the videos of the killing, even though the original police testimony – that
deadly force was warranted in the face of Grant’s own physical aggression – was highly
interpretive, to say the least.viii
As I suggest in Chapter Two, the surveillance camera ultimately functions as a
narrative apparatus. It is representative of both the limits of a singular perspective,
particularly in illustrating that singular perspectives contain blind spots, and of the ways
in which we are naturally compelled to augment objectively-captured visual information
with descriptive but necessarily interpretive, subjective narrative. We are story-telling
creatures. But a proliferation of video images taken from multiple perspectives by
multiple people would together theoretically provide a mosaic, visual amalgamation that
might ultimately represent greater fidelity to the truth of lived experience – to the
fundamental, human connections between perspectives and the socially constructed and
socially shared nature of what counts as the truth (in a courtroom or on a public transit
railway platform, for example). This interconnection doesn’t just illustrate that the
rhizomatic distribution of second-generation surveillance technology functions as a part
of a larger communicative system, it also illustrates that, in practice, surveillance
techniques in the Twenty-First Century do not neatly function Panoptically or
ideologically, as Foucault observed of similar techniques of social control and
punishment in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Rather, they often function as
another media and medium for the presentation and articulation of subjective perspective
and narrative interpretation. Thus, the institutionalized camera undermines its own
hierarchical authority in a postmodern culture that has all but done away with grand.

Justus, Chapter Three 82

Image 1: BART police offers detain Oscar Grant III while onlookers capture the scene from multiple perspectives.

Image 2: The killing of Oscar Grant III.
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Image 3: The moment upon which Mehserle’s defense rests.

Image 4: The beating of Rodney King.
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narratives and ultimate authority; but in the hands of people who occupy marginalized
spaces and positions – be they socioeconomic, racial, sexual, political, or in other ways
marginalized – the second-generation surveillance camera lends its objective authority to
otherwise marginalized subjective perspectives.
But surveillance technology performs another key function for postmodern
subjects: The camera sees so that we don’t have to. It sees what we might rather not
look at other than through the mediated gaze of the camera’s lens and the television or
computer screen. And it all too often replaces our subjective culpability in circulating a
racialized perspective that we might rather not openly acknowledge. For example,
targeted, visual, police surveillance in London focuses on black women and men one and
a half to two and a half times more often than their presence in the population would
warrant (Norris 265). And a recent study of San Francisco’s Community Safety Camera
(CSC) program – which involves 71 surveillance cameras strategically placed throughout
San Francisco – justifies focusing primarily on non-white neighborhoods by placing most
of its cameras in or near low-income, government housing projects and known “gang
activity areas.”ix What looks like the policing of crime often translates into the
surveillance of race. Towards this end, the institutional surveillance camera distances us
from our responsibility to maintain racial equality by automating the visual
circumscription of space allocated to marginalized groups – a space that David Theo
Goldberg calls periphractic space, or space that is metaphorically, literally, or as is
usually the case, both metaphorically and literally pushed to the periphery (see The Racist
Culture).
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This is precisely what makes the tactical use of second-generation surveillance
technology in the presence of institutionalized authority so important. The proliferation
of surveillance technology does not always necessarily come with an increase in the
proliferation of the racial institutionalized gaze: but it does mean that we are
occasionally equipped to fight fire with fire. In Steve Mann’s terms, we are
technologically equipped for sousveillance, literally “to watch from below” or, as Mann
means it, “to watch the watchers” in acts of using second-generation surveillance
technology to monitor known institutionalized surveilleurs, and this is what the multiple
instances of privately-captured videos and images of the killing of Oscar Grant III
illustrate.x
As I argue in this chapter, since the late 1990s, subjectively captured video and
still images taken at scenes of the enactment of institutionalized power have gained an
increasing authority in challenging hierarchal ideological practices that would otherwise
marginalize lateral perspectives. As we see in the case of the killing of Oscar Grant III,
contemporary, second-generation, surveillance technologies equip the postmodern
subject to add her subjective perspective to an enclave of subjective perspectives, and a
proliferation of perspectives synergistically perpetuates a method of “seeing” that both
falls outside of a traditionally hierarchical political or social order and undermines
traditional forms and institutions of authority. Moreover, as we see in the television
series The Wire, this multiplicity of perspectives has become naturalized and embedded
in narrative frameworks. Through regularly switching to camera angles and techniques
that replicate the angles and cinematographic feel of the first-generation surveillance
camera, The Wire mimetically replicates the narrative framework of a rhizomatic
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surveillance system. However, I argue that rather than align viewers with the
surveillance camera itself, this replication invites us to identify with a multiplicity of
subjective perspectives in much the same way that the increasing amount of YouTube
videos like those described above also invites us to see systems of hierarchical power
from lateral perspectives.
Moreover, and more importantly, we see that when social systems and systems of
power overlap, a great deal of agency is afforded to subjects inhabiting the spaces where
these systems intersect: in the cases of Oscar Grant III and Rodney King, the objective
authority of the camera augments the subjective perspective of the citizen in a space
where the authority of State power meets lateral perspective. This authority gains critical
mass in Anna Deavere Smith’s Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992, wherein a multiplicity of
perspectives forces us to see, if nothing else, the ways in which the surveillance of nonwhite neighborhoods translates into the surveillance of race. Finally, The Wire, beyond
mimetically replicating the narrative framework of a multiplicity of perspectives, shows
us that when systems of State Power meet social systems (like the massive social system
that regulates and perpetuates the inner-city drug trade), the postmodern subject may find
himself in an exceptional space with an exceptional amount of possibility for subjective
autopoiesis, or self-creation.
“The Power to Transgress”: Rodney King, Reginald Denny, and the LA Riots
To digress, perhaps what makes the case of the killing of Oscar Grant III so
poignant is its stark resemblance to the beating of Rodney King (see figures 1 and 4).
The ghostly specter of George Holiday’s filming of the Rodney King beating haunts the
videos of Oscar Grant’s killing, but unlike the video of the beating of King, the multiple
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videos of Grant’s murder carry the authority of the visual image which has the potential
to trump the hierarchical and ideologically charged perspective of police testimony in the
courtroom. In other words, where the authority of the visual image was undermined in
the courtroom by the hierarchical, State authority granted to police testimony in the case
of the beating of Rodney King, the authority of the visual image has been bolstered in the
case of Oscar Grant, in part because there are several videos and still images of the Oscar
Grant III incident as opposed to the singular video of the Rodney King incident, and this
proliferation of objectively captured, subjective perspectives provides a stronger,
interwoven net of marginal vantage points. For the purpose of examining the relationship
between privately captured video and institutionalized surveillance, what is most striking
is that if Holiday’s video was an instance wherein privatized, second-generation
surveillance was seen as an extension of its user’s subjectivity, the aforementioned videos
of the killing of Oscar Grant represent a shift towards the power of collective objectivity
and authority as well as the theoretical stability of the visual image, regardless of who or
what captures or generates it.
The images of the beating of Rodney King have been burned into the American
cultural psyche, and thus they are arguably embedded in most “readings” of video
footage of police brutality against black men, but the comparison of the beating of
Rodney King with the killing of Oscar Grant does warrant some degree of historical
context and description. On the night of March 3, 1991, Rodney King allegedly resisted
arrest when he sped from two LAPD officers (married officers Tim and Melanie Singer)
who spotted King speeding on a San Fernando Valley interstate. King was eventually
stopped after exiting the freeway into a residential area when several other patrol officers
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joined the pursuit and corned King’s car. King’s two passengers exited the car when
commanded to do so, but King briefly remained in the car before exiting, waving at the
police helicopter that had joined the pursuit, and taunting the police by grabbing his
backside (an act that was initially interpreted as reaching for a gun). When King resisted
being handcuffed, he was shot with a Taser twice and knocked to the ground. When
King stood up and allegedly charged one of the officers, he was met with the first baton
blow – the only one necessary to finally subdue King – of several at the hands of three of
the officers at the scene. The unseen, nearby resident who filmed the incident, George
Holiday, happened to be in the right place at the right time with a personal VHS camera.
The tape of this beating instantly became an international phenomenon, and many of
those who commented on the incident, including Tom Holert in his essay “The Politics of
‘Outside,’” have claimed, as Holert does, that “[t]hat amateur video recorded on 3 March
1991 which showed African American truck driver Rodney King getting a brutal beating
by officers of the LAPD did lead to the LA riots” (573).
At the beginning of a decade of American capitalistic decadence in 1991, Los
Angeles, one of the largest cities representing the primary locale for the creation and
circulation of media images that paradigmatically portray and circulate American cultural
and capitalistic excess, was on the verge of erupting into the ensuing acts of outrage
represented by the L.A. riots. There were certainly other contributing factors to the LA
riots aside from the acquittal of the officers involved in the beating of King, but these
riots provided another instance in which the lens of the camera was again used to point
out the shortcomings of Los Angeles police. During the four-day riots in LA at the end
of April in 1992, media helicopters filmed the brutal beating of truck driver Reginald
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Denny as the LAPD looked upon the riots and did nothing to stop the beating. Goldberg
describes the juxtaposition of the media images of the riots and the beating of Reginald
Denny – “that vicious beating of a defenseless white truck driver by young black men
overlooked from afar by inactive officers of the peace” – as the “photographic negative of
Rodney King’s brutal beating at the hands of white policemen” (202). The two images go
hand-in-hand as symbolic specters of institutionalized racism. But, as Goldberg puts it,
“[b]oth images” of Reginald Denny and Rodney King, “boasted the power to transgress,
to be outside the law” (202). In other words, these images represented the violent degree
to which officers of the Law and its subjects can resist ideological regulation.
Unfortunately, these instances also do as much to confirm the importance of the Law as
they do to illustrate our ability to resist it.
The images of “the torching of buildings and businesses” during the Los Angeles
riots as representative of a collective “rage against a class-defined collaboration in
perpetuating the subjugation of the racially marginalized” serve as a fixed point in the
history of the relationship between race and class (Goldberg 202). The “trashing” of
liquor stores, Goldberg suggests, signified a backlash against “the spirit of surplus value
soaked in degradation” and “the pursuit of profit with no regard for the consumptive
effects upon people” (202). In retrospect, these images add to the emotional and psychic
charge of the events that led up to the destruction. In the American social conscience, the
beating of Rodney King has been inextricably bound with the beating of Reginald Denny
and the L.A. Riots. This connection informs our readings of similar events, like the
killing of Oscar Grant III. In other words, the case of Rodney King and the L.A. Riots
have become bound together as a trope in the psyche of American Culture, and whether it
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be through subjective interpretation or systematic repetition, this trope is part of the
ideological and communicative system that perpetuates itself and circulates
institutionalized modes of “seeing,” regulating, and understanding race, gender, class,
and other categories of identification.xi Moreover, these instances have become iconic
examples for the promise and possibility of adding the objective authority of the visual
image to the subject perspective of the subject in periphractic space. They show us that,
in the hands of marginalized subjects, the camera adds objective authority to
marginalized or lateral perspective while highlighting the blind spots in the primary
perspective of State power. In periphractic space, the authority of the visual image may
be the only authority granted to marginalized perspectives, and so it is all the more
important that we are able to recognize and, to whatever degree possible, identify with
the subjective perspectives presented through the technological capture of secondary
observation.
“The Ghosts of White Supremacy”: Race, Class, and Perspective in Twilight: Los
Angeles, 1992
Cultural products that also present the interconnections of multiple, marginalized
perspectives on singular events give us further opportunity to both examine the
phenomenon of subverting prevailing hierarchical ideologies via the capture of secondary
observation and to ostensibly identify with the marginalized individuals whose
perspectives are narrated. For instance, in her stage play Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992,
Anna Deavere Smith captures the multiple voices and largely marginalized perspectives
of the beatings of Rodney King and Reginald Denny, the Los Angeles riots, and the
killing of a young black woman Latasha Harlins by the Korean store owner Soon Ja Du.
Drawn from interviews with people more obviously connected to the events, such as
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Reginald Denny and Ted Briseno – one of the LAPD officers involved in King’s beating
– to local residents and business owners such as a Los Angeles real estate agent and
juxtaposed with public statements issued by people like Elaine Brown, the former head of
the Black Panthers, the famous scholar Cornel West, and former LAPD chief Daryl
Gates, Twilight: Los Angeles consists of a deeply intertwined network of subjective
perspectives that work together to produce an image of a larger whole: an image that,
like a work in modern cubism, appears simultaneously distorted and fantastically
complete.
Moreover, described in the stage directions accompanying the script as well as
portrayed in the made-for-television one-woman performance by Smith herself, a barrage
of video images – from videos of the beatings of Rodney King and Reginald Denny to the
rioting and looting of downtown L.A. to the smoky and smoldering remains of the
aftermath – accompany and contextualize the dialogue. For example, in a scene entitled
“No Justice No Peace: The Story of Latasha Harlins,” Charles Lloyd, with the “defiant
efficiency of an old-time professional radio boxing sports cast announcer,” narrates the
surveillance footage of the killing of Harlins in Du’s downtown L.A. store in an instance
wherein diagetic narrative accompaniment to mimetic visualization of the killing are coenacted:
Boom!
Looka there in the face
Boom!
Latasha knocks Mrs. Du down, the lady throws the chair.
Mrs. Du reaches under the counter,
Picking up a gun now!
Trying to take it out of a holster
Latasha comes up to the counter with the orange juice!
Just like Hollywood— (40)
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Not only does Lloyd’s description of the scene as being “Just like Hollywood” suggest
that it resonates with the manufactured drama of the screen, but it also suggests the screen
effects how we view and interpret the events in the real world.
But film and other methods of subjective expression manifest underlying social
scripts, and both the scripts and their subjective expression are facets of a selfperpetuating, discursive, social communicative system. In the terms of systems theory,
even language is itself a system for which humans provide the environment.xii In other
words, we collectively provide the environment through which a language circulates and
perpetuates itself. Thus the process of providing narrative accompaniment to video
images does more than to make the images seem “just like Hollywood,” it discursively
perpetuates a linguistic system that has a deep impact on the way we “see” and interpret
video images. So too does a discourse – particularly one charged with the teeming crosscurrents of ideological, political, socioeconomic, and cultural underpinnings – function as
a self-perpetuating system. For example, discursive constructions, articulations, and
perceptions of race have tenaciously adapted to modern political and social climates to
ensure survival. In other words, racialized systems of power function discursively. As
Foucault says, “[p]ower is exercised through networks [or systems], and individuals do
not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and
exercise this power” (“Society” 29). Or, more succinctly, “power passes through
individuals. It is not applied to them” (“Society” 29). If “power passes through
individuals” in a discursive network, then its subjects are the environment for the
circulation and autopoiesis of power. In other words, power discursively perpetuates
itself through its subjects.
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Smith portrays the ways in which subjects are used by power, language, and
racialized discourse even as they are blindly caught up in it. Throughout Twilight: Los
Angeles, we see people with radically different perspectives on and interpretations of the
beatings of Rodney King and Reginald Denny during the L.A. Riots using similar
descriptive phrases. For example, Smith presents Reginald Denny’s perspective, spoken
in an interview given in his lawyer’s office, on the beating, his rescue by four local
residents, and his desire to have a personal shrine to the event:
Someday, when I
Uh
get a house
I’m gonna have one of those rooms
and it’s just gonna be
of all the riot stuff
and it won’t be a
blood and guts
memorial
It’s not gonna be a sad
it’s gonna be a happy room
[…]
And there won’t be
a color problem
in this room. (114)
Smith follows these words from Denny with words from Paul Parker, the chairperson for
the “Free the ‘L.A. Four Plus’ Defense Committee” – a committee that petitioned for the
release of Denny’s attackers and for charges against them to be dropped. Smith
masterfully juxtaposes Denny’s desire to have a “color-free” memorial room in his home
with Parker’s similar desire to have a personal shrine to the event:
When I finally get my house, I’m gonna have just one room, set aside.
It’s gonna be my “No Justice No Peace” room.
[…]
and have all my articles,
and clippings and, um,
everything else.
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I guess so my son can see,
my children can know what Daddy did. (118)
Smith’s point, clearly, is that we’re not so different: That people with racially,
ideologically, politically, or socially-informed perspectives that may superficially seem
radically different nevertheless contain underlying, interconnected moments of striking
similarity. That despite the vast differences on the surface, we’re all still human.
Her point is an admirable one, but problematic: for most intents and purposes,
racial differences in America are typically portrayed as paradigmatic examples of
difference itself. Suggesting that, despite our differences, we’re all really the same does
as much to confirm our differences as it does to highlight our similarities. Along these
lines, Smith ends up illustrating the discursive nature of racialized perspectives and
highlighting the individual subject’s role in being part of the larger environment of an
individualizing, if not racializing, discourse. But here, again, we do not use the discourse
to articulate subjective perspective so much as we are used by a discourse that evolves
only to ensure its own survival. In this way, and as I suggest in the previous chapter, this
discourse informs the narratives we construct from visual information, and in the madefor-television, one-woman performance of Twilight, LA, visual information of the
aforementioned beatings and killing along with images of the L.A. Riots provide a wealth
of opportunity to “read into” the tragedies they depict. The readings do more to tell the
truth of the underlying, discursive, systematic perspective than they do to objectively
describe the visual field.
The narrative we impose on this information resonates with the one embedded in
our perspective because it comes from a script deeply ingrained in our social conscience.
In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills articulates the deeply discursive and socially
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embedded framework that perpetuates various forms of naturalized race. “The Contract,”
to use Mills’s abbreviated phrase, is a social one that underpins the primarily economic
exploitation of marginalized races through the spatial segregation of race:
The norming of space is partially done in terms of the racing of space, the
depiction of space as dominated by individuals (whether persons or subpersons)
of a certain race. At the same time, the norming of the individual is partially
achieved by spacing it, that is, representing it as imprinted with the characteristics
of a certain kind of space. (42)
In other words, the relationship between space and identity is a discursive one that
represents the naturalization of certain stereotypes intertwined with how we view certain
spaces – particularly socioeconomically marginalized spaces – and certain people –
particularly people who occupy such spaces. The fact that this discursive system
circumscribes black people more often that it does people of other races and nationalities
intrinsically connects the black identity to stereotypically lower-class parameters of
performative possibility.xiii
And so our “reading” of the images of both the beating of Rodney King and the L.
A. Riots comes with an embedded perspective that often reflects the perspective of a
predominantly white sociopolitical order. In the case of the former, I would argue that
even reading racial motivation into the beating of Rodney King expresses the
fundamental assumption that, in instances wherein the power of the State is violently
enacted on its subjects, the relationship between whites and non-whites mimics, on a
smaller scale, the relationship between the State and its subjects. This assumption is
problematic: We might justifiably speculate about what would have been different if
King were not black, but in so doing we also perpetuate a perspective of racialized
subjugation to institutional authority. Simply put, talking about the beating of Rodney
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King in racial terms mimetically articulates the surveillance of race. We ensure that the
black identity remains ideologically circumscribed by pointing out that the black identity
itself is subordinate to, and arguably contingent upon, white power.
As for “the photographic negative” of the beating of Rodney King during the LA
Riots, from an objective perspective, the media images – which collate the ground
perspective taken by a handheld camera with an elevated vantage point from a media
helicopter – of the beating of Reginald Denny show a white truck driver dragged out of
the cab of his truck and severely beaten by, at first, four black men who are then joined
by a few others. These images, as they were broadcast in “real time,” provided the
impetus and occasion for four local residents – Bobby Green, Titus Murphy, Terri
Barnett, and Lei Yuilleto – to mercifully take action and rescue Denny. But what is
perhaps most striking about this is that several bystanders in “real space” at the scene of
the beating took pictures of Denny but did nothing to intervene while it took the mediated
perspective of the television broadcast to render the images into an event interpretable as
one that required action. This is not to undermine the empathy and courage of Denny’s
rescuers: they may certainly have helped had they been on the street near Denny’s
beating; however, their action does represent one of many subjective and interpretive
reactions to the televised video images.
Nevertheless, it was only the spatialized context of the chaos and destruction
during the LA Riots – which briefly represented an ad hoc exceptional, periphractic space
– that allowed the tables to be turned. In other words, when media images portray a
white man being beaten by several black men, it happens not inside the parameters of
State power, but in the parameters of the dissolution of State power. This perspective,
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too, is problematic because it suggests that black empowerment comes with the cost of
lawless chaos. In other words, institutionalized interpretations of the images of the LA
Riots and of the beating of Reginald Denny can too often and too easily justify the
surveillance of race. Instead, I propose that the riots themselves represent another
collective reaction to an interpretation – a collectively constructed narrative – of visual
information. When the officers involved in the beating of Rodney King were acquitted,
the African American Community was justly outraged at the failure of the
institutionalized and ultimately authoritative interpretation of Holiday’s personal film.
Smith articulates this failure from a few perspectives. For instance, Josie
Morales, described as a “clerk typist, City of Los Angeles, Witness to Rodney King
beating,” reports receiving a subpoena to testify in the trail against the accused officers,
but says that the prosecutor tells her “‘I can’t really talk to you / and I don’t think we’re
going to be using you because / it contradicts what the highway patrol said’” (51).
Sergeant Charles Duke, “Special Weapons and Tactics Unit, LAPD” and an expert
witness for the defense in the King trial, justifies the “fifty-six baton blows” against King
by noting that Officer Powell “was weak and inefficient with the baton training”: that
because the officer was holding the baton incorrectly, it took more blows to subdue King
(53). Duke also asserts that the LA city council prohibited the use of choke holds as an
inhumane use of force, and that the council was thus indirectly responsible for the
excessive measures taken against King. Keith Watson, co-assailant of Reginald Denny,
amazingly hits closest to home in hinting at the interconnected underpinnings of both the
beating of Rodney King and the LA Riots:
Southern California was rocked.
You know?
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I mean the the
the whole infrastructure
the foundation was cracked
Know what I’m sayin’?
The seams of that fine fabric,
that that Los Angeles image that we have?
That California? That sunshine?
You know?
See we showed the insides.
The core. (66)
Smith’s editorial choices in including these particular perspectives doesn’t necessarily
suggest that “the core” of Los Angeles is fundamentally violent; rather, as I have
suggested, she points out the way a perceptual framework simultaneously represents the
collective whole of the subjects represented by it while demonstrating that such subjects
are as much product as perpetuator of the embedded ideological perspectives.
The embedded ideologies are, in Cornel West’s words, “the ghosts of white
supremacy”xiv:
We’ve created certain spaces
where we can take off that mask
and be ourselves.
Our churches,
our nightclubs,
certain streets,
but they are very circumscribed, and
in the end they are still haunted,
by the ghosts of white supremacy. (106)
Ideologically circumscribed, charged with political and socioeconomic currents, and
often subject to surveillance, such spaces simultaneously serve as both the place where
one “can take off that mask” and the place that validates mask-wearing. Institutionalized
surveillance of such spaces – periphractic spaces – theoretically guarantees the continued
circulation of a racialized performative imperative. In other words, as part of a systemic
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circulation of power, surveillance of “black space” is the materialization of the ghosts of
white supremacy.
The System’s Vital Failures: Surveillance, Space, and Race in The Wire
The surveillance of periphractic space is central to the HBO crime-drama series
The Wire. For instance, the show’s opening title sequence includes a black-and-white
surveillance footage scene in which a hooded, black male throws a rock at a surveillance
camera’s lens.xv In this scene, we viewers share the perspective of the camera (see image
5), and we see the lens crack and the field of vision quickly shift upwards, illustrating that
the rock has not only cracked the lens, but also loosened the camera’s support and caused
it to either fall from its mantle or simply turn downward. This scene, taken from the
fourth episode (entitled “Old Cases”) of the first season of The Wire, illustrates a point of
resistance to hierarchical surveillance practices in a distinctly black, low-income housing
project known as “the low-rises” in West Baltimore. In the camera’s frame, we see two
key players in a Baltimore drug organization – Preston “Bodie” Broaddus and D’Angelo
Barksdale – facing the camera’s lens. The camera faces an open quad known as “The Pit”
in the low-rises where D’Angelo operates a drug operation under his uncle and gang boss
Avon Barksdale’s direction, and so, of course, neither D’Angelo nor his crew want their
activity in The Pit to be on the visual record.
What is more important, though, is that both this camera and its destruction
represent the functions of overlapping and arguably co-dependant systems: the camera
itself is symbolic of the larger system of surveillance which is politically, ideologically,
and practically designed to watch and regulate people inhabiting low-income, high-crime
areas; while the camera’s destruction at the hands of members of Baltimore’s drug
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“Game” (hereafter referred to as The Game to stay consistent with the language of The
Wire), itself a social system, represents a symbolic act of resistance. The camera is
located in the spatial and symbolic overlap where state power and criminal activity
mingle – government housing in a high crime area. In spaces like these, mechanisms of
surveillance (such as the camera or wiretap) and representatives of both State power and
The Game, themselves interlocking and intermingling systems, bleed together and open
the space (such as the Low Rise) for each system’s destruction and self-perpetuation.
These are overlapping or liminal spaces where surveillance sutures and separates two
systems – the system of hierarchical power circulated and maintained by the State and its
reciprocal system of the criminal underworld. In the third season of The Wire, for
example, one such space representing the overlap and co-dependancy of these two
systems is “Hamsterdam,” a space in Baltimore where drugs are effectively legalized and
sanctioned.
While season two of The Wire largely represents a departure from the show’s
focus on the inner-city drug trade centered around the Barksdale operation, the third
season returns to this focus and begins with the destruction of Franklin Terrace, the
coveted “212” real-estate for Barksdale’s drug ring. Baltimore mayor Clarence Royce
promises that this low-income high-rise will be replaced with low and moderately priced
homes and a new neighborhood free from the crime and corruption that had, up until the
point of its destruction, characterized it. As characters Malik “Poot” Carr and Bodie
approach the destruction ceremonies where the Mayor gives his speech, Poot waxes
nostalgic about feeling homeless and about losing the place where he “became a man” (or
at least lost his virginity). Bodie responds by noting that what Poot should be feeling bad
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about is the loss of the best place in Baltimore to sell drugs. They are effectively
disenfranchised by the project to reclaim the projects while the city council asserts that
they are returning this zone to the people. The show’s writers often exploit the
similarities between major crime organizations and state institutions such as law
enforcement organizations and political organizations, and this scene is no exception:
while Poot and Bodie discuss the capital value of Franklin Terrace and its inhabitants, so
does the Mayor.
The relationship between space, capital, and subjectivity is an important one: It is
this relationship that, as I discuss earlier, enables the surveillance of race insofar that lowincome areas are typically treated as both non-white neighborhoods and high-crime areas,
and they are surveilled as such. In a metropolis like Baltimore, at least as it is depicted
on The Wire, living in a low-income, high-crime area is essentially synonymous with
being black, and being black in such an area means being subject to surveillance.
Moreover, in The Wire, being a part of a low-income, high-crime, periphractic space
carries the social imperative of being a part of the collective body upon which
paradigmatic State power is focused and enacted. In other words, periphractic spaces in
The Wire represent the larger spatialized context for the surveillance and regulation of
race.
I should also note that a study of surveillance and race is necessarily a distinctly
metropolitan one that, as so many studies of race do, considers black identity, in
particular, from a distinctly socioeconomic perspective.xvi In urban areas, the geographic
segregation of black neighborhoods often conflates race with socioeconomic status so
that it becomes difficult to separate racial marginalization from economic
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disadvantage.xvii Added to the assumption that crime rates are higher in lower income
areas, the policing of segregated neighborhoods often translates into the surveillance of
race. Clive Norris says it best: “rather than promoting a democratic gaze, the reliance on
categorical suspicion intensifies the surveillance of those already marginalized and
further increases their chances of official stigmatization” (266). In other words,
surveillance in racially and socioeconomic marginalized spaces such as housing projects
confirms and perpetuates the social and political stigmatization of the people who live in
them, and, in turn, it guarantees the conditions of its own existence by circulating the
conditions that make this brand of surveillance seem necessary. The urban housing
development, like the aforementioned Baltimore low-rises or Franklin terrace, is the
segregated space where the surveillance of race is most easily justified.
Speaking of the housing project high rise as the “appropriate image of racialized
urban space,” Goldberg notes that the “racial poor [are] simultaneously rendered
peripheral in terms of urban location and marginalized in terms of power” (188). Along
these lines, Goldberg defines periphractic space as relational:
It does not require absolute displacement of persons to or outside city limits, to
the literal margins of urban space. It merely entails their circumscription in terms
of location and their limitation in terms of access – to power, to (the realization
of) rights, and to goods and services. (188)
In other words, and as I have previously suggested, periphractic space is the space of
marginalized subjects, those who have been pushed to the periphery literally or
metaphorically. It is spatial insofar as it is circumscribed in a number of ways –
ideologically, commercially (periphractic spaces tend to have more liquor stores than
department stores), financially (more pawn shops than banks), and thus politically.
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Periphractic space is further racialized to the extent that race can be considered in
socioeconomic terms. As Goldberg notes, “[a]s status, race is simply an index of social
standing or rank reflected in terms of criteria like wealth, education, style of life,
linguistic capacity, residential location, consumptive capacity, or having or lacking
respect” (69). If, as Goldberg puts it, “[r]acisms become institutionally normalized in and
through spatial configuration, just as social space is made to seem natural, a given, by
being conceived and defined in racial terms” (185), then a housing project like The
Wire’s low-rises or an ad hoc space like Hamsterdam are the institutional realizations of
the spatial regulation of race as a socioeconomic status. Any lens through which we see
the racial performative in these spaces is thus tainted by the ideology of periphractic
practice. Simply put, you see what you expect to see, even (and especially) if what you
see is through the mediated lens of the surveillance camera, the wiretap, or other
ideologically-justified mechanism of collecting information. This perspective informs
the parameters of ontological possibility; sets of deeply rooted, and problematically
naturalized expectations inform the discursive system of subjectivity that would have us
simply understand that if one needs to escape the harsh realities of having been born into
a life in the projects, one essentially has two choices: to do drugs or sell them. And so
the visual circumscription of a periphractic space where the parameters of possibility for
racial performance offers its inhabitants with few choices for subjective expression also
comes with the caveat that those who inhabit the space must also behave according to the
ideological scripts that justify the surveillance of the space to begin with. In other words,
surveillance of periphractic space regulates and guarantees the limits to which those
inhabiting it can aspire.
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This is not to suggest that The Wire presents only one option for the black
identity.

Lieutenant Cedric Daniels of the special task force that comprises the central

cast of police officers is played beautifully, albeit woodenly, by the black, Baltimoreborn actor Lance Reddick. Aspiring politician Tommy Carcetti (Aidan Gillen) seeks to
unseat Royce as mayor, and his biggest obstacle is that he, Carcetti, is white. The show
depicts African Americans living and working amongst all strata of the social hierarchy;
however, the hood, the low-income housing projects, and The Game are populated almost
exclusively by blacks, with one striking exception: the tragically white Johnny
Weeks.xviii
Before discussing Weeks in greater detail, as I do below, I want to note that the
options for the articulation of black identity in The Wire are as numerous as the various
subject positions with which we viewers are invited to identify. In The Wire, our
invitation to identify with characters like Daniels, Carcetti, Weeks or a host of other
major and minor characters comes as in imperative to share their perspectives. Often
multiple perspectives are intertwined to illustrate the vastly interconnected and
rhizomatically dispersed network of marginalized perspectives in periphractic spaces.
For example, in the fourth season of the show, the Baltimore City Police watch an
upcoming drug Kingpin Marlo Stanfield by concealing a surveillance camera in the open
area where Marlo holds court with his immediate subordinates. Marlo quickly learns of
the camera, which he steals and mounts on a fixture facing his collection of carrier
pigeons. All the while, Omar Little, the urban Robin Hood of The Wire, watches both
Marlo and the cops who are watching Marlo. From scene to scene, the authority of
hierarchical perspective is simultaneously undermined and augmented by the
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sousveillance inherent in the presentation of lateral perspectives. Along these lines, as in
the cases involving Oscar Grant III, Rodney King, the LA Riots, and the multiple
observers of these instances, postmodern subjects are equipped to observe and record the
blind spots in primary systems of power by borrowing the camera’s authority to augment
subjective perspective.
On Being “Green” and Turning Brown: Johnny Weeks in Hamsterdam
Weeks is, in the first three seasons of The Wire, Bubbles’s sidekick and a
“soldier”-in-training (see Image 6). Repeatedly told by Bubbles that he is too “green” for
the streets but assured that he will be made “brown,” Weeks’s comparable ignorance of
rules of the street and of The Game make it clear that he was born an outsider to the
social system that he is trying to enter. One gets the sense that Weeks probably came to
Baltimore for college and drugged his way into homelessness fairly quickly; regardless,
however he got to the street, it is clear that Weeks comes from a very different
background than that of those he is amongst. He doesn’t belong. His repeated failures in
The Game – repeat arrests, beatings, hospitalization, and so on – are interpreted as bad
luck, but they only further his role as an outsider and as one who has difficulty
internalizing the social scripts – the implicit rules – of The Game no matter how much he
overcompensates through over-indulgence and exaggerated, and occasionally fabricated,
adherence to the rules of The Game as he sees them. Shortly after we first meet Weeks,
he is severely beaten when he and Bubbles try to scam D’Angelo and Poot by using
counterfeit money
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Image 5: We share the perspective of the camera that faces The Pit in the low-rises.

Image 6: Johnny Weeks and Bubbles collecting scrap metal to sell for drug money.
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Figure 7: Johnny Weeks in Hamsterdam.

Figure 8: Weeks’s death bed, surrounded by the accoutrements of his habit.
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to buy heroin. Shortly after being hospitalized, he is given a colostomy bag and
diagnosed with AIDS. Bubbles reacts to Weeks’s “bad luck” by turning informant for
the Baltimore police, working with Officers Jimmy McNulty and Kima Greggs to
identify members of the Barksdale drug operation in hopes of getting vengeance against
those who injured Weeks.xix
Initially, Bubbles’s decision to become an informant is an act of loyalty to his
friend and vengeance against Bodie and Poot, but once he realizes that “snitching” brings
fairly easy money, he continues to snitch well after Weeks has healed from the beating
and well beyond the scope of targeting Weeks’s initial aggressors. Weeks is affronted by
Bubbles’s snitching, and he asserts that even his beating was all part of The Game. He
admonishes Bubbles for not sticking to the code of a “soldier” and urges him to return to
stealing and scamming for cash to support their habit. Bubbles, or “Bubs,” responds by
declaring Weeks to be too much of a “pup” to understand that paying work is paying
work, regardless of its nature. After a period of disagreement, Weeks convinces Bubbles
to scam a working man into giving them cash; however, once Bubbles sees that the scam
is successful, he absconds as Weeks collects the cash.xx We are invited to see that this,
too, is part of The Game.
The Game clearly has its own rules, and it is clearly a self-perpetuating social
system unto itself. I would argue that it is an autopoietic system par excellence: existing
to justify and perpetuate its own existence, circulating the conditions for its own survival,
and using its inhabitants and players as the environment and conditions for its own
continuation. It is holistic and complete unto itself and, like discourse, only adapts to its
environment when adaptation is necessary for survival. The individuals in The Game are
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far less important than The Game itself: People – players, users, dealers, soldiers,
hoppers, snitches, etc. – can come or go, but The Game continues regardless of who plays
provided that the intrinsic positions within The Game are filled. When, for example, a
drug kingpin is killed, another quickly rises to fill his place (see Marlo’s ascent that
coincides with Bell’s and Barksdale’s fall). Weeks’s devotion to the game is interesting,
particularly since Weeks occupies a space so low in The Game’s social hierarchy: Weeks
is a junkie. He exists to consume the product upon which a great deal of The Game
depends. But, as one who comes to The Game as an outsider, he must overcompensate in
order to be naturalized, and so his excessive consumption and self-destruction provide the
guarantee of his place in The Game’s structure. It is his only way in.
It is all too significant, then, that Weeks is amongst the first junkies to be released
into the space where The Game and State Power come together in, to use Giorgio
Agamben’s phrase, “a state of exception”: Hamsterdam, a portmanteau combining the
words “ham,” a reference to the police who sanction the area, and “Amsterdam” (Image
7).xxi As Agamben describes the state of exception as “neither external nor internal to the
juridical order” and “a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each
other but rather blur with each other,” so too does Hamsterdam blur the distinction
between what falls outside and inside of the law (Agamben, State of Exception, 23). It is
within these parameters that Weeks becomes the paradigmatic Agambenian character: the
homo sacer – “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” – whose life is lost inside the
state of exception in order to preserve the State and its exceptions (author’s italics,
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8).xxii But prior to his death, Weeks represents an important
subject position: He is autopoietic while caught up in an autopoietic system – one of the
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exceptions in the state of exception. He effectively re-creates himself as a soldier in The
Game by losing his life to his heroin habit in the exceptional, periphractic space of
Hamsterdam.
I should note that Hamsterdam is free from technological surveillance. Shawn
“Bunny” Colvin, the Western District police Commander who essentially creates
Hamsterdam and unofficially sanctions the legalization of drugs in this space, repeatedly
tells the dealers who have set up shop in Hamsterdam that the area contains “no cameras,
no microphones.” Appropriately, much of the third season of The Wire also contains
fewer instances of the type of surveillance that otherwise characterizes the series. In this
season, tapping cell phones has become far more complicated because the members of
Baltimore crime organizations have started using “burners” – pre-paid cell phones that
are tossed after their minutes are used. By the time an affidavit for a wiretap can be
approved, the telephone number for which the affidavit was written has expired.
Moreover, people who do business in The Game do it face-to-face and rarely in the same
location twice, thus obviating the use of cameras or microphones.xxiii
In a television series named for the show’s MacGuffin – the wire is the
mechanism most closely associated with auditory surveillance and data-veillance –
Hamsterdam would appear to be a significant departure from the show’s focus. It is
tempting to say that the police who physically surround Hamsterdam’s boarders
mimetically reproduce the metaphorical circumscription of space that would otherwise by
facilitated by technological surveillance. Furthermore, it is tempting to suggest that once
social workers enter Hamsterdam with clean needles, condoms, and religious pamphlets
and other materials, that the ideology of State surveillance enters with them.
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Hamsterdam quickly becomes what we would expect it to be: lawless, chaotic, out of
control. Junkies regularly overdose, unemployed hoppers and look-outs (kids once
employed by dealers to keep an eye out for cops) start drinking and fighting, prostitutes
appear in alleyways and in boarded up, vacant residences, and so on. However, rather
than concede that Hamsterdam replicates the practice and ideologies of Panoptic
surveillance, I suggest that it functions on another diegetic level. To take a metaphorical
step away, we see that through its depictions of Hamsterdam, The Wire simultaneously
replicates the ideologies that it critiques, particularly insofar that it suggests that the
absence of the enactment of State Power brings lawlessness, while it mimetically dilutes
the centralized power inherent in these ideologies, particularly insofar that we are invited
to identify with several characters in several subject positions.
However, Weeks’s subjectivity in the context of The Game brings about a striking
conundrum: On one hand, if Weeks does not “belong” to The Game, he is thus doomed
to perpetual inauthenticity, but the problem with a model of authenticity is that this model
is ultimately essentialist. It comes, as Kwame Appiah notes, from romanticism, and it is
“the idea of finding one’s self [… and it is] a matter of being true to who you already
really are, or would be if it weren’t for distorting influences” (17). In other words,
authenticity means being true to an essential Self and choosing social contexts that fit
one’s pre-existing, subjective condition. And so, by the internal logic of the show,
Weeks should be punished by death for his unapologetic inauthenticity. On the other
hand, it is clear that Weeks’s dogged and often over-compensatory adherence to the code
of the street is ultimately Weeks’s attempt at something more existential: to forge a self
in the social system he has chosen. Along these lines, Weeks’s death would finally grant
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him full membership in The Game in which he doggedly tried to fit. But, as Appiah says
of the essentialism vs. existentialism dichotomy, “neither of these pictures is right,”
because the self is not necessarily so rigidly fixed and free from creativity as the
essentialist and romantic model would suggest, nor is the Self entirely free from certain
preconditions that, at the very least, guide the existential, creative, ontological process
(17-18). And so I argue that Weeks at once symbolizes subjectivity under continual
construction, or an ongoing autopoiesis, that is deeply entrenched in the social parameters
of The Game while be continually doomed to repeat the shortcomings that, by his
“nature,” plague him. He represents a subjective formation whose one great stability is
that it is in constant flux and ongoing re-creation. His death, then, is more than just the
necessary condition for the arc of his subjective formation to be complete: it is,
according to the ways in which The Wire mimetically reproduces the ideologies it
critiques, what happens to characters who take too much liberty with their own
subjectivities.
Mimetically, The Wire reproduces the surveillance of periphractic blackness that
conflates race with socioeconomic class. For those who, unlike Weeks, grow up in the
projects, there is a clear and clearly circumscribed parameter of possibility for subjective
expression. Take Stringer Bell, for example: Avon’s right hand man who, after Avon’s
arrest, becomes the interim leader of Barksdale’s crime organization. Under Bell’s
tutelage, the organization becomes more like a business than a crime organization: Bell
organizes and conducts regular meetings for those in his employ where street dealers and
“enforcers” can voice concerns, cast votes for decisions that may effect the organization,
and so on. Furthermore, Bell essentially unionizes the drug trade by bringing Baltimore’s
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gang bosses together into the “New Day Co-Op” of equally divided territory and equally
shared product. As he becomes more of a businessman, his behavior changes: he loses
the stereotypical gangland verbiage in favor of more characteristically white businessman
behavior. He begins buying and developing property and investing dirty money in legal
business ventures. And he does experience some degree of success crossing
socioeconomic expectations for subjective identity expression. However, the ultimate
payback for Bell’s ambition is, of course, murder.xxiv He is killed in the elite
condominium building he has commissioned with drug money after being “given up” by
Avon.
But Bell’s death, like Weeks’s, is presented as a necessity. The surveillance of
race must guarantee that the visibility of race conforms to the expectations embedded in
our perspective of periphractic racial expression. When what once was made to conform
defies the conventions of conformity the systems fails to recognize the failure as that
which can fall within the institutionalized parameters of performative possibility. If,
then, The Wire mimetically replicates the function of institutionalized surveillance, Bell’s
metaphorical and literal attempt to escape from surveilled periphractic space cannot go
unpunished. And herein, perhaps, lies the failure of surveillance as an ideological
apparatus: Municipal surveillance programs of high-crime spaces neither ideologically
deter crime nor practically prosecute it; instead, such programs often do more to punish
than protect those who seek to escape the parameters of such space.xxv But I want to
suggest that the failure also lies in the distribution of mechanisms of surveillance. Where
this distribution theoretically ought to similarly distribute a Panoptic gaze, it instead
enables the aforementioned sanctioning of the authority of subjective perspective. Rather
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than carry the ideology of State Power through the circulation of surveillance technology,
this circulation effects the dilution of State Power. The real failure, then, may be in the
assumption that the authority of a primary perspective gets carried over into the
perspectives of those who are also watching. This is, in practice, is simply not the case.
What happens is that marginalized subjects in periphractic space are able to objectively
capture the blind spots inherent in the primary observations of the ideological system.
Weeks’s and Bell’s deaths, then, merely represent a manifestation of an internalized,
racialized perspective; however, they do not undermine the possibilities for lateral
agency.
Conclusion(s)
In the August 2007 issue of The Believer, the popular, ad-free, hipster staple
source of quirky essays, odd interviews, and unusual product reviews, Nick Hornby
interviews The Wire’s creator David Simon. Simon, who started his writing career by
writing for the Baltimore Sun for twelve years and also wrote Homicide: A Year on the
Killing Streets (1991) and The Corner: A Year in the Life of an Inner-City Neighborhood
(with Ed Burns, 1997), refers to The Wire in terms of a multiple point-of-view narrative
structure, noting that the show’s writers come from a much more solid background of
writing traditional print novels rather than writing for television, and he suggests, as
others have, the structure of the entire series is plotted out much more like a novel than a
traditional television show. He describes his approach to writing for the show in the
following terms: “My standard for verisimilitude is simple and I came to it when I started
to write prose narrative: fuck the average reader,” noting that he would much more prefer
those represented by the show to feel that they have been portrayed accurately rather than
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produced a canned version of the housing projects gangster or inner city cop so often
circulated on crime dramas (76).xxvi Appropriately, reviews of The Wire often present it
as a work in American Realism, suggesting that the show depicts the everyman as one
subject to unstoppable, external, and malign forces. The Wire effectively illustrates that
no organization – from crime organizations to the police force, from the educational
system to the political system, and from the manual laborer’s trade union to the media –
is free from corruption. In fact, it suggests that corruption is a fundamental aspect of
organization, and it often suggests that, when confronting corruption, one is given the
choice to “play or get played.”
To take a step back, I posit, is to see that The Wire mimetically reproduces what it
describes. The Wire opens a space for viewers to conduct the same type of surveillance
being depicted in the show and to theoretically be complicit with the corruption. But, in
so doing, we’re put into the lateral vantage point that enables us to see the blind spots of
the primary observing system. We’re invited to do this, to some degree, by the
occasional use of black and white images that are overtly meant to represent the
perspective of the surveillance camera. The aforementioned scene shot from the
perspective of the housing project surveillance camera is only one such instance. For
example (and these are only a few of many), The Wire presents the perspective of an
elevator surveillance camera located in the Baltimore police department headquarters; we
see Stringer Bell’s legitimate business front – his copy shop – from the perspective of
surveillance cameras installed just outside on the street; we see Lieutenant Cedric Daniels
through the mediated screen of a surveillance system at a State building security check
point; and so on. But more importantly, although we rarely see from the perspective of
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any single character, we are continually invited to identify with characters occupying
various subject positions in the various aforementioned systems. Along these lines, The
Wire also presents the opportunity to legitimize marginalized perspectives. The show is,
in many ways, an aesthetic realization of the postmodern narrative practice of
sousveillance.
Outside of the show, we are granted some agency through the use of secondgeneration surveillance technology to practice sousveillance and to add the camera’s
objective authority to our lateral, subjective perspectives. However, where a multiplicity
of perspectives may, for example, bring justice for Oscar Grant III, it also has the
potential to circulate systemic ideology that would have us spatialize the periphractic
black identity and to collapse socioeconomic status with black urbanity. As I argue in
Chapter Four, the implications of the regulation of categories of identity and
identification expands also to regulate and circumscribe gender and sexual orientation.
For instance, the airport security checkpoint often serves as a regulatory ideological
apparatus that severely limits the postmodern subject’s expressions of gender
identification.
i

Mehserle’s trial began on June 10, 2010. The jury delivered its verdict – guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and not-guilty of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter – on July 8. Mehserle was
sentenced to two years in prison with time-served. Although the public response was not as violent or
destructive as was the case in response to the case of Rodney King, it should be noted there were several
protests and small-scale riots.
ii
The case of Grant’s murder is not the first instance in which second-generation surveillance technology
has been used to question and refute police testimony. New York City detective Debra Eager, a detective
who, in her career, has been responsible for 1,300 arrests, was herself charged with three counts of perjury
when her testimony regarding a 2007 drug bust “starkly contradicted” surveillance footage. Moreover,
privately captured videos of police brutality have been used to question the legitimacy of several arrests,
including the charge of disorderly conduct aimed at cyclist Christopher Long. After a videotape of the
2007 “Critical Mass” cycling event in Manhattan showed officer Patrick Pogan charging Long and
knocking him violently to the ground, Pogan was indicted on charges of filing false paperwork and assault,
and he was released from duty after a long career as a New York police officer. And when a private video
showed fellow New York police officer Maurice Harrington repeatedly and brutally striking black truck

Justus, Chapter Three 117

driver Michael Cephus with a metal baton in February 2009, assault charges against Cephus were dropped
(Hauser).
iii
Queennandi X Sheba of the San Francisco Bay View, a “National Black Newspaper,” calls the shooting a
“legal lynching,” and she writes that the murder “was a reminder of the superiority complex that lies deep
within the Western slavemassa that leads him to believe that it is OK to shoot an unarmed Black man lying
face down, detained, and in the back” (Sheba par. 1).
iv
Domenici also claimed that she wouldn’t have handled the scene any differently than she did and that
Grant wouldn’t have been killed “[i]f they [Grant and the others who were pulled from the BART train]
would have followed orders” (Bulwa, “Cop,” par. 2). Moreover, she also confessed that she didn’t feel the
need to call for back-up, even though she asserted that the incident was intense enough to make her think
that she might shoot someone.
v
Meserhle’s defense asserts that he meant to grab a Taser. His apparent astonishment after firing his
weapon is the basis for this claim (Bulwa, “Mehserle’s Defense,” par. 7-9).
vi
According the southern Florida photographer and blogger Carlon Miller, several cameras were actually
confiscated at the scene.
vii
In an interview with YouthRadio, broadcasted on YouTube, Vargas recently said, “My life has changed a
lot since that night […] I think about the Oscar Grant shooting all the time. It’s become part of my daily
life. I get stopped in stores. I get people asking me questions. It’s a hard thing for me because I know I
have to sit there, and even though I know that I’m telling the truth, it’s hard because I know that the officer
will be sitting there as I testify, just looking at me. And, basically, you know, he’s going to be sentenced to
a long term. If he does.” Clearly, the fact that Vargas has offered her video of the shooting along with an
accompanied testimony has affected her life, but what also becomes clear is that people who, like Vargas,
are in positions to provide subjective testimony have good reason to feel hesitant about doing so.
viii
In a similar effort to use the interpretive act of watching this type of video to police advantage, Harland
Braun, the lawyer who represented LAPD officer Theodore Briseno in the Rodney King trial, responds to
the potential use of the videos of the killing of Grant by noting that “[v]ideotapes can be both useful and
deceptive,” particularly because “they show only one angle” (Egelko par. 8-9).
ix
University of California, Berkeley’s Jennifer King, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and Steven Raphael recently
conducted and published a study of “the effectiveness of the City of San Francisco’s Community Safety
Camera (CSC) program” (6). According to this six-month study which was commissioned by the San
Francisco municipality in March 2008 as an interdisciplinary program through UC Berkeley, there is “no
evidence of an impact of the Community Safety Cameras on violent crime” and that “violent incidents do
not decline in areas near the cameras relative to areas further away” (12). Moreover, there were “no
statistically significant differences in the relationships between the before-after change in crime and the
distance from the camera locations [… and] comparison sites” (12).
x
For instance, Steve Mann has orchestrated such scenarios by building “wearable cameras” affixed to Tshirts that are scripted with the words “For your protection a video record of you and your establishment
may be transmitted and recorded at remote locations” and, in all capital letters, “ALL CRIMINAL ACTS
PROSECUTED!!!” He has discussed at length the problems with what he refers to as “totalitarian video
surveillance” such as that found in department stores “where extensive video surveillance is used, yet
photography is prohibited” and he has confronted such totalitarian surveillance regimes through tactics
such as the wearable camera shenanigan (Mann 533). See, for example, his essay entitled “‘Reflectionism’
and ‘Diffusionism’: New Tactics for Deconstructing the Video Surveillance Superhighway” in the CTRL
[SPACE] edited collection.
xi
Interestingly, George Holiday continues to make the video of King’s beating available online, while Bob
Tur – co-founder of Los Angeles News Media and the man responsible for the filming of the beating of
Denny – has famously sued YouTube for making the video of Denny’s beating available. A quick Google
search of the Rodney King beating will result in several opportunities to actually watch the video, while a
similar search of the beating of Reginald Denny is far more likely to result in articles covering the lawsuit
against YouTube. Certainly, we must concede that there’s a difference between a privately shot video
using consumer video equipment and professionally shot images; however, King’s ghost continues to be
the far more visible one.
xii
See Gregory Bateson’s Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind.
xiii
This claim certainly has shortcomings, particularly insofar that it focuses on the ways in which black
people experience subjection to surveillance with little regard as to the ways in which other races and
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ethnicities experience such subjection. While this remains a topic for future study, I would direct readers to
Wendy Chun’s analysis in Control and Freedom of the ways Asian females experience subjection to a
technologically mediated gaze.
xiv
West’s recent arrest at his own home is yet another example of the ways the “ghosts of white
supremacy” manifest as the surveillance of race. Too little, in my opinion, has been made of the neighbor
who called the police to report two black men breaking into a home a “nice” neighborhood. While we all
certainly do not want to discourage neighbors from looking out for each other, we still must question the
assumptions that this particular neighbor made.
xv
Interestingly, and for no apparent reason, this same footage, as it appears in the fifth and final season of
The Wire is in color rather than black and white. One of the ongoing themes throughout the series is the
advance in surveillance technology as well as the Baltimore Police Department’s increased access and use
of such technology. Perhaps the switch from black and white to color is meant to portray these advances.
xvi
It is “necessarily a distinctly metropolitan” consideration largely because non-urban areas typically lack
both the funds and the spatialized population density to justify or support municipal surveillance programs.
It considers the black identity from a socioeconomic perspective because, as I discuss later in this chapter,
municipal surveillance cameras are often placed in such “high-crime” areas as government housing projects
and “known gang activity areas.” Such spaces, as Goldberg justifiably points out, are typically spaces
representing a brand racial segregation that masks itself as such by using socioeconomic terms.
xvii
In a 2008 issue of PMLA, Arif Dirlik states that “[c]lass more than ever cuts across and through racial
divides. Members of the colonized and the racially excluded have always been included in the ruling
classes, but the transnationalization of class structures with globalization brings forth the issue of class
more insistently than ever – ironically, as class has practically disappeared from analysis with the cultural
and the postcolonial turn” (1376). I would say that, rather than having “disappeared from analysis,” the
relationship between class and race has become naturalized to a point where an analysis of race,
particularly in urban areas, carries socioeconomic implications. See, for example, David Theo Goldberg’s
analysis of race in “periphractic” spaces (Racist Culture), wherein he discusses at great length the
geographic marginalization of black people wherein black neighborhoods have historically been situated in
relation to places of black labor, or work that characteristically pays very low wages.
xviii
The name “Johnny Weeks” itself is fairly descriptive, particularly insofar that Johnny is a sort of
“everyman” character who lives, within the world of The Wire for a fairly short period of time.
xix
It is tempting to read Bubbles’s turn as also being a reaction to Weeks’s diagnosis; however, it is not
until Weeks is released from the hospital and put into a rehabilitation program that Bubbles learns that
Weeks has “the bug.” At this point, Bubbles has already done extensive work for McNulty and Greggs,
and his reaction is ultimately mild. We are only made to understand Bubbles’s assumption (an assumption
that we later learn is incorrect): that Bubbles also has the bug.
xx
A relatively minor but important clarification: It seems to have become common knowledge that it is
Weeks abandons Bubbles out of disdain for his snitching. This is inconveniently not the case. Bubbles
leaves Weeks in order to continue snitching with a relatively free conscience.
xxi
“[…] if the law employs the exception – that is the suspension of law itself – as its original means of
referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for
any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law” (Agamben,
State of Exception, 1).
xxii
And, as Agamben says, in much the same way that Weeks belongs to The Game despite having come to
it from the outside, “Being-outside, and yet belonging [is] the topological structure of the state of
exception” (Agamben, State of Exception, 35).
xxiii
Late in the season, the BMPD finally responds to the “burner” problem as well as the increase in faceto-face meetings by pushing through paperwork to get on a set of recently purchased burners as well as by
installing cameras that focus on public, open spaces, such as the area outside of Stringer Bell’s copy shop.
xxiv
Omar Little, who seeks revenge against Bell for a former lover’s murder, and Brotha Fez, who seeks
retribution against Bell for Bell’s attempted assassination, successfully conspire to kill Stringer Bell
together. I assert that Bell was also killed for defying the performative regulation of black identity.
xxv
One of the primary objectives of the previously-mentioned CSC program is to provide evidence for
criminal investigations and court proceedings. In particular, the program guidelines suggest that the visual
information collected by the cameras is used to corroborate rather than replace eyewitness testimony.
However, in practice, the presence of the camera subverts its own aims: the Berkeley researchers quote
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SFPD investigator anecdotes about instances in which witnesses have been less likely to cooperate in
investigations when their “perception of power” invested in the surveillance cameras causes them to
believe that the cameras might provide “alternative evidence” that could contradict or undermine their own
perspectives (14). In other words, potential eyewitnesses are actually less likely to provide testimony when
faced with the possibility that the camera might present a perspective that is both hierarchically superior
and literally more encompassing. Furthermore, particularly in the case of homicides committed in known
gang activity areas, potential witnesses find a measure of relief in believing that they need not testify (and
potentially face backlash from the gangs involved in crime) since the surveillance camera has theoretically
captured all pertinent information. In effect, the camera usurps both the power of eyewitness testimony and
her voice in the courtroom. As those who could potentially be eyewitnesses see it, the camera replaces
subjective narrative with institutionalized “truth.”
xxvi
Simon’s full quote from the Hornby interview reads: “My standard for verisimilitude is simple and I
came to it when I started to write prose narrative: fuck the average reader. I was always told to write for the
average reader in my newspaper life. The average reader, as they meant it, was some suburban white
subscriber with two-point-whatever kids and three-point-whatever cars and a dog and a cat and lawn
furniture. He knows nothing and he needs everything explained to him right away, so that exposition
becomes this incredible, story-killing burden. Fuck him. Fuck him to hell.”
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Chapter Four:
Private Parts in Public Places: The Surveillance of Sexual Subjectivities
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault, without necessarily intending to, illustrates
that both practical (or architectural, as it is in Jeremy Bentham’s design for the original
Panopticon) and ideological surveillance function as systems: once prisoners in the
Panopticon – or once subjects in hierarchical institutions like hospitals, factories and
schools – are subject to architectural, technological, or ideological Panopticism,
surveillance, according to Foucault, functions automatically. Surveillance is thus also
autopoietic: subjects within ideological Panoptic institutions internalize and practice the
ultimate aims of surveillance by surveilling themselves and each other. And so we can
see that the ultimate result of surveillance is more surveillance.
The political and social effects of autopoietic, ideological surveillance are
widespread: public surveillance has become its own excuse for further implementation;
this implementation has been carried over into second-generation, private technologies
that add the ostensible authority of the camera to lateral or marginalized perspectives; and
this spread of surveillance affects the ways that we narrate, “read,” and identify ourselves
and each other. When multiple sources of visual information gathered from otherwise
autonomous surveillance systems are assembled together in a larger, explanatory
narrative structure – which, as I suggest in Chapter Two, was the case for Hani Hanjour –
they are linked together in a narrative framework similar to that of a conspiracy theory.
Thus, when multiple sources of surveillance footage are linked together by a larger
narrative, it becomes apparent that pairing visual information with explanatory narrative
is as much an act of interpretation as it is description. In such cases, surveillance footage
ultimately becomes subjected to some of the pitfalls and shortcomings of narrative. For
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instance, crucial information may be sacrificed to maintain the appearance of
chronological causality, and the ideological perspective of the narrator (or of the
individual or group responsible for the accompanying text) is usually embedded in the
resulting narrative itself.
As I suggest in Chapter Three, surveillance also affects how we “read” and
conflate race and socio-economic status in public places, and it affects the ways in which
we use visual information to narrate what happens in public enactments of hierarchical
power. This, for example, was the case in the filming of Oscar Grant III’s murder,
wherein multiple points-of-view destabilized the authority of police testimony. And in
Anna Deavere-Smith’s Twilight, Los Angeles, a play that centers around the beating of
Rodney King and the ensuing L. A. Riots, a multiple point-of-view structure emerges as
the best way to narrate something that comes closer to the truth of a lived reality, so that
the play’s narrative structure mimics the ways multiple surveillance systems can be
drawn together for the purpose of creating a larger narrative about race and class. Since
one positive side-effect of this type of multiple point-of-view structure is that
marginalized subjects can add the authority of visual information to representations of
lateral perspectives, hierarchical surveillance of race and class ultimately represents a
failure of this particular regulatory system because it destabilizes itself through the
narratives it generates.
But it may function differently in regard to gender and sexual orientation. This is
not to say that gender and sexual orientation escape surveillance. Quite the contrary:
institutions and ideologies that regulate the expression of sexual subjectivity abound. As
I discuss in greater detail later in this chapter, public places such as public restrooms and
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airport security checkpoints are heavily imbued with regulatory heteronormative
practices and ideologies that typically seek to “out” sexual “deviance.” Thus it is the
questionable visibility of gender and orientation that seem so subversive, largely because
these are categories of subjectivity that can theoretically be most easily disguised or
hidden from view. Where the surveillance of race and class assumes that the bodies of
marginalized individuals already confess their marginalization, the surveillance of
sexuality assumes that sexual subjectivity is buried further under our skin. In other
words, this brand of surveillance is imbued with a complicated series of assumptions
regarding the exteriority and interiority – the surface and depth – of sexuality; and such
assumptions often simultaneously treat the physical manifestations of gender and sexual
orientation as manifestations of an ostensibly stable core. In regulating exterior
manifestations of gender – performances of gendered scripts for public behavior,
enactments of sexual desire, and so on – the surveillance of sexuality also seeks to
ideologically regulate the interiority from which these things manifest. Thus, the
surveillance of sexuality primarily seeks to make the “invisible” visible. However, in so
doing, it also seeks to instill the primacy of heteronormative binaries in the social psyche.
Regarding both the various ways in which homosexuality may be visibly
disguised and the cultural panic that this practice often produces, Lee Edelman notes the
process of “outing” homosexuals, or publicly revealing the orientation of gay men and
lesbians, accentuates the ways in which “homosexuality remains, for most, illegible” (4).
And so the practice of outing “works to make visible a dimension of social reality
effectively occluded by the assumptions of a heterosexist ideology” and that this ideology
“has insisted on the necessity of ‘reading’ the body as a signifier of sexual orientation”
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(4). In other words, revealing a closeted homosexual’s orientation serves the dual
purpose of making sexual orientation visible and of suggesting that our bodies can be
read as symbols of sexual identity. Heterosexuality is thus naturalized in contrast insofar
as it is symbolized by the “unmarked, authentic, and non-representational” body.
Heterosexual articulations of identity become rendered a part of, to use Lacan’s phrase, a
“mottled mass,”i further perpetuating the “us vs. them” mentality that so often pervades
public and political discussions of sexual orientation.
While, then, homosexuality is rendered visible through the process of outing
otherwise closeted individuals, transgender identity renders visible the problems of
naturalizing articulations of gender. The transgender individual represents the subversive
sexual subject who makes public the notion that gender can be scripted onto the body and
who accentuates the inherent performativity of what would otherwise look like something
more essential, or like the “essence” of gender.ii And so we run into a provocative
conundrum: while transgendered manifestations of subjectivity often highlight the
inherent performativity of gender, so too do they problematize the notion of authenticity
in identification within the binary gender system. And so identifying with a gender in
contrast to one’s anatomical sex is typically explained via authenticity. Accounts of this
brand of authenticity often suggest that one’s essential gender has been mismatched with
one’s anatomy, so that performing gender becomes an act of fidelity to some essential
core buried “beneath” one’s physiological makeup.iii
While we must recognize that conflating gender and sexual orientation under the
broader umbrella terms “sexuality” or “sexual subjectivity” may imply that the two are
co-determinate (which is clearly not the case), we must also see that the ideological
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surveillance of sexuality assumes that the two are conjoined twins, particularly at the
point of anatomy, the hyperbolic point where genetic interiority manifests as physical
exteriority. And so it would thus seem that the surveillance of sexuality is the
surveillance of private parts in public places and that this type of surveillance serves to
regulate both enactments of sexual orientation and performances of gender. Edelman
posits a “transformation from a reading of the subject’s relation to sexuality as contingent
or metonymic to a reading in which sexuality is reinterpreted as essential or metaphoric”
(8). In terms of a “readable” gender, the body becomes the metaphor for the illusion that
performances of gender stem from a stable, gendered core created both by genetic
preconditions and even “deeper” essential underpinnings in a subject’s psyche. In terms
of sexual orientation, Edelman’s “transformation of reading” is represented by a shift
from homosexuality as “a discrete set of acts” to an “’indiscreet anatomy,” and this
produces a “powerful tropological imperative that needs to produce a visible emblem or
metaphor for the ‘singular nature’ that now defines or identifies a specifically
homosexual type of person” (8).
To describe the ways in which this metaphor is metaphorically scripted onto the
homosexual body, Edelman coined the term “homographesis.” Edelman defines
homographesis as a “double operation”: “one serving the ideological purposes of a
conservative social order intent on codifying identities in its labor of disciplinary
inscription, and the other resistant to that categorization, intent on de-scribing the
identities that order has so oppressively inscribed” (10). I would posit that the
surveillance camera is a physical manifestation of the ideology of heteronormative
inscription so that the camera not only captures, but also projects the performative
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imperative of the dominant social order onto all those who are within the public visual
field. In Edelman’s words, “[s]eeing no longer precedes in order to produce, as by
‘nature,’ understanding; understanding, instead, becomes a prerequisite for a subsequent
act of seeing, conjured as by ‘a magician’s wand,’ that figures the transformative agency
of ideological perception” (19). While Panoptic practice would ostensibly inscribe
sexuality onto the body to render sexual subjectivity visible, it is also a practice whose
ideological underpinnings determine how public articulations of sexuality are interpreted
and narrated. In other words, Panoptic practice is a topology of “seeing” that follows
ideologically inflected methods of understanding.
The in/visibility of sexuality thus problematizes Panoptic practices. Sexual
subjectivities may represent the categories of identity most heavily surveilled by the
ideological functioning of surveillance, but they are also the categories of subjectivity
that must be wrestled from and then mapped back onto the body in order to be made
observable. Perhaps, then, homosexuality and transgender identities represent the
categories of subjectivity that “de-scribe” the dominant, heteronormative social order.
Moreover, public enactments of both homosexuality and subversive gender appearance
may elicit the largest cultural panic not just because such enactments are often interpreted
(and narrated) as a social contagions, but also because they highlight the fact that so
much of heteronormative subjectivity is essentially performative, or, as Judith Butler has
famously noted, they reveal that articulations of heteronormativity are “stylized
repetition[s] of acts.” Enacting, and thus rendering interpretable or “readable,” queer
subjectivity in publicly surveilled spaces could thus also be read as a type of
homographesis.
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Later in this chapter, I will examine the ways in which the ideological functioning
of surveillance is carried out in public male restrooms in order to surveille and regulate
the performance of masculinity. I suggest that the ideology of surveillance in public
restrooms ultimately highlights the ways in which heteronormative social scripts are
undone by the fact that what appears as the essence of gender is clearly a manifestation of
a heavily stylized performance. And I will also examine the ways in which the
contemporary airport security checkpoint has become the space of sexual surveillance
par excellence: Not only do airport technologies like the backscatter or millimeter wave
scanner – or “virtual strip searches” – carry the secondary function of conflating
anatomical gender with gender identification, they also provide the visual information
that justifies the targeting of individuals who display discrepancy between gender
markers on identification cards and gender presentation. In this regard, beyond
reinforcing heteronormative scripts for gendered behavior, the airport security checkpoint
reinforces the problematic notion that there is a direct, causal relationship between
anatomy and identification.
Moreover, both the public restroom and the airport security checkpoint accentuate
the problematic but pervasive conflation of a subject’s sexuality and her body under the
assumption that the link between the two is an essential core from which both sexual
orientation and gender identity stem. By presuming a direct correlation between the two,
the surveillance of sexuality ultimately highlights the ways in which the two are separate.
It also illustrates that the essence of sexuality is not so much a manifestation of a
biological or subjective essence, but a manifestation of the internalization of
heteronormative social codes and scripts for performances of gender and sexual
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orientation. In other words, the surveillance of sexuality doesn’t so much pull the inside
out as it attempts to push the outside in.
“Behold the God Hermaphroditus”: Hybrid Sexuality Under Surveillance
First, though, I want to briefly look at Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex (2002). The
novel’s protagonist Cal, an anatomical hermaphrodite raised as a female who, as an adult,
identifies as a male, narrates the story; and his point-of-view oscillates between first- and
third-person perspectives as he traces the biological roots of a genetic “mutation” through
three successive generations in his family.iv Repeatedly dealing with the issue of hybrid
identities, the novel seeks to reconcile seemingly contrary identity positions: racial (Cal
is only the second generation of his Greek family to have been born in the United States,
and he often addresses racial segregation in mid-Twentieth Century Detroit); socioeconomic (Cal’s grandparents come to the U.S. with few possessions and no money, his
family rises to working middle-class affluence, and they are eventually financially
humbled during their declaration of chapter eleven bankruptcy); familial (Cal’s
grandparents were born siblings, and her parents are second cousins); and gendered (Cal
repeatedly ponders the duality between masculine and feminine modes of articulation).
At the forefront of various processes of reconciliation (or, at least, of becoming
comfortable straddling seemingly dual identity positions) is Cal’s struggle to naturalize
his identification as a male through a process of expressing sexual desire: The young,
female Calliope expresses and explores desire for other young women – suggesting a
biological predetermination for homosexuality inherited from her maternal grandmother
– however, Cal ultimately decides to live as a male rather than undergo sex reassignment
surgery, effectively naturalizing his sexual orientation via gender. That gender is
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naturalized through heteronormative desire is problematic; however, it is consistent with
the novel’s social, political, geographic, and familial climate and in the time and place of
its setting (1960s Detroit, a Greek Orthodox family, etc.). Insofar that it weaves together
disparate bits of information into a larger explanatory narrative, Cal’s processes of
assembling an identity that straddles various identity categories, and of creating an
identity that presents the hybrid identity as a unique brand of subjectivity, resemble the
types of narrative structure that surveillance practices generates.
Text or language that accompanies surveillance footage – be it as captions or
explanatory narratives – represents an interpretive attempt to bridge the gap between the
present moment of viewing captured footage and the historical moment of its capture.
And, thus, the meaning or significance that becomes attached to ostensibly objective
information creates a temporal rift wherein, in the case of sexual subjectivity, identity is
composed retroactively through a series of interpreted visual markers. Narratives that
seek to explain sexual subversion are interpretations that seek to place the process of
identity formation on a timeline of chronological causality, as if sexual identity is the
final result of a chain of events that inevitably lead to the present moment. I would
suggest that this problematic but pervasive process stems, at least in part, from a longstanding cultural tendency to surveille sexual identity. In other words, cultural
heteronormativity produces methods and ideologies of surveilling gender and sexual
orientation, and this, in turn, affects how we read or narrate sexual subjectivity.
Unsurprisingly, narratives that seek to tell the complex story of sexual identity
development are thus often narratives that piece together disparate bits of information in
a narrative structure of historical predestination. Such is the case, for example, in
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Middlesex. The novel’s narrator and protagonist Calliope (later, Cal) Stephanides begins
by explaining that he “was born twice: first as a baby girl, on a remarkably smogless
Detroit day in January of 1960; and then again, as a teenage boy, in an emergency room
near Petoskey, Michigan, in August of 1974” (3). Born with “5-Alpha-Reductase
Pseudohermaphrodites,” he is an anatomically intersex person who describes the
development of his sexual identity by tracing the path of the previously dormant, genetic
mutation that finally manifests in his body. With the assistance of a physician who
specializes in chromosomal gender differences – Dr. Luce – Cal later learns that the
“mutated gene on the fifth chromosome” was “smuggled” into the United States by his
grandparents, both of whom came from a long line of people who carried the gene, which
appears to have dated back to 1750, manifesting periodically, albeit very rarely, ever
since.
Cal explains that he was born with a “male brain,” but without corresponding
protruding genitalia, and that he was raised as a girl and so exemplifies a great
experiment to “measure the relative influences of nature versus nurture” (19).
Interestingly, Cal claims that “despite [his] androgenized brain, there’s an innate
feminine circularity” in his story; that, in other words, telling the story of genetic history
– which, for him, begins when his grandparents, born siblings, flee Greece and marry
each other – expresses something intrinsically feminine about his process of
identification as a man. But the information he culls together in assembling this story is
often antiseptic and clinical, which stands in contrast to his claims that a “feminine
circularity” would privilege, for example, relationships over hard facts.
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Aside from having an “androgenized brain,” Cal describes himself as “not
androgynous in the least,” noting that “5-alpha-reductase deficiency syndrome allows for
normal biosynthesis and peripheral action of testosterone, in utero, neonatally, and at
puberty” and that “in other words, [he] operate[s] in society as a man,” which he
contextualizes by pointing out that he uses the men’s room – “never the urinals, always
the stalls” – and that he showers in men’s locker rooms, “albeit discreetly” (41). Cal
possesses nearly all of the secondary sex characteristics of a normal man (all except male
pattern baldness), and, upon narrating the story, has lived more than half of his life as a
male. He regards the occasional resurfacing of Calliope – his pre-adolescent female self
– as something like the resurfacing of “a childhood speech impediment” (41).
It is unsurprising that Cal internalizes a medical or clinical perspective of the
various discrepancies between his chromosomal gender and his contrasting experience as
being raised as someone of the opposite sex. During adolescence, when the genetic
mutation begins to fully express itself, Cal is subjected to various medical diagnoses that
separate his gender from his identity. In effect, the hospital functions Panoptically –
ostensibly “seeing” the ways in which his body confesses the aforementioned gender
discrepancies and projecting, back onto Cal’s body, what it sees. And so we are meant to
assume, I believe, that Cal has essentially internalized his diagnosis, particularly since he
so often discusses his genetic “condition” in clinical terms.
But Cal’s story also mirrors the approach of accompanying the information
resulting from visual surveillance with an explanatory narrative that situates identity on a
timeline of inevitability. He casts his identity as the result of a series of interlocking
historical events: the burning of his grandparents’ homeland that pushed the two into the
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“new world” where, rather than continue living as brother and sister, they live as husband
and wife; the marriage of his parents who were conceived on the same night as each other
and born as second cousins; the ultimate result of his family straddling so many contrary
identity positions, and so on. In effect, Cal pieces together these otherwise disparate bits
of narrative to explain his social ostracization. He later discovers that, in an old
dictionary, the term “hermaphrodite” is analogized with “monster,” and he briefly
internalizes his subject position accordingly.v
Cal’s process of rationalizing queer desire is another manifestation of, to use
Debra Shostak’s phrase, “the tyranny of binaries.” The young Callie’s first sexual
experience is with a neighbor girl referred to as “the Obscure Object.” Her second, and
far less pleasurable, tryst is with the Obscure Object’s brother Jerome. Cal’s later
identification as a male is directly linked to his desire for other women expressed most
honestly with the Obscure Object. But, as Shostak puts it “[t]he option does not occur to
[Callie], however, to retain her ‘uncorrected’ anatomy and continue to live as a girl, a
failure of imagination largely connected to her experience of erotic desire for another
girl” (404). This option does not occur to her because she is incapable of recognizing
that this is, in fact, an option. And so it is a massive amount if internalized guilt paired
with the socially pervasive expectations for sexual behavior that underlies Cal’s process
of sexual transition, in terms of both her gender and sexual orientation.
When he refuses sexual “realignment” surgery and decides to publicly identify as
a male, Cal flees Detroit for San Francisco. He ultimately finds work at something like a
burlesque theatre called “Octopussy’s Garden,” where, having adopted the stage name
“The God Hermaphroditus,” he regularly swims in a large tank – an aquarium, as he calls
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it – with sliding windows that open when change is dropped into a slot. In other words,
he puts his anatomy on display, or, in his own words, “I made my living by exhibiting the
peculiar way I am formed” (483). To address his comfort at displaying his genitalia in
public, he notes that “[t]he Clinic had prepared [him] for it, benumbing [his] sense of
shame” (483). And so it would appear that fully submitting to the surveillance of his
sexuality by publicly exposing himself completes a process of transformation initiated by
his biology, catalyzed by his desire, and antisepticised by the clinic (itself a Panoptic
institution).
In her essay that examines the intersection of theory and praxis in Middlesex,
Shostak notes that “questions raised by the hermaphrodite’s narrative center on
embodiment, on the place of the body in constituting the subject” (387). If Cal’s
narrative is, as I have suggested, an attempt to reconcile the embodiment of his process of
identification as a straight male, then the very act of narrating this story represents a
willful attempt to internalize and embody the history of a genetic mutation. Since, for
Cal, so much hinges on his biology, something like a biological essentialism emerges.
Rather than consider his sexual identity as manifesting from an essential core in his
psyche (or other such nebulous, “interior” space), Cal’s essential identity is genetically
determined. And so his sexual desire becomes genetically naturalized as a manifestation
of his biological gender. In short, Cal does what the surveillance of sexuality attempts to
do: he essentializes his identity through observation and narrative. Moreover, Cal’s
narrative essentially suggests that the linkage between his gender and his sexual
orientation is that they both stem from a stable core, so that this connection is made
observable through narrative. However, it is also clear that the narrative’s secondary, and
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more insidious, function is to actually create the illusion that such a core exists. This, I
believe, is a tragic form of, to use Barthes’s phrase, ideological abuse.
Piss Stance: The Surveillance of Gender in the Public Men’s Restroomvi
But Middlesex represents just one of many cultural manifestations of the
pervasive surveillance of sexuality. I posit that the surveillance of sexuality has become
a cultural trope that discursively manifests in cultural products and narratives as well as
in the predominant social order, and so we should be able to locate a repetition of such
manifestations in both culture and its products. As Roland Barthes explains in
Mythologies, “I resented seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, and I wanted
to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological
abuse which, in my view, is hidden there” (11). Like Barthes, I want to approach a
cultural phenomenon—specifically, the “falsely obvious” behaviors that the public men’s
room encourages—as manifestations of ideological, heteronormative, cultural codes for
behavior. Like Barthes’ commentaries on popular culture phenomena, my analysis
should be read as an “ideological critique bearing on the language of so-called massculture” (9), and in the spirit of Barthes’ “ideological critique,” my analysis of the public
men’s room seeks to locate and examine ideological, cultural undercurrents that manifest
in public restroom behavior and to examine the recursive relationship between an
ideological surveillance system and heteronormative male identity.
In its function as a place of gender performance, the public men’s room represents
a stage that both demands specific gender performances and prescribes these types of
performance to its users. That is, as a theater, the public men’s room is a space that
arguably interpellates its users by demanding that they perform according to the
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ideological context that the space requires. Additionally, the public men’s room
functions as a space in which gender performance is comparatively evaluated. That is,
because degrees of masculinity ostensibly manifest at the urinal, the public men’s room is
also a place of competition. Along these lines, I refer to the public men’s room as both a
theatre and an arena to indicate the public restroom’s role as both a stage that demands a
performance and a space that elicits competition. Ultimately it is the restroom’s roles as
both a prescriptive theatre and as a place of competition that accentuate that so much of
what gets publicly treated as essential gender is really just a series of heavily stylized and
deeply internalized performances.
As Lee Edelman notes, “in the twentieth-century American social landscape, the
institutional men’s room constitutes a site at which the zones of public and private
overlap with a distinctive current of psychic charge” (158). The men’s room is
“psychically charged” with the currents of dominant ideological behaviors that, when
internalized, manifest as stereotypical, male, gendered behaviors. On one hand, then, the
rules of the restroom represent ideologies that dictate these prescribed behaviors; on the
other hand, anxieties around the violation of these rules exposes the underlying societal
anxieties regarding gender performance and sexuality.
Unlike that private, domestic restroom, the public restroom separates users
according to their biological gender, and this anatomical distinction reaches beyond a
division of public restrooms. The public restroom ostensibly circulates sexual
differentiation based on the genitalia of its user. For example, in an anecdote about two
children who have perceived “Ladies” and “Gentlemen” restroom doors as designating
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two separate countries, Lacan illustrates the delineation of “urinary segregation,” noting
that:
To these children, Gentlemen and Ladies will henceforth be two homelands
toward which each of their souls will take flight on divergent wings, and
regarding which it will be all the more impossible for them to reach an agreement
since, being in fact the same homeland, neither can give ground regarding the
one’s unsurpassed excellence without detracting from the other’s glory. (144)
The gendered segregation imposed by public restrooms, Lacan suggests, also imposes a
public segregation, further implying that there are gendered differences between the ways
private space is used in these public places. If we entertain the idea that these differences
are sufficient for delineating two genders as cultural, identifying factors, then we can also
see that this delineation casts the cultural differences between men and women in the
same way we might see the cultural difference between, say, a native Indonesian and a
Russian. That is, if we are to perceive the Ladies’ room and the Gentlemen’s room as
spaces that inherently appeal to a user based on her cultural orientation—an orientation
that suggests that gender and genitalia are co-determinant—then our view of gender as
being determined by much more than biological traits is exposed. Moreover, such
perception further illustrates one way in which, to again use Edelman’s formulation,
understanding precedes seeing.
In contrast to the more traditional view of biological determination of gender,
Butler, as I’ve previously mentioned, argues that “gender is instituted through the
stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which
bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an
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abiding gendered self” (“Imitation” 402). Thus, gender manifests in the most minute
physical actions and postures, and, in this sense, we can “read” one’s gender as being
scripted by and enacted upon our bodies. Gender, “an identity instituted through a
stylized repetition of acts,” is internalized via ritualistic, societally regulated
performances (402). The manifestation of gendered behavior—what one does—is thus
dependant upon the performer’s ability to recognize and internalize social gender norms;
thus, gender clearly involves much more than the corresponding genitalia which public
restroom facilities are designed to accommodate. In fact, I would argue that, by virtue of
its ergonomic facilities and in its role as a theatre in which gender is performed, the
public restroom assigns gender differences to its users more than it caters to anatomical
genetic markers. In so doing, the public restroom is itself a physical manifestation of an
ongoing, cultural narrative that seeks to simultaneously describe gender and sexual
orientation while it also creates the fictional core from which the two stem.
In Female Masculinity, Judith Halberstam identifies the public restroom as a stage
upon which it is detrimental to perform one’s gender accurately, and she focuses on
female masculinity in order to expose the problematic societal relationships that poor
female performers (or, more specifically, females who refuse to perform their
femaleness; or, more specifically still, persons who reject the idea of an intrinsic
“femaleness” altogether) must negotiate in the public sphere. Halberstam presents “the
bathroom problem” by highlighting the bathroom’s role as “a gender factory” for
producing stereotypical female behavior (24). The punishment for deviant bathroom
behavior may lead to an “offender’s” run-in with authorities or, at the very least, being
chastised by fellow restroom users. Regardless, by virtue of its role as a place where
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poor gender performers are punished, the bathroom becomes an apparatus for reinforcing
gender norms and perpetuating gender stereotypes. Halberstam notes that, for women in
the public restroom, revealing “decisive gender traits,” such as higher-pitched voices and
protruding breasts, signifies gender, especially degrees of femininity, to other women.
These traits, however, are physical, bodily expressions, or performances, of femininity,
suggesting that a gendered identity is something deliberately superscripted onto and
enacted by one’s body.
Like Halberstam, I seek to explore the ways in which the public restroom
functions as a gender factory, particularly the ways in which the public men’s room
regulates performances of masculinity. Accordingly, in my examination of the various
social scripts that regulate performances of masculinity, I will focus on the urinal. The
degree of visibility, and thus vulnerability, that the urinal actualizes necessitates a few
ground rules and, at the same time, reveals sexually charged anxieties about exposing
private parts in public places. Behavior in typical, public, male restrooms is governed by
a system of unspoken rules that reveal underlying anxieties regarding sexuality. For
instance, men generally avoid standing directly beside one another at a urinal, and they
create what is commonly called a “buffer zone” between themselves and other urinal
users. The exception here is when a restroom is crowded, in which case men are more
likely to gravitate toward a pre-existing “pair” rather than creating a new pair altogether.
Additionally, men typically avoid looking directly at each other while standing at the
urinal. They tend to keep conversation to a minimum, and when conversing, they tend to
discuss exaggerated stereotypical, heterosexual male topics. While these rules are clearly
arbitrary, they still expose societal fears. For one, physical proximity is an important
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factor in the signification of a man’s autonomous, heterosexual identity; and staring
blankly at the wall illustrates the lack of temptation of looking at another man’s genitalia.
Additionally, the deepening of the voice during sparse conversation about, for instance,
sports subtly assures that, although one user is speaking to another during urination, there
can be little doubt about the degree of his masculinity and, moreover, the nature of his
sexual preferences.
The frequency that these rules are followed depends largely upon the extent to
which they are internalized. Apparatuses for social control play an important role in
maintaining the restroom’s role as a theatre for prescribing gender roles. Lee Edelmen
notes that, in response to the increasing need for preserving the ideals of this private
space, “[r]efinements in techniques of interrogation, surveillance, and security
examination” have been increasingly implemented as “technologies of social control”
(560). As I’ve already noted, surveillance functions as an autopoietically selfperpetuating means of social control once it, too, is internalized by both the surveilleurs
and the surveilled. As Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish, “a state of conscious and
permanent visibility […] assures the automatic functioning of power” (201). Along these
lines, I would assert that the public restroom, a place of “conscious and permanent
visibility,” assures “the automatic functioning” of inscribed gender roles, particularly
when ideological surveillance and heteronormative identity formations become entwined
in a negative feedback loop. It is, of course, the restroom users who themselves enact
this brand of ideological surveillance. Although it is not entirely unheard of, the
placement of surveillance cameras in public restrooms would unsurprisingly be met with
great resistance. Even so, technological surveillance in public restrooms is largely
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unnecessary since restroom users themselves carry out the ideological imperative to
surveille each other.
Displays of masculinity in the bathroom along with the unspoken rules of public
urination have become common tropes in popular culture, manifesting not only in webbased games (such as Clevermedia’s The Urinal Game which depicts the aforementioned
urinal “rules”), but also in popular literature, film, and television. For example, in
Walker Percy’s novel Love in the Ruins (1971), the narrator and protagonist Dr. Tom
More prepares to present his revolutionary invention to a crowd of his peers by making
“a last visit to the men’s room.” “Why am I so nervous?” he asks himself, “The Director
has to be on my side”; nonetheless, More’s performance anxiety over giving his
presentation carries over into his restroom observations (199). The scene in which More
finds himself exemplifies some of the rules I mention above:
A man takes the urinal next to me though there are six urinals and mine is at the
end. I frown. Here is a minor breach of the unspoken rules between men for the
use of urinals. If there are six urinals and one uses the first, the second man
properly takes the sixth or perhaps the fifth, maybe the fourth, tolerably the third,
but not the second. (200)
More’s subsequent observations of his fellow restroom user Art Immelmann link
Immelmann’s inappropriate urinal usage to his failure at heteronormative, masculine
performance: “I notice that he ‘dresses’ on the wrong side. He dresses, as tailors say, on
the right, which not one American male in a thousand, ask any tailor, does” (200). This
“small oddity,” as More notes, is “slightly discommoding to the observer” (200). In other
words, More, as both a socialized performer and spectator, questions Immelmann’s
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masculinity based on his poorly performed bathroom behavior. In light of More’s
position as the more heternormative socialized male, Immelmann is even cast as More’s
intellectual inferior, but the opportunity for judgment of gender performance is only
enabled by the close proximity to More that Immelmann subjects himself to.
The degree of potential surveillance in a men’s room is increased by the exposed
vulnerability a urinal affords; thus, urinal rules implicitly depend upon the degree to
which a user both watches and is watched by other users. If, as Foucault would suggest,
“visibility is a trap,” then the men’s room itself, by virtue of its role as a place of
ideological surveillance, is a trap to ensnare and expose potentially sexually deviant
behavior. If, as Edelman suggests, the perceived “rhetorical gesture[s] whereby
homosexuality becomes discernible” as effeminate acts are so accentuated in sexually
charged public places, then deepening one’s voice at the urinal plays a double-role in
bolstering one’s gendered identity while also suggesting another way a gay man can
“pass” as straight (558). The public men’s room, simply by virtue of its role as a place of
surveillance, provides a place where private acts can be publicly surveyed and
stereotypical male behavior can be subtly reinforced.
Like Love in the Ruins, Nicholson Baker’s novel The Mezzanine (1986) also
illustrates the common issue of the urinary anxiety of public performance. The novel’s
narrator confesses his psychosomatic reactions to the vulnerability to surveillance that the
urinal enables:
I was just on the point of relaxing into a state of urination when two things
happened. Don Vanci swept into position two urinals over from me, and then, a
moment later, Les Guster turned off his tap. In the sudden quiet you could hear a
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wide variety of sounds coming from the stalls […] The problem for me, a
familiar problem, was that in this relative silence Don Vanci would hear the exact
moment I began to urinate. More important, the fact that I had not yet begun to
urinate was known to him as well. I had been standing at the urinal when he
walked into the bathroom—I should be fully in progress by now. What was my
problem? (author’s italics, 83-4)
The narrator’s urinary anxiety renders him unable to perform under relatively close
proximity to a fellow urinal user. Vanci appropriately distances himself from the
narrator, providing a buffer zone that would enable the illusion of distance; nonetheless,
in order to appropriately perform, the narrator must ultimately imagine himself
“dispassionately urinating onto the side of [Vanci’s] head” (84). That the narrator must
imagine himself urinating on his colleague suggests that he must picture himself in a
superior position in order to relax his urethra for a piss. In this sense, the narrator
assumes an imagined dominance over his fellow users, thereby alleviating the burden of
performing under surveillance—a burden appropriately referred to as “stage fright.”
Thus the narrator’s performance on the center stage of the urinal demands that he assume
superiority over those for whom he must perform.
These fictional examples essentially do what they describe: by depicting the
“falsely obvious” behaviors that equate anatomy with sexual identity, they circulate the
same ideological underpinnings that they expose. To return to Halbsteram’s examination
of the public female restroom, wherein “decisive gender traits” are essentially
exaggerated forms of the types of performances Butler critiques, the heteronormative
masculine behaviors described above also point towards problematic encounters
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transgender individuals may have in public male restrooms. For instance, Lacan’s
anecdote describing “urinary segregation” as assigning gendered difference based on
genitalia alone ignores sexual orientation and gender identification, much less anatomical
transsexualism, or intersexualism.
And so I view the transgender identity as a beacon of hope, especially insofar that
the transgender identity subverts neat identity categories that the ideological function of
surveillance in public restroom circulates. Unfortunately, however, such subversion is
not often met with kindness and tolerance especially in sexually charged places like
public restrooms: as Halberstam and Edelman point out, transgender people in public
restrooms are too often met with hostility, violence, and, occasionally, detainment by
police. Thankfully, significant measures to protect the rights of transgender individuals
in public places are being taken. For instance, on May 19, 2011, the Connecticut House
of Representatives passed a bill – voting 77-62 – to prohibit the discrimination of people
based on “gender identity and expression.” The bill, which was passed by the Senate on
June 4, 2011, provides protection for transgender individuals in gaining employment, in
attaining credit, and in using public accommodations such as public restrooms.vii
Unsurprisingly, during the five-hour debate that preceded the House vote, the issue of
transgender people in public restrooms dominated the conversation (CBS New York),
and the bill itself has been repeatedly called the “Bathroom Bill.”
As Halberstam asserts, “the bathroom is a domestic space beyond the home that
comes to represent domestic order, or a parody of it, out in the world” (951). Moreover,
the public restroom has come to represent a paradigmatic space of public, gender
surveillance. If provisions such as Connecticut’s “Bathroom Bill” can be passed, then we
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can effectively change the environment of gendered subjective identity formation. In
theory, changing a system’s environment can give a system the opportunity – in this case
the system of gendered subjectivity – to manifest pre-existing components of its internal
structure. In practice, perhaps, public, urinary segregation, a practice that is clearly a part
of a larger system of gender identity segregation, could be ended by such systematic
changes.
Later, I will return to the power of altering public narratives regarding sexuality as
a way steering the discourse itself (such alterations may be made through enactments of,
to use Lauren Berlant’s phrase, “Diva Citizenship,” which I discuss in greater detail in
this chapter’s conclusion). First, though, I want to continue my examination of how this
discourse manifests in technologies of surveillance and gender inscription. If urinary
technology represents a way in which common ideologically heteronormative narratives
are enacted and enforced, so too does the technology at the airport security checkpoint
represent the most recent mimetic manifestation of the surveillance of sexuality and
gender inscription.
From Ticket Booth to Terminal: The “As-If” of the Airport Security Checkpoint
As I’ve already suggested, the surveillance of sexuality happens at the airport as
well in the public restroom.viii Where public restrooms represent the space wherein its
occupants enact ideological surveillance by watching each other, the airport security
checkpoint represents the ways in which such ideologies manifest as technological and
hierarchical practices. In both spaces, the surveillance of sexuality serves to create the
illusion of an essential core from which sexual subjectivity manifests. And, in both
spaces, the performance of gender and sexual orientation are first conflated and then
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regulated, effectively separating the performance from its ostensibly essential core. But
by doing so, it ultimately accentuates the fact that there is no such core. As I note earlier,
Edelman asserts that seeing no longer precedes understanding, but that understanding
precedes seeing. Along these lines, ideological surveillance in the public restroom
represents the ideological order of understanding essentialized gender. This ideological
order later manifests as a technology of making gender visible at the airport security
checkpoint. In short, airport security is part of a larger historical continuum wherein the
understanding of gender later gives way to the technology of seeing, or surveilling,
gender. Before discussing the surveillance of sexuality in the airport, I first want to
discuss the development and rise of airport security technology and how it seeks to create
a rift between a subject’s psyche and her body.
Between the ticket booth and the terminal, most air travelers know what to expect:
the wait lines that, at times, wrap and coil themselves in convoluted mazes and ultimately
usher us into one of a few queues in front of a magnetometer (metal detector) or an
Advanced Imaging Machine (like the backscatter or its competing technology, the
millimeter wave scanner); the plastic bins into which we put our keys, watches, jewelry,
cell phones, iPods, laptops (removed from their cases), jackets, shoes, pocket change, and
so on; the airport security screener employee who functions as the gatekeeper to the
airport terminal; and the hustled dance of returning displaced pocket items, donning the
recently removed sports coat, and fumbling with shoelaces. Everything and everyone
gets undressed. We air travelers typically accept this orchestrated stripping away of
visual makers of identity with necessarily serene complaisance, and, once we have
reassembled ourselves, we enter into the airport terminal. While most such security
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screening measures might make the airport and air travel safer (even if only by creating
an illusion of safety), they also ostensibly function as part of a larger ideological aim of
subjective assimilation. For instance, an air traveler who doesn’t neatly fall into a binary
gender category could be exposed in ways that are unwanted, uncomfortable, and
arguably unconstitutional.
Contemporary systems of airport screening may have inevitably developed along
with rapidly developing technologies; however, after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, methods of and the implementation of advanced surveillance systems were
catalyzed by the ensuing paranoia and fear. Beginning by banning all knives in airports,
including in the dining areas of airport restaurants, on September 12, 2001, the U. S.
government proposed a series of procedures that would dramatically increase a seemingly
justified system of surveillance that would ultimately govern all American airports. On
September 19, for example, New York Times columnists Dean E. Murphy and Joel
Brinkley reported on proposals for future airport security systems, such as “large security
cones, which would be enclosed structures where passengers would be screened by
machines that read molecular structures of the items they wear and carry” and
technological methods of “facial recognition technology, which would compare physical
characteristics of passengers to those of known and suspected terrorists” (Murphy and
Brinkley B1).
Before 9/11, the system of security that governed most U. S. airports was, as
Murphy and Brinkley report, “a convoluted system, where airport owners, airlines, and
the Federal Aviation Administration all [had] overlapping responsibilities” (Murphy and
Brinkley B1). This tri-fold system, put into place in 1973, quickly changed to a more
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regulated system imposed by government legislation. By September 21, 2001, airports
were already “putting into effect new federal security measures, and their presence [was]
evident everywhere, including additional X-ray screenings, body pat-downs, and multiple
identification checks from the ticket counter to security checkpoints to the departure
gates” (Janofsky B9). On September 28, George W. Bush announced official plans for
government-regulated airport security measures, announcing that he “would work with
Congress to put the federal government in charge of passenger and bag screening and all
safety inspections” (“Excerpts” B6); and on November 16, the government announced
the passage of a bill that gave the federal government full control over airport screening.
By May 30, 2002, the U. S. government also instilled a modified version of their
“Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System,” at the security checkpoint (Wald,
“Plan,” A21). This system has repeatedly come under attack by the American media and
public alike; however, such a system is still in place and has become increasingly
bolstered by biometric techniques that catalog a traveler’s physiology and compare it
with databases of both known frequent fliers and known terrorists.
In addition to screening a traveler’s possessions, the TSA has controversially
begun to implement more invasive biometrics systems that check an air traveler’s identity
through fingerprint recognition, iris scans, and facial recognition technologies. In fact,
the National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC) subcommittee on biometrics has
also developed systems of speech recognition, “dynamic signature” measures (which
measure and compare the speed and pressure with which an individual signs her name),
gait/body recognition, and “facial thermography” (which measures the heat a person’s
face emanates).
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More invasive still, and more common, are Advanced Imagining Technologies
(AIT) such as the backscatter and millimeter wave scanners, the latter of which emits far
less harmful radiation than the former in rendering naked images of the traveler.
Opponents to such technologies tend to refer to them as “visual strip searches,” noting
that such searches violate the Fourth Constitutional Amendment, which protects
Americans from unreasonable searches without probable cause, and for good reason.
These machines essentially depict the traveler fully unclothed, and they have proven
repeatedly unsuccessful in detecting materials within body cavities. Moreover, despite
the TSA’s repeated statements that these machines do not store the resulting images, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) obtained documentation from the TSA in
2008 that clearly shows that the machines do store and transmit images “for training
purposes” (“EPIC v. DHS” and Rosen 9).
As the implementation of AIT at airport security checkpoints has increased, so
has the number of complaints regarding the TSA’s practices in what many are calling
“security theater” (insofar that such technology creates the illusion of safety without
actually increasing safety). A growing flood of privately captured video, much of which
has been posted on YouTube, bolsters such complaints. Searching YouTube for phrases
like “TSA,” “screening,” and “airport security” yields a surprisingly large number of
videos of people receiving secondary screening. Videos of children, the elderly, and
infirm being subject to invasive pat-downs destabilizes the apparent, hierarchical power
of the TSA, at least in the public eye. As a result, the issue of invasive screening has fast
become a bi-partisan one: right-wing pundits like Ann Coulter are as likely to decry
invasive searches as are representatives of the more “liberal” media. And politicians on
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both sides of the aisle have raised the issue. Even so, the TSA continues to receive
funding to increase the number of AIT machines nationwide.
In the modern airport, at the terminal entrance, the airport security checkpoint
represents a threshold between the ticket booth and the terminal—between the earthly
place of consumer agency to the purgatory that prefigures the traveler’s ascent. Marc
Augé notes that, in places such as airports (or, in his term, “nonplaces”), “the passenger
accedes to his anonymity only when he has given proof of his identity; when he has
countersigned (so to speak) the contract” into which he has entered and by which he is
governed by the ideological apparatuses at work (Augé 102). There are ways in which the
security checkpoint functions as a facilitator of anonymity in the “nonplace” of the
terminal by only granting such anonymity to those whose identities have been checked.
A gateway between the open, public domain of the ticketing area and the closed, gated,
and guarded terminal, the security checkpoint determines who can and cannot pass into
the transitory space of the terminal. To use Agamben’s phrase, the security checkpoint is
a threshold into a “state of exception” wherein subjects, as they disrobe, empty their
pockets, present photo identification, and, in some cases, surrender physiological signs of
identity, are monitored and even controlled by a system of surveillance that captures,
reconfigures, and re-projects their visual, subjective identities back onto their bodies.
They represent what Agamben calls “homo sacer,” the “sacred yet sacrificial” individual
whose exception reinforces a larger socio-political norm.
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Mark Wallinger, “Threshold to the Kingdom” (2000)
Much like the “rules” for heteronormative masculine behavior in public
restrooms, the methods by which airport security surveillance systems regulate the
subjective identity formations of air travelers manifest in various cultural phenomenon—
from literature, film, and art to internet blogs and television commercials. For example,
Mark Wallinger’s video art installation “Threshold to the Kingdom,” highlights the actual
spectral “capture” of video surveillance equipment. First shown at the Venice Biennale
in 2001, “Threshold to the Kingdom” depicts airline passengers entering the UK from the
International Terminal at the London Heathrow airport. The video is played in slowmotion and is set to the soundtrack of Allegri's “Miserere,” a song of redemption from
the fifty-first Psalm: “Have mercy on me, God, in your kindness / In your compassion
blot out my offence.” Referring to both the entrance to the United Kingdom and the
Kingdom of Heaven, “Threshold to the Kingdom” captures travelers at a unique scene of
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identity transformation. In each scene of the film, the airport security guard functions as
both a gatekeeper to the UK and, metaphorically, as St. Paul, the gatekeeper to Heaven.
But the film depicts more than just the ethereal, slow motion arrivals of airtravelers to the UK: it depicts the transformative nature of both accelerated travel and
systems of identity signification. In the case of the former, systems of accelerated travel
function to “make the world a smaller place,” thereby rendering airline passengers
subject to a more global ideological framework. As travelers in Wallinger’s video art
installation enter London at the international terminal, the gap between their respective
places of international departure and England have been sutured together at their point of
arrival in London. In this way, Wallinger draws an analogy between the “Kindgom of
Heaven” and the International Arrival airline terminal: the terminal, like heaven,
functions as a non-space that, although not limited by national boundaries, is nevertheless
circumscribed by its own set of rules and ideologies. In the case of the airport
functioning as a site of identity formation, in “Threshold to the Kingdom,” for example,
as the passengers move in slow motion to the sounds of “Miserere,” they are caught in a
process of fragmented identity formation. Under erasure, their identities are subject to
the system of interpellation that arguably reconfigures them. Along these lines, as the
Psalmist of “Miserere” pleads to God to have his offences blotted out, so does an airline
traveler have her past erased. As the traveler begs entrance at the mercy of the security
checkpoint guard, so does her plea render her subject to the ideological confinements of
the airport threshold. As the traveler’s past is blotted out and she is interpellated into the
ideological framework of the airport, so does she become rendered faceless in the crowd
of those who have preceded her.
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In Homo Sacer, Agamben notes that, in the state of exception, “[m]an is not a
living being who must abolish or transcend himself in order to become human—man is
not a duality of spirit and body, nature and politics, life and logos, but is instead
resolutely situated at the point of their indistinction” (Agamben 153). Along these lines,
Agamben presents the body as the external signifier of his interiority. In the scene of the
airport security checkpoint, each subject must present himself as the “point of
indistinction” between interior and exterior. The photo ID represents another layer of
indistinction between interiority and exteriority: a visual amalgamation of identity
information—from home address to social security number to categorical gender markers
(information that could be further used as methods of surveillance). In the case of
Wallinger’s exhibit, passengers have hypothetically already subjected themselves to the
system of surveillance; however, as “Threshold to the Kindgom” illustrates, by virtue of
literally visually capturing and visually re-projecting subjects in the final act of airport
interpellation, the system of surveillance is not entirely bound to the confines of the
airport. Subjects themselves carry with them the ideology at work.
Perhaps most importantly, exterior, visual representations of the duality of the
subject’s interior and exterior provide evidence that the subjective interior is constituted
by the visible exterior, rather than vice versa. As Lacan writes:
What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is
outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I
receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through
which light is embodied and through which—if you will allow me to use a word,
as I often do, in a fragmented form—I am photo-graphed. (Lacan 106)
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The instrument of the externalized gaze at the airport security checkpoint—the network
of video and audio surveillance, the security guards, the baggage scanner, the metal
detector, AIT, and other methods of visual identification—functions quite literally as a
mechanism of fragmentation—of graphing the photo, mapping the visual, both off of and
on to each subject’s visual representation—each subject’s body. In this sense, systems of
surveillance, like the gaze, do not only see—they project.
Lacan also discusses the relationship between a subject’s appearance and his
interiority in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function.” He describes the mirror
stage “as an identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the term: namely, the
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [assume] an image—an
image that is seemingly predestined to have an effect at this phase” (Lacan 4). The
exterior image that is projected onto and reflected from a mirror is reciprocally projected
back onto the subject so that he must always be a representation of his reflection—twice
removed from his Self and once returned. This process of externalization and return
introduces a new temporality in the composition of the Self. That is, the subject is not
just currently the image he reflects, but always has been this image and will continue to
be the image. In the scene of the airport security checkpoint, as each subject’s image is
captured, it is also projected back onto his Self. As each subject further externalizes his
interior by presenting his photo identification as a signifier of his identity, he reciprocally
becomes that which he has externalized. This is the complex, entwined, recursive system
of surveillance and subjectivity at work.
However, external markers of subjectivity are open to inspection and
interpretation. As Gillian Fuller notes, “I have been scanned, checked and made to feel
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guilty. I could be a body containing wrong bodies (a smuggler), a body that could
explode (a ‘terrorist’), or I could be a body with no rights (an ‘illegal alien’),” (Fuller par.
16). The key here is that the traveler herself may not even be aware of her guilt. “As
shoes are searched and fire teams do drills,” Fuller continues, “innocence is not
presumed, it must be proved” (Fuller par. 21). Having passed through the security
checkpoint, each subject must not only be deemed safe, but she must also be deemed to
have always been safe. Moreover, it is in relation to the other subjects who have
successfully passed through this threshold and have likewise been deemed safe that each
subject is not only safe herself, but also safe from others.
As Agamben states “[f]or life under a law that is in force without signifying
resembles life in the state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or the smallest
forgetfulness can have the most extreme consequences” (Agamben 52). In this sense, the
airport security checkpoint functions much like Agamben’s state of exception: “The state
of exception is thus not so much a spatiotemporal suspension as a complex topological
figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law,
outside and inside, pass through one another” (Agamben 37). Along these lines, the state
of exception, a “complex topological figure” wherein “the most innocent gesture” can be
interpreted with dire consequences, thus conflates a subject’s zoe and bios. The state of
exception simultaneously treats the subject’s “private life and political existence”
(Agamben 187) by, for one, reading private, “innocent gestures” as public, political
statements. In the case of the airport, for example, a joke, albeit one in poor taste, told
privately about bombs, explosives, terrorist actions, or other politically charged topics
can have “extreme consequences.” Yet, in the case of the public airport, travelers still

Justus, Chapter Four 154
behave “as if” they can still privately say anything they want, but this is only true if they
say what is deemed contextually appropriate in this ideologically-charged and regulated
space.
If all travelers are subject to a system of rules that transforms private conversation
into a public concern, then each subject is rendered an autonomous, anonymous, but
individual part of a larger whole: a blank face blended in with a conglomerate of blank
faces—each of which has passed through the threshold of the security checkpoint and
thus operates in an ideological framework of (non)existence. As Lacan states,
“[m]imicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself
that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage, in the strictly technical sense. It is
not a question of harmonizing with the background but, against a mottled background, of
becoming mottled” (Lacan 99). The performative aspect of the airport security
checkpoint identity enables subjects to “harmonize” with a “mottled background”: it
enables subjects to become mottled. More importantly, the function of rendering
passengers part of the mottled mass further serves to spread the underlying ideological
aims instilled in the security checkpoint. That is, as travelers become mottled, they
performatively assume the contextual demands of the ideologically charged space of the
airport.
As a state of exception for which subjects must first qualify for entrance, the
airport security checkpoint functions as a gateway between the semi-public space of the
ticket booth to the semi-private, exclusive space of the terminal. Not only must each
subject satisfactorily pass through this system of surveillance, but each must also
appropriately signify membership to the gatekeeper. As depicted in Wallinger’s video
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installation, as in the Kingdom of Heaven, those who will pass through the threshold are
those who already belong. Most obviously, each subject must present a flight ticket and
photo identification card to a gateway guard, but more importantly, each subject must
continue to signify a seemingly unstable identity formation at a scene wherein the
subject’s visible presentation has been stripped of some layers of signification. That is,
once the subject has stripped himself of some key outward signification of identity—
jackets, shoes, wallets, and other personal items—the subject must continue to perform as
if he is what—or who—he signifies. Moreover, who he signifies is one that behaves as if
he already belongs in this scene of identity interpellation—as if his behavior at the scene
of surveillance is congruent with his behavior everywhere else. As if to bolster this
feeling of being in the “everywhere else,” the airport terminal functions as if it were a
shopping center or marketplace. As a reference to the consumerist outside world, the
semi-private, exclusive space of the terminal mimics the open public.
In this space, the traveler’s visible performance and its capture by camera and
other devices offer “evidence” of the act, as if visually documented proof dictates identity
formulation. In this sense, the system of surveillance not only captures and records but it
also projects a formulation onto the subject. What has been captured becomes a sort of
prescriptive definition that demands that each subject conform to what has been captured.
On the other side of this scene of visual capture and interpellation, the subject must then
behave as if he is who has been captured, and as if he was the same subject before his
visual capture and interpellation. In this sense, a subject conforms to a unique, hybrid
identity formation woven from three strands: 1) The performative, outwardly signified
identity formation the subject brings into the airport, particularly at the scene of the ticket
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booth; 2) The interpellated, captured visual representation wherein the subject is
simultaneously stripped of some of the outward signification and is nevertheless asked to
manifest an internalized version of the visual representation; and 3) The reconstructed
identity formation that operates in a fantastical scene of false representation.
That is, the visible projection of the self furthers the fragmentation of the self in
much the same way that Lacan’s “mirror stage” does. A fissure between the subject’s
interior and exterior—a fissure that both disrupts and is disrupted by the fantasy of
spatiotemporality between the ticket booth and terminal. The security checkpoint is a
unique spatiotemporal space unto itself. Because each subject is rendered a part of the
mottled mass, because she engages in series of repeated acts, and because this repetition
imposes a retroactive judgment (of safety), the airport operates within a problematic
temporality. Moreover, because this event is not limited to one time or to one place, a
unifying thread is interwoven through each space and in each time of the series of
international security checkpoints. Specifically, the network of surveillance cameras and
other machines used to “detect” harmful materials also capture the subject’s appearance
at the point of his destabilized exteriority. In this sense, the subject’s image—his
exteriority—is captured by the surveillance network.
Perhaps a greater, and more tangible, personal price for the illusion of increased
safety is the exposure of private parts in public places, particularly by the aforementioned
Advanced Imaging Technology, which clearly renders the subject’s body fully, visibly
naked. Some arguably pay more dearly: for instance, travelers with catheters or other
medical issues that require hidden medical devices, such as breast cancer survivors who
wear aesthetic prosthetics, may suffer embarrassment at having such private, hidden
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information made visible. Transgender individuals (particularly pre-operative
transgender individuals) also suffer unnecessarily. Once an air traveler has been
channeled into a line that would take her through an AIT machine, her only options for
avoiding the visual strip search are to leave the line and airport altogether or to subject
herself to an invasive, and too-often aggressive, pat-down by an airport employee. In
both cases, transgender travelers have reported being subject to greater scrutiny and
public humiliation – often through unwarranted outing – by invasive screening methods.
Part of the problem is that of identification markers. A person whose driver’s
license or passport suggests a discrepancy between an assigned gender marker and gender
identification or presentation is routinely subject to greater scrutiny. But a larger part of
the problem is that Advanced Imaging Technology so oversimplifies gender that it
altogether fails to recognize subject positions that fail to conform to one of the two binary
gender categories. The airport security checkpoint thus seeks to theoretically stifle and
erase the subjective legitimacy of those who fall outside of its ideological gaze. Therefore
those who don’t fall neatly into heteronormative modes of presenting and performing
gender are further marginalized by technological and ideological surveillance practices.
This both represents and highlights a significant failure of the complex, recursive system
of gender identity and public surveillance: figures who don’t neatly fit into a gender
category are subject to greater interpellation; however, the result is rarely, if ever, greater
assimilation. Again, the transgender individual in this public space of surveillance
represents the hope of a paradigmatic shift in the environment of heteronormative
subjectivity by positing a unique homographesis that, as Edelman puts it, ultimately describes “neat,” binary gender categories.
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Until practical measures are taken to protect and respect transgender individuals
at airport security, such individuals are likely to suffer increased targeted surveillance.
The National Center for Lesbian Right (NCLR), along with the Transgender Law Center
and the National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE), have begun collecting
personal reports from individuals who feel they have been targeted for additional
screening because they don’t neatly identify or present as the gender marked on their
identification cards. Amongst the common complaints that the NCLR identifies are that
security officials “[make] an inappropriate comment about [one’s] gender,” “[out the
individual] to other passengers,” refuse the individual’s right to opt out of scanning by
requesting a pat down, and forcing the individual “to be searched by a security official
who was not of the same gender” (“TSA Incident Report”). The organization intends to
present the results of the reports to both the TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security.
Such reports could potentially carry with them one of the greater powers of
narrative: to put the reader or listener in someone else’s shoes. There are a small, but
growing, number of individuals striving to do just that. For example, Kyle Jones, who
identifies as a genderqueer butch, runs a blog entitled Butchtastic. A recurring theme on
the blog concerns Jones’s experiences at airport security checkpoints. And, like many
trans people, he addresses the anxieties raised by “passing” at the airport security
checkpoint. For some trans individuals, passing at the airport is the ultimate test of
passing in society, but such behavior only reaffirms the social underpinnings of an
oppressive gender binary. Instead, Jones offers the following advice: “Don’t hide.” For
him, amongst other things, this means wearing a “packy” (a prosthetic penis) through
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security. Such prosthetics are typically registered by AIT as objects that warrant more
invasive secondary screening. Moreover, there have been reports suggesting that wearing
prosthetics through screening often results in the wearer being publicly, and unjustifiably,
outted. The more common approach to prosthetics is to pack them in checked luggage,
which, for many, often feels like removing or amputating a significant part of one’s own
body in order to avoid more public measures.
But Jones wears his. Writes Jones:
Why do I want you to consider packing through security, even if it might get you
challenged, harassed, searched and humiliated? Because the idea of hiding who I
am, just to make the rest of the world comfortable, curdles my insides, and I don’t
think I’m alone in that reaction. Sure, “me being me” is more than uncomfortable
to some people — it’s threatening, it’s confusing, it doesn’t compute. Fuck them.
I do not exist to make other people comfortable and secure in their little bubble of
conformity. (Jones, “Airport Security and Gender Deviance”)
Such “subversive” acts have caused Jones to be targeted for extensive scrutiny. For
instance, he describes an experience at the San Francisco airport, wherein, after being
screened in a backscatter machine, he was approached by a female agent who “asked
[him] if [he] had anything else in [his] pockets or ‘around this area’ as she gestured at
[his] pelvis” (Jones “Exposing Myself at Airport Security”). Upon admitting that he was
wearing a “packing cock,” he was taken to a private room with multiple agents and
forced to unzip his pants and expose his prosthetic penis. Upon leaving the private search
area, Jones discovered that his computer bag would be subject to additional screening by
one of the agents who witnessed his disrobing. In the end, Jones takes the experience in
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stride, noting that the search could have been more invasive. More important, however,
is that Jones circulates subjective narratives in contrast to those circulated by the
dominant social order. In making his story heard, Jones enacts a sort of narrative
therapy: he treats the predominant social narratives regarding gender as something that
need to be healed. And he does so wherein a triangulated system of surveillance mimics
the multiple points of view that surveillance narratives often share.
But not all are as comfortable as Jones in acting in such bold contrast to the
dominant social order. There are several reports that suggest that trans individuals
experience a great deal of anxiety about passing through the airport security checkpoint,
and for good reason. A number of these reports describe instances wherein security
agents have forced individuals to state aloud the gender marker on their passport or
licenses when the marker and the individual’s presentation don’t neatly match. Others
have quoted disparaging remarks received from security agents and fellow travelers. And
many have felt that the discrepancy between their identification cards and their
appearance has caused them to be targeted for additional screening at a disproportionately
higher rate than what less “subversive” individuals might experience.
As exemplified in Wallinger’s “Threshold to the Kingdom,” on the other side of
the checkpoint, subjects typically continue to behave “as if” they haven’t just
deconstructed themselves in a scene of power and interpellation, behavior that continues
the prerequisite performances for gaining admittance to the airplane itself. Subjects
behave as if they have retained their subjective identity throughout the process, as if they
haven’t just removed items of clothing, as if they are in a shopping mall, as if they can
say anything they want, and so on. This denial only functions to further the
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fragmentation of subjectivity. That is, the fissure between the exterior and interior that is
exploited at the security checkpoint is widened and maintained in the “nonspace” of the
terminal. Once the traveler has arrived at her destination, she exits the terminal “nonspace,” and, before leaving the airport altogether, collects her luggage at the baggage
claim. The baggage claim scene confirms the tragedy of the process, bags that, upon
entrance into the terminal, are checked and secured by the system at work—bags whose
contents have been questioned and protected—are now idly cast to anyone—to no one—
in particular. They have, like the air traveler, been processed and forced into the
parameters of a regulated space, and, having been examined, they have been carelessly
ejected back into the public. They, like their owners, typically carry the marks of their
journey into the outside world.
“Diva Citizenship”: Conclusion
Perhaps, as Lauren Berlant suggests in The Queen of America Goes to
Washington City, there “is no public sphere in contemporary United States, no context of
communication and debate that makes ordinary citizens feel that they have a common
public culture, or influence on a state that holds itself accountable to their opinions,
critical or otherwise” (3). The surveillance of sexuality, of private parts in public places,
certainly points towards the erasure of a truly public sphere. And the practices and
techniques of reinforcing essentialized scripts for performing gender and sexual
orientation do more to perpetuate the ideology of difference than to promote the feeling
that “ordinary citizens” share “a common public culture.” And perhaps, as Berlant
writes, a “sexually toxic American culture and a national fantasy of corporeal dignity will
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characterize this story” of marginalized people who are systematically denied agency and
whose identities are de-legitimized (228).
But I will conclude here with another figure of hope: the person who, in Berlant’s
terms, enacts “Diva Citizenship,” which, as Berlant puts it,
occurs when a person stages a dramatic coup in a public sphere in which she does
not have privilege. Flashing up and startling the public, she puts the dominant
story into suspended animation; as though recording an estranging voice-over to a
film we have all already seen, she renarrates the dominant history as one that the
abjected people have once lived sotto voce; but no more; and she challenges her
audience to identify with the enormity of suffering she has narrated and the
courage she has had to produce, calling on people to change the social and
institutional practices of citizenship to which they currently consent. (223)
This is as much a description of subversive agency as it is a call to action: an imperative
for those of us who have been marginalized and disenfranchised by the dominant social
order, as well as those of us who seek social justice for the disempowered. Enacting Diva
Citizenship, as, for example, Kyle Jones does, in places like public restrooms and airport
security checkpoints could ostensibly become one way of “renarrating” the dominant
history, so that the social environment that surrounds issues of normativity can change,
and, in so changing, provide the social milieu for trans individuals or other individuals
who resist neat categorization to flourish.
To return to Edelman’s phrase, enacting Diva Citizenship in surveillance spaces is
a type of homographesis that visually publicizes the inherent problems in so many of the
practices and technologies of the surveillance of sexuality. Since sexual orientation must
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be made visible through the public outing of closeted individuals, we must re-narrate the
dominant social script by publicly decrying the various ways in which sexual identity is
extracted from and then mapped back on to the body. In much the same way that
previously mentioned surveillance narratives rely on multiple points-of-view to
legitimize the truth of a lived experience, so too should we publicize as many subjective
points of view as possible in order to correct the hierarchical, panoptic, and regulator
perspective that has become embedded so deeply in our cultural psyche.
Fictional characters such as Cal/lie Stephanides exemplify a pervasive real world
conundrum: heteronormative ideologies and panoptic institutions too often force those
who don’t fall neatly into one binary identity category or the other to internalize
something like a diagnosis. For Cal, the hospital that recommends corrective anatomical
surgery only projects a method of heteronormative articulation and presentation, so that
he later briefly comes to view his sexual identity as something diseased and horrifying.
Moreover, similar real world practices serve to, as Agamben would say, situate
individuals at a “point of indistinction” between the body and the psyche, so that
individuals who could otherwise be subversive are effectively drained of all agency via
the extraction of identity from and the subsequent mapping of identity back onto the
body.
As Edelman says, understanding precedes seeing, and this is certainly true.
However, Diva Citizenship turns this particular table. By publicly enacting social
subversion, what she renders visible may have a profound impact on what we come to
understand about transgressive identity formations. Diva Citizenship thus represents
hope that the surveillance of sexuality will ultimately fail to function as a stifling,
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invasive, and regulatory practice. More importantly, enactments of Diva Citizenship
reappropriate the aforementioned narrative structure wherein disparate bits of information
are culled together to create a larger narrative regarding subjectivity in public: such
enactments represent homographetic corrections to the narrow vision and ideological
short-sightedness of the larger, hyperbolic, panoptic eye. In other words, Diva
Citizenship is one way of pushing against heteronormative social scripts in a way that
facilitates greater recognition, legitimacy, and agency for those who are so often
marginalized.

i

See Lacan’s “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud.”
I should note that many transgender individuals view their gender as something essential. My
constructivist approach is not meant to undermine or devalue any means or method of forming and
experiencing a stable identity. Instead, what I am here suggesting is that so much of what we consider to
be the essence of each of the two, traditional binary genders is really nothing more than a product of a longstanding and ongoing process of naturalizing what are, in fact, constructions. In other words, gendered
articulations of subjectivity are products of pervasive social scripts. I personally find it troubling that so
many people, cisgender and transgender individuals alike, often feel that they must legitimize their gender
identities via essentialized authenticity when, in fact, gender identities that don’t neatly conform to the
gender binary should be openly and publicly recognized as equally valid ways of being in the world (as
should identities that do conform more closely to an essentialized gender script). I view the essentialization
of gender as another way in which individuals who don’t neatly or readily conform to the dominant social
order are further marginalized. One of my intentions is to add my voice to the growing chorus that seeks to
legitimize non-binary gender categories.
iii
This is not to suggest that the transgender identity is not legitimate as a category of identity that falls
outside of the male/female gender binary. Quite the contrary. Trans individuals suggest that there are
many ways of identifying in the world that are both legitimate and that subvert the aforementioned binary.
iv
The switches between first- and third-person perspectives happen most notably when the older maleidentified Cal discusses his sexual experiences, desires, and processes of maturation as the young, female
Calliope. In other words, Cal consciously refers to his younger, female self as another entity altogether in
an attempt to distance himself from that part of his identity.
v
It should be noted that Cal also clearly associates his genetic mutation as a direct result of inbreeding,
effectively re-articulating his grandmother Desdemona’s belief that the family would eventually be
punished for her and her brother’s incest. That hybrid identity is viewed as a form of familial punishment
associated with incestuous love underpins Cal’s view of himself as a freak or a monster.
vi
A longer version of this section was published as an essay, entitled “Piss Stance: Private Parts in Public
Places,” in 2006 in Studies in Popular Culture (28.3).
vii
The passing of this bill makes Connecticut the fifteenth state, in addition to D. C., to protect transgender
individuals in the workplace.
viii
I am indebted to Emilia Dunham, the Program Associate for the Network for LGBT Health Equity at
Fenway Community Health Center in Boston, Massachusetts, for providing insight into the issue of
transgender identity at airport security checkpoints. Emilia also directed me to organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Center for Transgender Equality who have been fighting
ii
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the implementation of invasive screening procedures. Perhaps most importantly, Emilia helped me
cultivate greater empathy for the suffering that unwarranted and unconstitutional searches cause members
of the LGBT community.
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Chapter Five:
Dataveillance: DataNarratives in the Age of Information Proliferation
Until this chapter, my focus on visual surveillance has been underpinned by a
basic assumption that the primacy of visual information supercedes that of other sensory
information – both in terms of the ways our brains have evolved to privilege sight over
other senses and in the ways American culture has increasingly privileged visual media
over other forms of media. Accordingly, the most readily apparent forms of
technological surveillance are visual – both insofar that visual surveillance technologies
are meant to themselves be seen, which includes the strategic placement of cameras (or
devices that are made to look like surveillance cameras) in public places along with
accompanying signage that declares the surveillance of public space (such signage serves
as a powerful visual symbol which, as I report in Chapter Three, functions nearly as well
without the actual accompaniment of cameras) and in the fact that so much of this
surveillance is conducted via cameras as opposed to audio recording devices or other
technologies of non-visual surveillance.
As for the evolutionary primacy of visual information, our cerebral cortex and our
occipital lobes – the parts of our brain responsible for processing what we see – represent
the brain’s largest centers for processing sensory information.i And it’s easy to see why:
Amongst our earliest animal ancestors, the sense of sight would have been vital for
survival. In the process of becoming ambulatory, early animals and insects needed to see
the space in which they would move about as well as to see all potential threats to their
vitality. Undoubtedly, the development of the eye played an enormous deciding factor in
natural selection, thus it is also of little surprise that the eyeball so fascinated and
perplexed Darwin, who viewed the eye as the body’s most advanced organ, so much so
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that he allegedly questioned his own theories of natural selection when faced with
explaining how it came into existence. We have since come to understand that the
eyeball likely evolved from light-sensitive brain matter. Thus, perhaps it is the
evolutionary, developmental age of the eye as well as the probability that it evolved from
brain tissue that further explains why our brains have so accommodated and ostensibly
privileged the visual information they receive.
Because of the ways our brains privilege visual information, it is no surprise that
the primacy of vision has long been a pervasive cultural force – from the role of public
theatre as a prevalent form of entertainment that has historically superceded its print
counterparts (for instance, in Sixteenth Century England, more people saw Shakespeare’s
plays than read them) through the multifarious forms of visual entertainment like cinema,
television, and YouTube that proliferate today. Examples of a widespread preference for
visual media abound, and arguably, because they have been so favored, they have
developed and proliferate exceedingly rapidly. In fact, I would argue that contemporary
practices and technologies of visual communication have grown and proliferated
exponentially in accordance with Moore’s Law.
Moore’s Law is named after Gordon Moore, a co-founder of Intel, who, in 1965,
successfully predicted the exponential increase in the number of transistors that can be
placed on an integrated circuit at a relatively consistent cost. In short, Moore predicted
that this number would double every two years. It turns out that he was not only
uncannily prescient, but that this prediction also has broader applicability to other types
of technological progress. For instance, the storage size of computer hard drives has
progressed accordingly. Optical networking is progressing at a rate faster than what
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Moore predicted. And, while critics have noted that Moore’s Law has become a selffulfilling prophecy in the technology world insofar that manufacturers now set goals for
expansion accordingly, and while it has been further noted that such progress induces the
obsolescence of a great deal of technology, others have asserted that technology tends to
progress at its own, independent rate: that if one tech company does not develop
technology that pushes forward exponentially, another will.
Perhaps more interestingly, as visual media technologies have both exponentially
expanded and diverged, so too have various forms intermingled. Many television shows
include supplementary web-based phenomena to create a greater and more involved
experience for the viewer. Likewise, television entertainment has migrated to the web.
Virtual venues ranging from YouTube to Hulu to Netflix and so on have naturalized the
conflation of personal computers, television, and the cinema. This move is significant for
many reasons. For one, it represents the increasing convergence of computer technology
and entertainment, a convergence that seems to be having increasing spillover effects, not
the least of which is inherent in some significant, fundamental ways in which information
is legitimized and disseminated. Moreover, this convergence mirrors the convergence of
hierarchal surveillance technologies and private, second-generation surveillance
technologies. Taken together, the convergence of multiple forms of surveillance added to
the convergence of communication technology and entertainment has created new
narrative forms wherein multiple sources of surveillance footage are disseminated
through social media outlets like YouTube which have been, in the brief period of their
existence, primarily associated with entertainment. While the phenomenon resonates
deeply with so much so-called “reality television,” it does exemplify a cultural trend
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towards viewing surveillance footage for the purpose of entertainment, not unlike the
emergence of the hybrid forms of “docutainment,” “edutainment,” and “shockumentary.”
Such convergence is perhaps best exemplified and demonstrated by the modern
smart phone. Triangulate the modern phone’s ability to capture video with its perpetual
connection to the internet with the internet’s many opportunities for distributing
privately-captured video, and you have a pocket-sized method of practicing what I’ve
previously referred to as Diva Citizenship (a phrase and a figure I borrow from Lauren
Berlant). Such was the case, for example, in the filming of the killing of Oscar Grant III
and the digital distribution of this footage. And such continues to be the case for a
variety of purposes: 2011 has, as of this writing, been a year in which smart phone
technology combined with social media has been exceedingly significant in international
cultural and political movements such as the “Arab Spring” phenomenon in the Middle
East and the recent “Occupy Wall Street” movement, or in a phrase that more accurately
parallels its Middle-Eastern predecessor, the “American Fall.” The smart phone conflates
various forms of media and communication so that the line between entertainment and
communication is continually blurred, so much so that to distinguish the two from one
another seems superfluous – as is the case in many social networking sites like Facebook
and YouTube. Moreover, such social media sites are increasingly becoming preferred
venues for information dissemination, thus the ways in which information is legitimized
and circulated have been fundamentally and, in all likelihood, permanently changed.
As I’ve already noted, surveillance footage is typically accompanied by an
explanatory narrative, at the very least in the form of captions, so that such footage often
triangulates various forms of media – particularly text, video, and audio. Friedrich
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Kittler, in his essay “Gramophone, Film, Typewriter,” famously presented these three
technologies of media production as having “separated the data flows of optics, acoustics,
and writing and rendered them autonomous,” so that these technologies of capturing
sensory information created individual categories of media (114). The ways in which
modern communications technologies conflate text, film, and sound have brought us to a
point where the work that Kittler’s three media-making machines no longer represent
distinct categories of mediality. However, one need look no further than the smart phone
to see that modern communication technologies have returned us to a point prior to the
historical divergence of audio, video, and text captured and created by the gramophone,
camera, and typewriter.

Buffalo Trace Bourbon Distillery
An Unidentified Restaurant,
Times Square, Manhattan
near Lexington, KY
Location Unknown
Each of these screen shots were taken on the evening of September 12, 2011.
Each image comes from a live feed of an Axis 2100 surveillance camera.

But the cell phone is far from the only example of the ways previously separate
forms of technology have conflated. Private and public surveillance cameras often
provide news stations with the opportunity to remotely monitor traffic or weather; store
owners with the ability to monitor their store during off hours; child and pet-care
facilities with the option to provide their clients with the ability see their children or pets
while away from them; and so on. Many such systems – such as the Axis 2100 series of
surveillance cameras – can be easily hacked by performing a simple Google search for a
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bit of code embedded in the software that provides otherwise encrypted web-based
access.ii When this software flaw was first discovered in 2007, hacking into such systems
became a form of entertainment for even the most amateur hackers (the first two images
above were taken by me after searching for a bit of code indigenous to the Axis 2100
software platform).iii Since then, unsurprisingly, many such systems are being increasing
implemented for the dual purpose of entertainment and panoptic practice: such as New
York City’s systems of cameras that are not only hosted through an openly accessible
website, but that can also be repositioned remotely by its users (the third image above is a
screen shot of a feed that has been made publicly available). Systems such as New
York’s put paradigmatic Panoptic practice to use: there might ostensibly always be
someone in the proverbial observation tower.
Arguably, surveillance technology has also developed exponentially, even as it
has dovetailed with entertainment technology. In fact, surveillance has clearly become a
form of entertainment unto itself: this was perhaps most overtly acknowledged with the
creation of the aptly titled reality television series Big Brother. The growing number of
other such “reality” television programs, a genre that, amazingly, also seems to
exponentially expand, only bolsters the role of the surveillance camera as a technology of
entertainment. Subversive figures, such as the New York City players, who enact public
dramas in publicly surveilled places, further force this into our public conscience.
This phenomenon resonates with much of what I have claimed throughout this
dissertation: that, as visual surveillance technologies continue to proliferate, and as we
see second-generation technologies being increasingly used to add the illusion of
objective authority to marginalized perspectives, we see the subversive significance of
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representing multiple perspectives show up in several ways and in many cultural
products, not least of all in web-based phenomena like Elahi’s Tracking Transience
project or the more ubiquitous practice of posting videos of police officers abusing their
authority; in literature such as Deavere-Smith’s Twilight: Los Angeles, 1991 or DeLillo’s
Cosmopolis; in news broadcasts that link together multiple surveillance systems in a
larger, explanatory narrative structure, such as in the story about Hani Hanjour; and so
on. This phenomenon is becoming increasingly pervasive and is having some significant,
cultural effects. For instance, as I’ll discuss later, this phenomenon has rendered
multiple-point-of-view narrative frameworks more intuitive, natural, and common. More
importantly, it has also fundamentally destabilized the reliability of traditional narratives
told from singular perspectives. And I should note, again, that text accompanying video
footage, for instance, typically represents the hierarchical position of the person or
organization presenting the material. The proliferation of visual information
accompanied by social media’s multiple venues for information dissemination is a game
changer in the world of subverting hierarchical structures. As I’ll argue later,
information-disseminating websites like Wikileaks along with phenomena that spring up
around the liberation of information (such as the Arab Spring and American Fall) have
altered the ideological structures in which they operate so much that the ways in which
one might even act subversively within a modern hierarchical structure have changed.
As a narrative structure, the multiple-point-of-view approach that I have
repeatedly discussed in this dissertation is becoming increasingly common. And this
narrative approach is arguably expanding so that multiple independent narratives
sometimes provide an additional perspective for each other. For instance, in the popular
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reality television program Project Runway, a group of designers parade their clothes in
front of judges by choosing models to wear their clothes on a runway. Since the show’s
inception, a companion piece developed which centers on the models themselves –
Models of the Runway, which aired for only two seasons. Models of the Runway depicts
the events in Project Runway from the models’ perspectives rather than the designers’.
This certainly isn’t the first instance of a television show spin-off providing another
perspective on the characters or contestants in the original, but it is an excellent example
of the ways in which the narrative approach mirrors a larger approach to representing the
world as we experience it: through multiple perspectives that draw from visual
information to add authority to otherwise marginalized subjectivity.
And, of course, it is not visual information and accompanying narrative alone that
mirror this structure. In the Information Age, all information – be it visual, auditory,
textual, numerical, and so on – might simply be considered pure information, pure data.
The practice of collecting information – often described by the inadequate portmanteau
dataveillance – is another massively proliferating approach to surveillance.iv From the
Puritanical witch hunts of the late Seventeenth Century to McCarthy’s Cold War hunt for
communists, the practice of gathering multiple streams of information and tying them
together through explanatory narratives charged with hierarchical, ideological
perspectives is nothing new. Dataveillance, or the process of collecting data transmitted
via computers or other communication technologies such as smart phones, is practiced by
corporations that mine for consumer trends, by the government to ostensibly monitor
terrorist or other criminal activity, by individuals for purposes ranging from monitoring
spouses or romantic partners for signs of infidelity to business owners or managers who
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monitor their employees’ computer usages. It is a prevalent practice and is conducted
within an ideological, hierarchical structure far more often than not.
Dataveillance is essentially another manifestation of a cultural system wherein
techniques of observation ultimately feed into pervasive narrative frameworks. Used by
an investigative branch of the government, the material collected via dataveillance
typically feeds into a narrative structure that points towards whatever inevitable
conclusion that particular hierarchical system wishes to reach. Performed by
corporations for the ostensible aim of gathering consumer data, the information typically
serves to create targeted marketing campaigns for very specific demographics. Used by
individuals, the information is typically plugged into an explanatory narrative structure,
about, for instance, what one’s spouse or children “do” on the computer when they are
alone. In all cases, dataveillance is not unlike traditional, Panoptic practice: the observer
almost always represents a hierarchical position of proverbially looking down from
above. And so my intention in this chapter is to examine the ways in which this
pervasive cultural force 1) affects popular narrative structures and influences the ways in
which we read and interpret information and 2) opens up new virtual spaces and
facilitates hitherto uncommon methods of subversion. In short, I believe that both
emerging narrative structures and methods of subversion stem from the same phenomena,
that emerging methods of observation have had great influence on the rising popularity of
multiple point-of-view narrative structures that serve to decentralize the authority of
hierarchical surveillance and that this phenomenon has some significant “real world”
analogs, such as Wikileaks.
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To equate visual information with pure data may, to some, seem counterintuitive:
in part, because information gathered via dataveillance is generally seen as being less
subject to interpretation, largely because it is ostensibly objectively verifiable. But
insofar that so much visual information is disseminated via modern communication
technologies, it is all ultimately reducible to the same type of code used to transmit any
message between two or more electronic communication devices. Moreover, since, as I
suggested earlier, multiple forms of media have been conflated into streams of digital
information, the encoding of all information – visual or not – ultimately suggests that all
information is either already digital or waiting to become digitized.
As a result, there has been a massive conflation of various types of media as well
as a conflation of what exists as digital information and its analog counterparts. As this
conflation continues, several interesting phenomena take place. For one, the line between
the digital and the analog is increasingly blurred, and the significance of a difference
between the two is all but lost. Virtual environments are increasingly setting the stage for
various types of “real world” practices and policies: by, for instance, simulating war
environments in order to craft better approaches to actual warfare; designing economic
structures based on game theory wherein non-material consumption in virtual worlds
offers a new way to understand real world economics; and setting stages for massive and
immersive narratives across various different media platforms and venues.
Edward Castronova notes that, in the so-called “exodus to the virtual world,” so
much of what is happening in various virtual environments is having an increasing real
world effect. For instance, non-material production in virtual spaces like Second Life
may earn an avatar a certain amount of Linden dollars, the currency of this world, which
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may be traded for real world currency. It is estimated that thousands, if not millions, of
dollars are circulating in this way or in similar ways (such as selling “experienced,” and
thus powerful, World of Warcraft characters on Ebay), little of which is accounted for in
any single country’s gross domestic product. In other words, the virtual world has a
significant impact on global economics. Moreover, and more clearly, the virtual world
impacts politics, as it has in cases wherein grassroots organizations make real world
change through social media. The instances of political change in the Middle East during
the aforementioned Arab Spring, particularly in places where social media and “leaked”
information has been used to broadcast images that governments would want to suppress
or to organize rallies in ways that would have otherwise been impossible (as was the case,
for instance, in Tunisia and Egypt), have exemplified the virtual world’s power to be a
place that facilitates change by giving voice to marginalized perspectives. Such has also
been the case in the aforementioned American Fall, or Occupy Wall Street / Occupy
Together, movements.
As various forms of media converge to create hybrid media and new narrative
structures, so to does the amount of recorded information increase. Insofar that the
internet might be considered a continuously expanding repository of information, so to
does it become a virtual primordial ooze from which new genres and narrative forms may
arise. There are those who argue that virtual narratives represent a move beyond
postmodernism, and this stance is certainly compelling. For instance, Postmodern
cultural products, as Frederic Jameson observes, might be viewed through the lens of
schizophrenia and trauma – especially insofar that both divorce symbols from what they
symbolize and break and restructure chains of symbolic associations so that the person
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who suffers from schizophrenia or PTSD engages in a productive narrative process of
creating new meaning from old symbols. Along these lines, much of the work of
Postmodern literature, film, and art similarly deconstructs culturally pervasive symbols
and metaphors and reconstructs alternative chains of associations – between popular
tropes, historical periods, perspectives, and so on. Accordingly, works in Postmodern
literature often “borrow” from various genres to create a pastiche of conflated genres and
hybrid narrative forms.
If schizophrenia and PTSD are the indigenous psychological disorders of
Postmodernism, then autism and Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) are arguably the
representative psychological conditions for what comes next. The majority of those who
suffer from autism suffer also from a hypersensitivity to sensory information, and those
with ADD tend to struggle to focus on singular streams of information for an extended
period. In the age of massive information proliferation, the rise of disorders related to
information sensitivity highlights the ways in which we understand the significance of
information dissemination. Accordingly, contemporary narratives have increasingly
become assemblages of multiple streams and forms of information. Many contemporary
narrative structures mimetically reproduce the anxiety associated with managing
information overload. Moreover, the contemporary novel may “borrow” from another
genre, but rather than use a borrowed genre to also borrow its inherent conventions, the
practice of assembling together multiple genres looks more like the modern day “mashup,” or a narrative structure that blends together multiple genres and multiple media in a
way that mimics the larger proliferation of information – a proliferation wherein the
distinction between various types of information or various forms of media matters very
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little. In other words, contemporary narrative structures often mimetically represent the
contemporary convergence of multiple genres and media, a method of artistic production
not entirely unlike the autistic or ADD experience of information overload. Moreover,
by virtue of presenting multiple threads of information, many contemporary narratives
are also often constructed much like conspiracy theory narratives, wherein the proverbial
“end” of the story is known and essentially all associated information can be plugged into
an explanatory narrative structure that seems to point towards a specific, inevitable end.
But where conspiracy theorists assume that a conspiracy is tied to a hierarchical power
structure, this new contemporary narrative structure is rarely built upon hierarchical
authority. More often than not, it is quite the contrary: contemporary narrative structures
often go so far as to remove even the ostensible authority of a narrator or of an unlimited
point-of-view. For these reasons, it would appear that such structure is predicated upon
the relative equality of information from multiple sources and perspectives.
Convergence Culture and Information Multiplicity
Convergence Culture, explains Henry Jenkins, happens when and “where old and
new media collide, where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the power of
the media producer and the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways”
(2). The phrase speaks to the ways in which content and information flows “across
multiple media platforms” as it also describes interactions and cooperation between
media industries as well as “the migratory behavior of media audiences” who tend to
refrain from privileging one platform over another in search of entertainment.
We see this occurring in many ways. One of the more prevalent is the
development of contemporary spoiler cultures that spring up around popular television
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shows. Jenkins focuses on Survivor in describing this culture, particularly since the show
can ostensibly be “spoiled” by people living in or visiting the areas where the show is
filmed or by people who are close to one or more of the shows participants – both
contestants and crew alike. This culture surrounds other programs as well: most
recently, televised dramas with sprawling narrative arcs are often subject to scrutiny and
informed speculation by zealous fans. On True Blood fansites, for instance, fans that are
able to procure promotional materials such as frame shots or promotional photos, or those
who respond to casting calls to discover the descriptions of new characters, speculate
endlessly on the directions the show will take. And this particular show is already
loosely based on a series of novels! In other words, the print media that itself contains
detailed information about the possibilities for the various televised narrative threads is
not enough to satisfy a spoiler culture once it has sprung into existence.
As Jenkins notes, one thing that the spoiler culture demonstrates is a larger
cultural tendency to simultaneously distrust and desire insider knowledge. On one hand,
spoiler culture illustrates a clear privilege for those who know over those who don’t.
Accordingly, within this culture, as in many other web-based social spheres, a great deal
of policing by the culture’s members serves to weed misinformation from true spoilers.
On the other hand, by removing expertise from those recognized as experts by, more
often than not, removing information from institutions that are designed to circulate it,
spoiler culture also exemplifies the ways in which cultural hackers strive to reconstruct
the system by which expertise is conferred. This is very much in line with the hacker’s
maxim that “hackers should be judged by their hacking, not criteria such as degrees, age,
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race, sex, or position.” In other words, spoiler culture often decentralizes the authority by
which expertise is conferred or earned.
This position is a familiar one to those who publicly leak information online.
Inarguably, the most famous leaker of the Twenty-First Century thus far is Julian
Assange, the editor-in-chief and the public face of Wikileaks. While I must note that
Assange claims only to be the face of a formerly wiki-based website that has historically
allowed its users to leak information on their own, he occupies an interesting cultural
position: Assange is at least popularly viewed as a disseminator of information across
several channels of communication, and, even if only because he has become the de facto
“face” of Wikileaks, he is accordingly subject to much attention and scrutiny. Regardless,
by virtue of the fact that he is the face of an organization that seeks to make all
information “free” (both in capitalistic terms and in “spatial” terms, insofar that his
information is not limited to one virtual space) he symbolizes one of the great ways that
the hacker credo has helped liberate information. In short, Assange does not so much
represent a new authority in the realm of information dissemination as he represents an
ultimate manifestation of the internet’s potential to destabilize authority and open
authority to the scrutiny of multiple perspectives. Moreover, Assange illustrates that the
greater authority goes to those who provide the most unfettered access to information as
opposed to those who guard and disseminate it.
While I’ll save extensive discussion of Wikileaks and Assange for later in this
chapter, what I want to suggest now is that Wikileaks has become another information
generator for the types of multiple point-of-view narratives that are highly saturated with
various streams of information. John Johnston calls the literature that stems from this
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narrative approach “novels of information multiplicity.” To contextualize, Johnston
explains that “contemporary culture – or more specifically, what is called postmodern
techno- or cyberculture […is] an artifactual space created when information restructures
modern or traditional culture in order to make it a better habitat for information” (3). In
other words, contemporary culture’s relationship to the proliferation of information is to
make of itself a more suitable environment for the proliferation of information.
Accordingly, in Johnston’s formulation, novels written in the Information Age
take on the characteristics of the culture of information that produces it. Such novels
look like assemblages of otherwise disparate bits of information and otherwise unrelated
genres. Johnston draws from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus to explain that
an assemblage “constitutes not a structural unity or totality but only a functional
consistency or ‘jelling together’ of diverse parts and processes” (14). As such, the novel
of information multiplicity, or the application of the assemblage to other narrative forms
(which I’ll call DataNarrative), appears fragmentary and incomplete: under perpetual
construction with no real conclusion. I posit that more and more novels and other
narratives (like many of those I’ve discussed in this dissertation) that fit this description
will be produced alongside the exponentially growing proliferation of information, and
that popular narratives and the popular media outlets through which they are
disseminated will become increasingly enmeshed. In other words, I argue that because
technologies of information capture and dissemination are becoming increasingly
prevalent, so, too, will the types of narratives such technologies generate proliferate. One
recent and excellent example of this is Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad. I
feel I must note that this novel, as many recent novels are, is available with additional
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multimedia components when purchased for e-readers such as the Kindle or iPad.
Clearly, narrative frameworks are not just being influenced by the proliferation of
digitized information, but they themselves are also part of such proliferation. Moreover,
they represent a brand of media aware of their own shifting mediality. Many of them
have arguably become both examples of exponential technological growth and cultural
metaphors of such growth. Such is arguably the case for A Visit from the Goon Squad.
“X’s and O’s”: Human Beings as “Information Processing Machines” in A Visit
from the Goon Squad
2010’s Pulitzer Prize in Fiction winner A Visit from the Goon Squad has been
heralded by some critics as a novel that pushes beyond the characteristics of postmodern
fiction. In other words, it has been suggested that the novel is post-postmodern, or, as
some would have it, “post-contemporary.” It is not terribly difficult to see why: it is a
multiple-point-of-view and multi-genre novel comprised of a series of interlocking short
stories that privileges no single perspective of one character over another, each of whom
play only a distant role in the focus of most of the novel’s chapters, and jumps between
various historical periods and locations. Moreover, the narrative framework spills far
beyond the boundaries of the printed (or, as is the case in its e-reader versions, digital)
text itself: for instance, Egan has created a soundtrack to accompany the novel which she
hosts on her website; there exists a widely circulated, full-color PowerPoint presentation
to mirror the one that appears in the novel; the novel itself becomes a part of its own
internal framework (a narrative approach I explain in greater detail below); and, perhaps
most notably for the sake of my larger argument, it represents an assemblage of data,
pieces of which are situated as independent chapters, which can be assembled together by
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the reader in different ways into a larger narrative structure. Theoretically, the reader
could read the chapters in any order she chooses (although they have already clearly been
ordered by Egan); however, as one reads, it becomes clear that the narrative structure is
not predicated on chronological causality. In much the same way that digital information
on the Internet blends multiple historical periods in coexisting components of the present,
so too does the novel arrange the histories of each character as part of a larger presenttense assemblage.
Most of the novel’s chapters can function as independent short stories, and some
have been published as such: The New Yorker alone published three of the novel’s
chapters as shorts – “Found Objects,” “Ask me if I Care,” and “Safari.” And so it would
appear that the novel, as a set of interlocking stories, is something like a modern-day
Winesburg, OH. Thus, clearly, this narrative approach is not altogether new. Even the
fact that the novel blends genres – one chapter appears as a newspaper article, another as
a PowerPoint printout – doesn’t really push us beyond Postmodern narrative structures.
Using multiple genres as pastiche is certainly a defining characteristic of postmodern
fiction, and the practice of linking together multiple short stories into a larger narrative
predates postmodernism (by a long shot, Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales arguably follows a
similar narrative structure). Even so, I assert that the novel represents something that has
only been fully recognizable in the Twenty-First Century: First, the novel mimics the
multiple-point-of-view narrative framework facilitated by information gathering and
disseminating machines like surveillance cameras and smart phones; second, to use Kate
Hayles’s phrase, the novel models an “infinite regress of observers” – a series of nonhierarchical, if not marginalized, perspectives – necessary for an authentic depiction of its
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foci; and third, it mirrors the ways in which the contemporary, massive proliferation of
information coalesces into raw material from which multiple narratives told from
multiple points-of-view can be culled. As such, it represents a DataNarrative not unlike
what Johnston has called “the novel of information multiplicity.”
The novel’s setting is loosely centered on the periphery of the punk rock scene in
and around Los Angeles in the late 1970s and early 80s, but it jumps forward to the
present day and our near future and as far back as the mid-60s. Its final two chapters
flash forward into a dystopian future where corporate-driven, consumer dataveillance (or
as it is most often called, “data mining”) is the rule. As it raises questions regarding the
authenticity of the central characters’ subjectivities, it examines the relationship between
socioeconomic status and labor, particularly in light of the relative value of artistic labor,
and characteristically blends elements of high and low culture so that the difference
between the two is essentially indistinguishable. Moreover, a recurring theme that runs
throughout the novel is the existential, inevitable, deathward progress of all narratives.
The novel’s title itself plays on the metaphor of a time as a goon that robs us all of our
youth, potency, and power.
Perhaps what is slightly less common is the way that central characters so often
appear in the distant periphery of each chapter’s focus. The narrator of each chapter is
typically so far removed from the other characters that we only retrospectively
understand their role in lives of the characters with whom we are ostensibly meant to
identify. Moreover, the novel itself decentralizes the notion of central characters
altogether. Where the overarching story line at one point seems to be about Bennie
Salazar, it quickly shifts to his mentor Lou, and later it becomes apparent that so much of

Justus, Chapter Five 185
the larger story is actually about Bennie’s former assistant Sasha. Even so, the novel
contains stories about Bennie’s wife Stephanie; Stephanie’s boss Dolly; Dolly’s associate
Kitty, who was once interviewed and then assaulted by Stephanie’s brother Jules, a focus
of another chapter; Bosco, an aging punk-rocker who plans a suicide tour and gives sole
coverage rights to Jules; Sasha’s best friend in college Rob; Sasha’s daughter; and so on.
To best illustrate the ways in which A Visit from the Goon Squad exemplifies a
post-contemporary narrative structure that mirrors the intermingling of narrative forms,
themes, historical periods, and subjective perspectives, I feel that some small amount of
summary is warranted. The novel opens a few years after Sasha has stopped working for
Bennie in what appears to be modern-day New York City. It depicts the first (and only)
date Sasha has with a man named Alex who has just moved to the city and who Sasha
finds exceedingly boring. This story is framed by a visit to Sasha’s therapist, and we
learn that Sasha is a kleptomaniac. During the date, she steals a woman’s wallet in the
restroom and is unwittingly apprehended but not arrested. Later she steals a personal
note kept in Alex’s wallet. The second chapter focuses on Bennie a few years prior. In
this chapter, Bennie struggles with the impotency that accompanies age and takes odd
measures to regain the potency of his youth: by, for instance, putting gold flakes in his
coffee and making a sexual advance on Sasha. Both of these chapters are told from an
unlimited, third-person perspective.
Every chapter thereafter moves us further away from or in various social
constellations around Bennie and Sasha. The third chapter moves us one step away from
Bennie and several years back to the late 1970s Los Angeles punk rock scene. The
chapter’s narrator, a freckled young girl named Rhea who is a groupie for Bennie’s punk
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band, muses on her friendship with Jocelyn and their inner-circle love triangle where
everyone loves someone else except that no-one loves Rhea. In this chapter, we, along
with Bennie, are introduced to a wealthy music producer named Lou, who, we later learn,
hires Bennie into a major L.A. record label. This is followed by a fourth chapter that
centers around Lou’s middle-aged excursion to South Africa where he takes his children
and young girlfriend, a picture of whom appears in Rhea’s narrative, suggesting it
occurred nearly a decade prior to Rhea’s story. Neither Bennie nor Sasha appear in Lou’s
safari, but we see the return of the issue of dealing with the stereotypical, aging male fear
associated with declining potency, power, and machismo. The fifth chapter moves
forward to depict Lou on his deathbed. It is narrated by Joceyln, the once dear friend of
the aforementioned Rhea. Jocelyn and Rhea visit Lou in his home, and the time that has
passed since their last visit is illustrated through Jocelyn’s remembrance of squandered
opportunities and of Rhea’s comparative successes, even if only as a mother. Lou, in this
chapter, becomes the spectre of impotency, a metaphor for the deathward spiral of all
narrative arcs, especially, in the context of the novel, Bennie’s.
This chapter is followed by another first-person narrative, this time narrated from
the perspective of Scotty – Bennie’s bandmate in youth and a former friend of Joceyln
and Rhea’s. Scotty visits Bennie in a Manhattan high rise at the height of Bennie’s
success as a record label owner and producer. This confrontation forces Scotty to
recognize his own impotence, although he had convinced himself that all experience was
reducible to “Xs and Os” – pure information – that one can acquire either via direct
experience or indirectly through popular media like television and the internet. Thus,
Scotty had assumed that the experience of potency and power was something he could
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gain second-hand; however, in his confrontation with Bennie, Scotty realizes that his
view – that humans are essentially “information processing machines” and that
information can be gained either first-hand, through direct experience, or second-hand, by
vicarious experience, such as what one might get through watching television or surfing
the Internet – is problematic. We later learn that, as systems of communication and
entertainment continue to converge and exponentially advance, Scotty withdraws from a
life of vicarious experience, choosing instead to spend his evenings repetitiously eating
the same meal (string beans), drinking the same thing (Jagermeister), and essentially
doing the same thing (fishing in the early morning, ostensibly writing songs in the
evening). Because of this withdrawal, Scotty later becomes a beacon of hope as a
musician who has clearly been untainted by the corporate processes by which consumer
taste is monitored and manufactured. Moreover, the repetitive pattern of Scotty’s life
stands in stark contrast to that of an information society that operates under the notion
that experience is attainable second-hand through communication and entertainment
technologies. In other words, because Scotty ultimately rejects the notion that all
experience is reducible to “X’s and O’s,” or as the zeroes and ones of which digital
information is comprised, he ultimately symbolizes the inherent hope of neo-Luddhism:
to live free from the shackles of technological progress and retain the authenticity of
direct, real-world, albeit repetitive, human experience.
Scotty tells Bennie, who has assumed that the visit was prompted by a desire to
gain a recording contract, that he only wants to know Bennie’s story of “A to B” – or the
story of how Bennie has gone from being a poor, untalented bass player in a largely
unknown L. A. punk band to a powerful and reputable producer. This phrase has greater
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significance to the novel itself. The novel is split into two parts: A and B. In this sense,
the novel exemplifies another way in which media has become aware of its own
mediality, that on various diegetic levels, the novel itself straddles the “inside” and
“outside” of the story. The novel as a thing is a part of the novel as a narrative. Scotty’s
visit marks the end of the novel’s first part, the tale of a character who shares striking
resemblance to Scotty – the story of Bosco, the aging punk rocker who once fronted the
The Conduits, the band who brought Bennie his success – begins part B.
In this first chapter of the novel’s second half, Bosco has recorded an album
entitled A to B, another nod to 1) the passage of time implied by Scotty’s original
statement; 2) the separation of time both within and outside of the novel’s narrative
structure; and 3) the structure of the novel itself. Although we learn much about Bosco in
this chapter – that, for instance, he wants one last stab at fame in attempt to “flame out”
on stage by returning as a grossly overweight, haggard, washed-up fifty-something
wannabe rocker – the story focuses on Bennie’s wife Stephanie. The couple has moved
to an affluent, conservative neighborhood whose social circle finds its hub at a posh
country club. Their move into this area, along with their accompanying country club
membership, symbolizes Bennie’s rise to affluence at the height of his potency.
Stephanie, accompanied by her ex-con brother Jules, visits Bosco to discuss promotion of
A to B, and Bosco gives sole rights to record the process of his ultimate decline and
demise to Jules. In this chapter, Bosco calls time a “goon,” a phrase after which the
novel is titled, and he declares that he will embark on a suicide tour, effectively draining
death itself of its potency.

Justus, Chapter Five 189
Chapter Eight returns to the metaphor of time as the proverbial power-sapping
goon. This chapter focuses on Dolly, who was once known as La Doll while leading the
promotions firm where Bennie’s wife Stephanie worked. Dolly’s own power was lost at
a promotional event wherein a poorly planned, large, ambient art installation made out of
a dangerous concoction of oil, water, and intense (and subsequently hot) light melted and
collapsed, injuring several high profile guests. In this chapter, Dolly has been hired as a
political promoter to revamp the image of a highly controversial South American general.
Her final stunt is to pair the General with the washed-up Hollywood actress Kitty Jackson
who was once known for being exceedingly polite and benign, but who, after being
attacked by Stephanie’s brother Jules, has become acerbic and publicly opinionated.
Upon meeting the General, Kitty makes several deliberately offensive political remarks,
including an accusation regarding genocide, and things initially go horribly until Kitty is,
presumably by the General, given back her life as a high-profile actress. This chapter is
followed by a news article written by Jules while in prison awaiting charges resulting
from his earlier attack on Kitty. From it, we are meant to understand that Kitty ultimately
internalizes Jules’ own harsh perspective on reality.
Chapter Ten returns us to Sasha in the form of an unusual, present tense, secondperson account from her close, college friend Rob. It is the early 1990s. Mainstream
culture is abuzz with the change in the White House: Clinton has recently been sworn in
as president. We learn that Sasha is a freshman at NYU: a student in her early twenties,
having spent time overseas – first in Japan, then Hong Kong, and finally Italy – under
shady and dubious circumstances. It is in this chapter that Sasha meets Bennie at a
Conduits show. She returns to Bennie’s apartment for an after party, and it is presumably

Justus, Chapter Five 190
there that she first agrees to work as Bennie’s assistant. Rob, who clearly projects his
desire for Sasha onto her boyfriend Drew, reveals to Drew that Sasha had once been a
prostitute and thief. Rob follows Drew, who seeks to escape from both Rob and the
information Rob has provided, into the Hudson River and drowns. From here, the
narrative moves back a few years and centers on Sasha’s uncle who has traveled to
Naples to search for Sasha at her parents’ behest. We see, in greater detail, the version of
Sasha that Rob describes to Drew. Here, again, the multiple perspective approach of this
novel illustrates a relatively recent, but pervasive, cultural trend towards representing the
truth of a lived reality through an intricately interconnected series of perspectives.
Theoretically, the more perspectives there are, the fewer the blind spots.
The novel’s penultimate chapter moves forward to a dystopian near-future: May
14 and 15 of 202_. The chapter takes the form of a PowerPoint printout that Sasha’s
daughter Ally creates in lieu of maintaining a personal journal.v In it, Ally reveals that
Sasha had once lost contact with Drew, but that they were reunited via Facebook, shortly
after which they married. Drew has become a successful medical doctor, a career path he
chose the day Rob drowned. We also learn that, in addition to having a daughter, Sasha
also has a son who appears to be autistic. They live in what once was a golf course that
has since become a desert. Global warming has destroyed much of the earth’s fertile soil,
and drastic measures have been taken to preserve the earth’s remaining natural habitats.
It is in this chapter that the novel’s own structure is allegorically represented by one of
Sasha’s hobbies: assembling collages of disparate and relatively insignificant bits of
information – from grocery receipts to notes about meetings to newspaper clippings and
so on – so that the loosely assembled information aesthetically represents a larger story
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that revolves around the nuances and banality of her life as a mother and wife. In so
many ways, this narrative approach of assembling together bits of information that lack
strong, clear ties to each other is strikingly similar to the novel’s own narrative structure.
The concluding chapter returns us to NYC where Bennie, having been fired from
the record label he founded, works as an underground and largely unknown record
producer. We learn that he was fired for serving cow feces at a CEO dinner in order to
make a point about the ill effects that marketing music to young children – a hitherto
largely “untapped” market in the music industry – has had on the quality of popular
music. In this chapter, he has reunited with his childhood bandmate Scotty, who has
managed to evade having any web presence as well as having managed to remain free
from the massive interconnectedness and conflation of various forms of media. Most
communication, consumption, and entertainment is facilitated by “handsets,” which have
clearly evolved from the modern-day smart phone, that function as communication
devices, multimedia centers, cameras, GPS locators, and so on. This future depicts NYC,
and the world at large, as having fully evolved into a complete surveillance state;
however, most of the surveillance is conducted by marketing firms seeking to track and
regulate consumers buying habits. As a result, consumers have become desensitized to
marketing via communication technology, and so word-of-mouth endorsement has
become the most valuable and highly coveted method of advertising. Consequently,
legitimacy and authenticity have become high character traits: the instant that one is
suspected of being paid to endorse a product or event – such people are called “parrots” –
their credibility completely and permanently crumbles.
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Each chapter of the novel legitimizes a singular perspective and focuses on a
different character or set of characters. This narrative approach ultimately has the larger
effect of destabilizing the traditional approach of privileging a protagonist and a singular
perspective in a larger narrative arc. A Visit from the Goon Squad takes an approach that,
while illustrating the interconnectedness of its characters, does so more to illustrate that a
network of perspectives feels more intuitive in the contemporary cultural milieu than
narratives told from a singular perspective. Arguably, it is the novel’s approach to
blending multiple perspectives across time that, beyond illustrating fundamental
similarities between characters, illustrates something that has only been fully realizable in
the Twenty-First Century: a narrative structure that, in so many ways, mimetically
reproduces the narrative structure inherent in the dissemination of information in social
media. It is only in that such a narrative approach approximates the aforementioned
process of retroactively assembling information into a larger narrative structure (similar
to the aforementioned narrative structure of conspiracy theories) that this approach
harkens back to a time before virtual, social media existed. However, as I’ve already
suggested, this approach also represents a clear break from the conspiracy theory
narrative framework. It instead mimetically represents the way in which a proliferation
of information can be assembled together, largely arbitrarily, in an overarching narrative
framework. Moreover, it also points towards the ultimate destabilization of an
authoritative narrative perspective that plays some larger role in the story’s significance.
The larger story is significant only insofar that it has been assembled as such.
Again, no perspective has any privilege over any other: it is only through
multiple perspectives, across time and space, that the narrative takes shape. And no
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singular narrative perspective represents an authoritative perspective. Instead, A Visit
from the Goon Squad represents the types of narrative we can cull from various
investigatory methods inherent in collecting data. That there is so much information
from which one can draw, the significance of any single bit of data is no greater than any
other bit. In short, the novel illustrates the massive interconnectedness of multiple
perspectives facilitated by the Information Age, wherein information flourishes at the
expense of the cohesiveness of information, so that information itself ostensibly has the
ability to alter information. Moreover, this massive interconnectedness of multiple
perspectives brings the reader back to her awareness of a position she must ignore in
order to fully immerse herself in the story: the reader, too, is an observer. This novel,
then, illustrates an internal, and closed, system represented by a series of observers that
ultimately closes in on itself, effectively creating an internal feedback loop. The reader
occupies a position outside of this system and thus mimetically performs a function
analogous to that of the novel’s characters. She also carries the narrative burden of
secondary perspective.
In her aforementioned essay, “Making the Cut: The Interplay of Narrative and
System, or What Systems Theory Can’t See,” Kate Hayles observes that “[t]o be
effective, narrative requires a sense of how the present relates to past and future and of at
least potentially causal relations between events” (79) and that narrative
“characteristically reinscribes historical contingency, relating events that might have
happened other than they did” (81). And this certainly rings true for A Visit from the
Goon Squad. While the historical period of each chapter shifts back and forth between
the future and past of the novel’s present, it does give a vague sense of the historical

Justus, Chapter Five 194
contingency between the novel’s events, particularly of how Bennie’s and Sasha’s lives
unfold between their rebellious youths and comparatively tame late adulthoods. But
creating this contingency is entirely up to the reader. In this way, the reader is put into a
position to perform an interpretive act of dataveillance or data-mining of her own. In
other words, the reader is presented with a proliferation of information about several
characters’ lives. From this collection of what is essentially data, the reader may
construct a larger story of historical contingency about any character she chooses.
As for Egan’s intentions in structuring the novel, she has noted that she asked
herself, “Who is the person you’ve glimpsed from the corner of your eye in this chapter,
and would be surprised and interested to find is the subject of the next chapter? That’s
how [the novel is] organized” (Ciabattari). Here, again, we find that each chapter centers
on a character at the periphery of the previous chapter. This structure mirrors the
“infinite regress of observers” that Hayles suggests is necessary to fill in on the multiple
blind spots generated by communicative systems.
Maturana and Varela, in Tree of Knowledge, discuss the significance of the
autopoietic process of generating explanations of what we see and the related significance
of the blind spots we generate in doing so:
All we can do is generate explanations, through language, that reveal the
mechanism of bringing forth a world. By existing, we generate cognitive “blind
spots” that can be cleared only through generating new blind spots in another
domain. We do not see what we do not see, and what we do not see does not
exist. (242)
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Hayle’s argues that “[o]ne of these cognitive blind spots is narrative. And one of the
windows that opens onto it,” she suggests, “is the construction of the observer in systems
theory” (94). In other words, we might see a narrative structure as a blind spot generated
by human social systems, particularly those communicative systems involved in the
generation of explanations of the world around us, a distinctly linguistic process that, as
Maturana and Varela note “reveal[s] mechanism of bringing forth a world.” In other
words, as we explain the world, we bring it forth. In so doing, narratives are generated as
by-products of translating the natural world into verbal description.
Each narrative we generate through the process of piecing together the bits of
information at our disposal contains blind spots: spaces that we not only fail to see, but
that which we cannot see simply by virtue of being at the center of the explanationmaking process.vi It is through multiple perspectives, or via an “an infinite regress of
observers,” that we fill in each other’s blind spots. This is a narrative process in which
both the reader of A Visit from the Goon Squad and the various characters therein engage.
In much the same way that the singular perspective represented in each of the novel’s
chapters creates both another observer of other observers’ blind spots while generating
blind spots of her own, the novel also provides a series of observations for the reader to
similarly piece together. We, the readers, can see what the characters do not, and we can
see that for those characters what goes unseen does not exist.
This process returns us to the primacy of vision. Even as we examine the
linguistic processes of explaining our sensory experiences and of narrating the world
around us, we once again experience the fact that so much of the process of harvesting
information from its various sources is often understood and explained as a way of
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seeing. Perhaps, too, then, the process of dataveillance is another way of “seeing,” of
harvesting information to assemble together in an explanatory, narrative structure. If this
is the case, then we might view dataveillance as being simultaneously a method of
generating explanatory narratives that contain their own blind spots and of revealing the
blind spots of other observing systems. Such is the case, for instance, for whistle-blowing
news sources, like Wikileaks, that use subversive countermeasures that, in many ways,
mirror the practices of the hierarchical structures they seek to subvert.
State Surveillance vs. Wikileaks
Covert, data-gathering surveillance programs have been a longstanding tradition
in government-operated investigations for quite some time. From the mid-1950s to the
early 1970s, COINTELPRO (the Counter Intelligence Program) involved a series of FBI
initiatives that aimed to infiltrate, surveille, discredit, and disrupt organizations that the
government deemed subversive: various civil liberties groups and women’s rights groups
as well as the Ku Klux Klan, Martin Luther King, Jr and his associates, the NAACP, and
Vietnam War protest groups, and so on. Unsurprisingly, such investigative measures
both manifested from and perpetuated the deep, cultural undercurrent of paranoia that
characterized that historical time period. Also unsurprising is that government counter
intelligence programs ideologically lodged themselves firmly into the American social
conscience so that they have repeatedly manifested in various forms: Most notoriously,
COINTELPRO was allegedly ended in 1971 when it was exposed to the public; however,
there has been evidence that suggest that its work continued far beyond 1971. For
instance, most recently, it is abundantly clear that government-sanctioned and supported
surveillance initiatives proliferate, particularly since September 11, 2011.
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Since 9/11, the passage of the Patriot Act along with the subsequent sanctioning
of warrantless wiretaps has ushered in a new era of state surveillance. The technology
that has developed alongside the rise of state surveillance suggests that a massive amount
of wiretapping occurs fairly regularly: hardware technologies and software programs
capable of detecting targeted phrases and words – both spoken and written – have
repeatedly appeared in news headlines, as have the names of major corporations like
AT&T and Google who’ve worked with the NSA for these purposes. Such revelations
have become fairly, albeit disturbingly, commonplace.
Also becoming increasingly common are reports of FBI “informants” who are
hired to bait individuals who might be deemed as a security risk into taking part in highly
orchestrated (and well-funded) terrorists plots. The arrests of these baited individuals are
often depicted as preventative measures in the war on terror. As Trevor Aaronson and
others have reported, such procedures arguably create the terrorist before arresting him as
such, effectively creating the illusion that such FBI initiatives are necessary. Aaronson
explains it as follows:
Here’s how it works: Informants report to their handlers on people who have, say,
made statements sympathizing with terrorists. Those names are then crossreferenced with existing intelligence data, such as immigration and criminal
records. FBI agents may then assign an undercover operative to approach the
target by posing as a radical. Sometimes the operative will propose a plot, provide
explosives, even lead the target in a fake oath to Al Qaeda.
Take, for instance, James Cromite, a psychologically unstable former Wal-Mart
employee who met an FBI informant and operative, Shahed Hussain, at a Newburgh
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mosque in 2008. Over the course of ten months, during which Hussain paid Cromite’s
rent and promised to buy him a barbershop, Cromite – a notorious anti-Semite – was
coerced into taking part in a bomb plot. At Hussain’s behest, upon planting fake car
bombs near a synagogue in the Bronx, Cromite was apprehended by a SWAT team and
arrested (Aaronson).
I would be remiss to ignore that the above narrative does much of what I have
been describing all along: it assembles together bits of information into a larger
explanatory structure. But there is a poignant moral to the story that must not get lost:
such schemes essentially serve to create the terrorist plot that is subsequently thwarted. It
is an undeniable ill effect of a malicious form of state surveillance. For instance, were
Cromite’s anti-Semitic and racist remarks not so forthright, and were he not so clearly
susceptible to suggestion – conditions that were certainly clear to the FBI – he would not
likely have been targeted for such intense measures. All reported examinations of
Cromite suggest that he would have continued to be an ineffectual, albeit annoying,
loudmouth had the FBI not coerced him into a phony terrorist plot.
And then there are those who are charged for being part of a terrorist plot without
overtly knowing that they were taking part in one. In August 2011, Petra Bartosiewicz
reported in Harper’s magazine on the case of Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain, two
leaders in a New York mosque who were sentenced to fifteen years in federal prison
because of their involvement in an FBI-constructed terrorist plot that the press later called
the Albany “missile plot.” Regarding this particular plot, the FBI later admitted that the
public had never been in jeopardy and that Aref and Hossain posed no real, credible
threat. Subsequently, the Muslim population of New York was justifiably outraged.
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During the course of a sting operation that lasted roughly eight months in 2003, the FBI’s
informant befriended Hossain, the owner of a restaurant whose livelihood was in
jeopardy, and promised to loan him $50,000 to support his business. Surveillance video
that has been used in the testimony against Hossain and Aref shows that the FBI’s
informant once showed Hossain a rocket launcher that he claimed could be used to attack
an airplane. Hossain responds by saying, “Holy is Allah.” Four months later, Hossain
brings Aref, a local imam, to a meeting with the informant where the informant has
agreed to provide $5,000 of the promised $50,000 loan. Aref’s presence as a credible
third party is part of Muslim custom in such dealings. The FBI parlayed this transaction
into a so-called “missile plot” and arrested both Hossain and Aref, the latter of whom
never knew that a missile had been shown to the former (Bartosiewicz, Aaronson).
It becomes clear very quickly that an ideological narrative structure can be
constructed prior to generating the data that retroactively justifies the “story.” In other
words, there is clearly a pervasive government narrative that, a decade after 9/11,
continues to typecast Muslims as terrorists. Furthermore, the U. S. government continues
to bolster and circulate this narrative. The result is that a hauntingly large number of
Muslim Americans are targeted for surveillance, and far too often, the result is that
targeted Muslims are either “flipped” into becoming FBI informants or are coerced into a
phony plot simply so the FBI can create the illusion that the so-called war on terror
continues to be successful.
In his essay, “Visible Secrets: Ethics in a World Without Secrets,” Peter Singer
wonders if the proliferation of various forms of surveillance mirrors a cultural trend
towards the decline of the ways in which Western culture has historically valued privacy.
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As he points out, most social networking websites encourage people to volunteer various
personal bits of data about themselves that could ostensibly be used in many of the same
ways of constructing narratives that I’ve been describing. Along these lines, social media
also represents an autobiographical, DataNarrative framework wherein the user creates an
autobiographical story about herself as she selectively chooses and publicizes personal
information.vii Singer notes that the advantages that come along with social spaces like
Facebook – for instance, “the benefits of connecting with others, sharing information,
networking, self-promoting, flirting, and bragging” – paired with the fact that personal
information is shared voluntarily “outweigh breaches of privacy that accompany such
behavior” (33). But Singer’s justifiably greater concern is with instances wherein the
distribution of personal information is involuntary and unannounced. For instance,
Singer reports that “Verizon alone receives 90,000 demands for information from lawenforcement agencies annually,” typically without the consent of the Verizon subscriber
(33). Arguably, one of Facebook’s more insidious effects is thus to naturalize the erosion
of privacy so that intrusions such as those facilitated by Verizon feel less invasive, even
in the imaginably rare event wherein such intrusions are noticed.
But social media, and the associated erosion of the value of privacy, may also
force a hitherto unrealized openness amongst government and corporate organizations.
Historically, whistle-blowing and investigative journalism actions have repeatedly pulled
back the proverbial veil covering government secrets. Furthermore, contemporary,
whistle-blowing organizations such as Wikileaks arguably push beyond traditional
methods of conducting investigative journalism and reporting its results.viii By creating a
virtual venue for “crowd-sourcing” information and by facilitating the dissemination of
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what would have otherwise been classified information, Wikileaks exemplifies the ways
in which the digital sphere – the networked fourth estate – has profoundly affected the
means by which information is legitimized, circulated, and consumed. No longer is it the
responsibility of a single investigator or a single news source to get the scoop: instead, it
becomes the responsibility of those with access to information to make it free and
available to all those who wish to both disseminate and consume information. Moreover,
by providing the virtual space for this phenomenon, Wikileaks has fundamentally altered
a larger ideological structure.
In a conversation between Slavoj !i"ek and Wikileaks’s Julian Assange, a
conversation sponsored by Democracy Now and funded by the organization Frontline,
!i"ek reminds us that hierarchical, ideological structures contain both their own internal,
governing laws and principles as well as the methods by which those laws may be broken
and principles violated. From the perspective of a subject within an ideological structure,
one’s options for subversion are relatively few, largely because for subversion to be
subversion it must be recognized by the ideological structure as such. Behavior that falls
outside of the scope of an ideological structure’s internal logic and outside such a
structure’s internal, proverbial field of vision typically fails to be recognized, and so the
aims of subversion are thwarted simply by the fact that they are not recognized by the
system at which they are aimed. In other words, an ideological system essentially
prescribes all possible actions that can be recognized by the system. Wikileaks has
proven impossible for the larger ideological system to ignore. !i"ek thus describes
Wikileaks as a heartening example of an extraordinarily significant way in which an
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ideological system’s subjects can fundamentally alter methods and practices of
subversion within a particular system.
Thus, what !i"ek points out is that the greatest contribution that Assange has
made to the information world is that the methods by which the rules of a predominant
ideological system can be broken have been fundamentally, and arguably permanently,
altered. By leaking classified government information, Wikileaks changes the rules
within an ideological structure because the ideological structure is simply incapable of
ignoring it, in part because several, major world news outlets have, whether they intended
to or not, legitimized it. Therefore, Wikileaks represents another way in which the
erosion of privacy has become a culturally pervasive force; however, it also turns a
proverbial table. It pulls back the proverbial veil on government actions to facilitate
greater transparency. Unsurprisingly, on several occasions, Assange has asserted that in
order for a democracy to function the way it was intended to, the public must be well
informed, and he makes it clear that the central aim of Wikileaks is to promote the same
kind of transparency amongst government organizations that the government expects of
its citizens. Moreover, Wikileaks exemplifies a method of subversion – one that has
already had dramatic real-world impacts – that was once only previously attainable when
a government insider or spy leaked information to the mass media. Wikileaks draws from
a method of “crowd-sourcing” information inherent to the internet and best facilitated by
social media in order to fully realize a method of information gathering and
dissemination that has hitherto not been fully realized.
But Assange doesn’t operate entirely outside of the usual channels of information
dissemination. In fact, he has brilliantly used reputable news organizations to circulate
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and validate the information that Wikileaks makes available. Most notably, in what has
since been dubbed “Cablegate,” Assange made nearly 250,000 cables available to three
major news sources: New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel.ix As it turns out,
this was also a brilliant way to ensure that the cables were released to the public.
Because each news source is invested in getting the scoop on the others, the probability
of the cables’ publication greatly increased. Moreover, that all three published some of
the cables further increased Wikileaks’ credibility as a news source in its own right. This
not only increased Wikileaks credibility as a whistle-blowing news organization, but it
also demonstrated another way in which multiple perspectives can be used to bolster the
credibility of objective information.
Unsurprisingly, there has been an enormous backlash. Several high-profile
American politicians have declared Assange a terrorist (or, as is more often the case, a
“cyber-terrorist”), and he rightfully fears extradition to the United States to be tried as
such. Most notable amongst such threats has been Senator Dianne Feinstein’s call to
prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act of 1917.x Furthermore, Assange has been
repeatedly accused of “having blood on his hands,” and it has been suggested that people
may have been and might be killed as a direct result of the information Wikileaks has
made available to the world. Assange’s response is that the information that Wikileaks
publicizes may very well do more to save lives than to end them. Moreover, the same
news organizations that have so often vilified Assange and Wikileaks have also served to
bolster both Assange’s and Wikilieaks’ credibility. Several mainstream media outlets
have published several disparaging assessments of Assange’s character, ranging from ad
hominem attacks (by, for instance, depicting Assange as a rapist per the as-of-yet
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unsubstantiated allegations of two Swiss women) to oddly superficial reproaches (the
New York Times has most notoriously characterized Assange as a beggar – one who uses
his friends’ credit cards to pay for his expenses and whose unsavory hygiene manifests
even in the ways he wears his socks).xi
Arguably, people fear Assange not so much because he leaks information, but
because he erodes our ability to ignore it. As !i"ek notes, we all essentially know that,
during wartime, the military branches of national governments sometimes do terrible
things. In essence, we all, on some level, know that “collateral damage” sometimes
means that innocent civilians are killed. The reason Assange is so feared is that he
symbolizes the fact that Wikileaks forces information and images of governmental
misdeeds into the public conscience. In other words, Assange forces us to come face-toface with what we already know, and this may be far more shocking, if not more
frightening, for far more people. !i"ek analogizes this beautifully by noting that it is one
thing for a husband to know his wife is sleeping with other men: this knowledge itself
may afford the husband the opportunity to think of himself as an open-minded, liberal,
modern man. But, as !i"ek explains, it is another thing altogether for the man to see
photographs of his wife’s infidelities. It is the latter – the objective information that
makes it impossible to ignore what one already knows – that typically evokes the stronger
reaction.
Since Assange forces us to face what we essentially already know – since he
makes this knowledge tangible and thus harder to ignore by providing the hard evidence,
images, and objective information – he thus also makes it more difficult for mainstream
media to successfully distract us from this knowledge. In this way, Wikileaks is a part of
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a long-standing tradition of whistle-blowers like George Holiday (who filmed the beating
of Rodney King) and investigative journalists. By providing the hard and largely
undeniable evidence that, for instance, the U. S. military sometimes deliberately kills
unarmed civilians, Wikileaks exposes some of the horrors of warfare, if not the
aforementioned, deeply-embedded, institutionalized racism that has targeted so many
Muslims since 9/11.
Take the famous case of the Reuters journalists who were killed by gunfire from
an American Apache attack helicopter on July 12, 2007. Reuters sought, under the
Freedom of Information Act, and were refused the video footage of the event before
Wikileaks leaked it on April 5, 2010. Wikileaks released two versions of the footage, both
of which have been titled Collateral Murder, and both of which have been made
available on several online video channels, blogs, and websites: a full 40 minute, uncut
version and a shorter, edited version in which several minutes of extraneous and
insignificant material was removed.xii Both versions depict a view similar to what the
helicopter pilots would have seen: taken from the moveable gun camera, itself designed
to assist in targeting and firing the Apache’s weapons, we see the gun’s-eye view a group
of men on a corner in Baghdad, two of whom were Reuters employees, Namir NoorEldeen, age 22, and driver Saeed Chmagh, age 40. A couple of the men appear to be
carrying weapons – a not entirely uncommon phenomenon in Baghdad – and one of
Noor-Eldeen’s camera’s is mistaken for a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The
Apache helicopter fires on the men, killing all but Chmagh, who is severely wounded.
When a van carrying two men and two children stops to collect the wounded, the soldiers
in the helicopter request and are eventually granted permission to open fire, and Chmagh
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and the two good Samaritans are killed. Both children are severely wounded.
Perhaps what is most troubling about the video is its audio accompaniment (which
is also subtitled in the publicly available versions). In it, we hear young, trigger-happy
soldiers talking as they might while playing a first-person-shooter video game. Of one
wounded, unarmed civilian, a soldier is heard saying “Come on, buddy, all you gotta do
is pick up a weapon.” This civilian – Chmagh – is killed when a van of a nearby resident
pulls up and the driver and a passenger get out to provide assistance. As the helicopter
fires upon and kills these two men, we can hear the soldiers congratulating each other on
their aim and celebrating the firing of a missile through the front window of the van, in
which, as the video clearly makes visible, children sit in the front seat.

Still shots from the Collateral Murder video. The
subtitle reads “Picking up the wounded?”

“Oh, yeah, look at that. Right through the
windshield!”

But this audio accompaniment provides more than just insight into the troubling
perspective of young American soldiers. We hear the series of communications between
the pilots and the chain of command wherein the pilots note that a van has come to
collect the wounded. Upon noting this, the pilot asks for permission to engage. We hear
a series of messages relayed further up the proverbial chain of command. It is when
permission to engage is granted that helicopter fires on all of the individuals, including
the aforementioned journalists as well as the van containing children. It is this portion of
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the audio accompaniment that ultimately provides the most damning evidence of the
atrocities of war: that it wasn’t just a bunch of trigger-happy young men whose
perspectives may have arguably been influenced by playing violent video games, but that
the request for permission to fire upon unarmed men who had clearly stopped to collect
the wounded passed through a chain of command that ultimately granted the permission
to engage.
A 22-year-old, Army intelligence analyst named Bradley Manning allegedly
provided this video footage, along with the 250,000 aforementioned cables, to Wikileaks.
In May 2010, Manning was arrested and jailed, and, as of this writing in late 2011, he has
not yet received a hearing after well over a year of imprisonment under reportedly harsh
circumstances, including nine months in maximum security and solitary confinement.xiii
Manning was first exposed as the source of this leak to Wired Magazine by the hacker
Adrian Lamo, a hacker convicted of a hacking-related felony in 2004, when Lamo
released a series of instant messaging chats he had with Manning (Greenwald). Beyond
breaking the news of Manning’s involvement and arrest, Wired has since made these
materials available online (Hansen).
On May 21, 2010, Manning initiated these chats with Lamo as follows:
(1:41:12 PM) bradass87: hi
(1:44:04 PM) bradass87: how are you?
(1:47:01 PM) bradass87: im an army intelligence analyst, deployed to eastern
baghdad, pending discharge for “adjustment disorder” in lieu of “gender identity
disorder” (Hansen, bold and underscore appear in the original)
While I don’t want to make too much of Manning’s “gender identity disorder,” I believe
it is significant enough to note that Manning sought out Lamo upon learning that Lamo
identified as bisexual whose former lover, also involved in the military, is a MTF
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transsexual individual. After Manning writes that he “questioned [his] gender for several
years… sexual orientation was easy to figure out… but [he] started to come to terms with
it during the first few months of [his] deployment,” Lamo responds that he is “a journalist
and a minister” and that Manning could “pick either, and treat this as a confession or an
interview (never to be published) & enjoy a modicum of legal protection” (Hansen). In
other words, Lamo cultivated an air of hierarchical benevolence to which he added his
pre-established credibility as both a hacker and as someone whose sexual orientation put
him in a marginalized identity category along with Manning. Furthermore, the
publication of this information has arguably added to the narrative that would describe
Manning as a subversive figure: his political deviance has been made to mirror what has
been treated as a sexual deviance. While it is tempting to think that the military may very
well have inadvertently pushed Manning to think of himself in these terms and thus
provided the impetus for the leak of classified information in the first place, I want to
suggest that there’s something deeply touching, humane, and extraordinarily significant
about a soldier’s willingness to follow his conscience over his orders. It would not be
unreasonable to imagine that Manning’s gender identification and sexual orientation
would be used to undermine his credibility; however, these identity markers only further
stress the power that a marginalized subject has when in possession of objective
information that can be used to incriminate and destabilize a hierarchical, ideological
system.
Moreover, the footage that Manning shared with Assange not only provides
objective information for the investigation of the so-called “collateral murder,” but it also
forces the issue into the public eye in such a way that could potentially prohibit future
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uses of such excessive force. Ideally, an investigation into such uses of extensive force
could keep the military’s excessive use of force in the public conscience. In other words,
this footage forces us to face some harsh realities of war in ways that could have some
significant real-world effects. Wikileaks thus arguably provides information to construct
narratives that counter many popular ideologically informed narratives regarding the role
of government, the role of the military, and so on. As such, it is also a paradigmatic
example of Diva Citizenship.
Conclusions
As of this writing, civil and political unrest in parts of Northern Africa and in the
Middle East have resulted in some extraordinary political changes. While these areas
have had a long history of civil unrest, the recent “Arab Spring” arguably began in
December 2010 in Tunisia when Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself in protest to the
police seizure of his vegetable cart, a means to which the unemployed college graduate
had to resort after failing to find gainful employment. After ten subsequent days of
protest, the Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali promised to both arrest protestors
and to pass a job creation bill. Upon failing to improve the lives of the Tunisian people,
and after continued protest, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, and
control of the government was ultimately overturned.
Concurrently, protests erupted in Egypt, where the use of social media was
instrumental in organizing protests and other action as well as in raising international
awareness and interest in the movement. Despite the government’s attempts to suspend
internet access, and thus quiet the lines of communication amongst protestors,xiv the
Egyptian people were ultimately successful in forcing long-time president Mubarak out
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of his seat. A civilian was later appointed as prime minister, and the promise of free and
open elections for a new president now lingers. Similarly, in Libya, the long-time,
tyrannical leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was first overthrown by the newly formed
National Transitional Council (NTC) and then killed in his hometown Sirte on October
20, 2011 by NTC forces. In so doing, Libya effectively ended over 40 years of autocratic
rule.
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are not the only countries in which the Arab Spring
movement has brought about protest and change. Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Suadi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and Western
Sahara have all had some degree of civil unrest, protest, and political upheaval. And all
have taken cues from the earliest movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. And this is
significant for many reasons: Most notable is that the networked fourth estate – in other
words, the web’s role in the circulation of information (or news) – has played a key role
in the organization and perpetuation of these movements. In fact, Amnesty International
has famously cited Wikileaks’ aforementioned release of the U. S. diplomatic cables as a
major catalyst for the protests, uprisings, and revolts, which further illustrates the ways in
which crowd-sourcing and social media have conflated in the Information Age to provide
a method of information collection and dissemination in ways that fundamentally alter
pre-existing ideological frameworks.
And the political unrest in parts of Europe and the Middle East have been recently
mirrored in the United States and elsewhere, particularly in the growing Occupy Wall
Street (OWS) movement that, in its earliest incarnations, took as a slogan the phrase “Are
you ready for a Tahrir moment?” – a direct reference to the Egyptian uprisings that were
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organized via Facebook. The movement got off to a comparably small start on
September 17, 2011 when a couple hundred people heeded the call of the Canadian, anticorporation magazine Adbusters to protest corporate greed and excess. The Wall Street
Occupiers have since established an encampment at Zucotti Park, a privately owned park
near Wall Street, as a home base and have conducted their operations largely from there.
This movement, much like the Arab Spring, has repeatedly illustrated the fundamental
ways in which information dissemination have been fundamentally changed by social
media.
Even as I write this, OWS, along with several other Occupy Movements across
the United States and elsewhere, protesters continue to use Facebook to publicize rallies,
marches, and events; they continue to use Twitter as a fast way to disseminate
information; and they continue to post videos to YouTube to further engender support
and to continue to document the development of the Occupation from the perspectives of
subjects who would otherwise be marginalize by the hierarchical corporate and
government regimes they are rallying against. Clearly, although the impetus for the
OWS movement originated in a traditional print publication, a great deal of its
organization has been conducted via social media. Together, this triangulated social
system of information dissemination (Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) has been a
powerful force: for instance, since its earliest days, videos of police abusing their power
by attacking, often violently, OWS protesters have been galvanized and inflamed the
movements sympathizers. Such videos have inarguably caused the number of
sympathizers and protesters to increase.
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In the scope of what I’ve argued in this dissertation, the Occupy Wall Street
movement illustrates the ways in which marginalized perspectives may borrow the
ostensibly objective authority of the camera and other such information-colleting
technologies to legitimize a counter-perspective that can fundamentally destabilize
prevailing hierarchical, ideological structures (a practice that, as I’ve reported elsewhere,
Steve Mann has called sousveillance). Moreover, it illustrates the ways in which the
Information Age has both added to and altered predominate methods of information
circulation. Taken together, the practice of sousveillance and the method of using social
media to circulate information – be it in the form of privately captured videos, leaked
government information, or other information acquired via practices not unlike
dataveillance or datamining – this phenomenon has had some striking manifestations and
impacts on culture and politics and, subsequently, prevailing narratives, media, and
narrative forms.
Throughout the course of this dissertation, I’ve examined several instances
wherein the conjoined technological twins of information capture and digital methods of
information dissemination manifest in culture and its products. In Chapter Two, I draw
from Hasan Elahi’s ongoing Tracking Transience project to examine ways in which the
modern smart phone’s capabilities of capturing photos and videos as well as its perpetual
connection to the web can be used to create a virtual hall of mirrors through which the
bodily referent of postmodern subjectivity can vanish, and I locate a literary example of
this disappearance in Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis. I push my examination of smart phone
sousveillance practices forward by examining the case of the killing of Oscar Grant III at
the hands of an Oakland police officer and the subsequent circulation of videos of the
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event on YouTube, and I locate other instances of the type of multiple point-of-view
structure that this phenomenon engenders by tracing ways in which it has been replicated
in narrative and cinematic form in, for example, Anna Deavere-Smith’s Twilight: Los
Angeles, 1991 and the HBO crime-drama The Wire. And in Chapter Four, I examine the
ways in which sexuality, particularly gender, is both ideologically and technologically
surveilled – as exemplified in Jeffrey Euginede’s Middlesex and in the more pervasive
cultural phenomenon of subjecting transgender individuals to increased targeted
surveillance in airports. Also in Chapter Four, I draw from Lauren Berlant to imagine a
beacon of hope for marginalized figures who are so often subjected to greater
surveillance: The Diva Citizen.
It has been my intention to exemplify ways in which panoptic practices, or
heirarchical surveillance, can be subverted by technologies that put the authority of the
camera in the hands of marginalize subjects. I’ve sought to illustrate that modern
communication technologies allow us to triangulate multiple perspectives on relatively
singular events. I argue that the effect is threefold: First, this triangulation illustrates that
such technology can effectively be used to flood the hyperbolic panoptic eye with visual
information so that the postmodern subject can ostensibly disappear in the hierarchical
system’s blind spots. This, for instance, is the case for Hassan Elahi. Second, and
concurrently, the postmodern subject is equipped to bolster the authenticity of
marginalized perspective by drawing together many such perspectives. Such was the
case in the killing of Oscar Grant III, and such was exemplified in the narrative structure
and content of Twilight: Los Angeles, 1991. And, finally, I’ve sought to examine this as
a recent narrative practice wherein multiple perspectives are necessary for depicting the
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truth of a lived reality. Such is most recently exemplified by A Visit from the Goon
Squad.
That these practices have become central to socio-political movements like the
Arab Spring and the Occupation of Wall Street suggests to me that these practices will
continue to proliferate. I predict that they will not only become increasingly
commonplace, but that they will continue to steer emerging narratives in both form and
content. Multiple point-of-view narratives, for instance, that address communication
technology’s ongoing impact on our lives will also become increasingly commonplace.
While I’ve rather inadequately attempted to dub such narrative structures
DataNarratives, largely because they mirror the approach of mining data to create a
narrative assemblage, I would hope that future scholars will be equipped to more
adequately describe and name this emerging phenomenon. Moreover, it will soon
become important to document the history of the use of social media in political
uprisings. The combination of private photo and video technologies paired with the
established trend of circulating privately capture materials has inarguably changed the
face of information dissemination. My assumption is that it will also play an increasingly
important role in the development of emerging narrative forms.

i

Much of what I have learned about the eye has come from John W. Gamel’s essay “The Elegant Eye,”
which was originally published in The Alaska Quarterly in 2010.
ii
Googling the relatively simple code “inurl:/view.shtml” enables hackers to view live feeds from Axis
2100 surveillance cameras that have not updated their security software. Unsurprisingly, many Axis 2100
users have, years after this vulnerability was exposed, still not closed this proverbial back door. As of
September 12, 2011, such a search yields nearly 239,000 results.
iii
The code that allowed me to hack these surveillance cameras was obtained by a subversive form of
dataveillance, further illustrating the ways in which visual surveillance and digital data are becoming
increasingly conflated.
iv
The phrase “dataveillance” does not adequately describe the practice it represents. Etymologically
speaking, since “surveillance” literally translates as “watching from above (wherein “above” can refer both
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to physical location and an ideologically hierarchical position),” dataveillance would translate as “watching
data.” Since dataveillance is typically performed within a hierarchical structure, the loss of the surfix that
suggests as much also loses the significance of mining data for ideological purposes. As I’ll explain later,
dataveillance can be performed both as surveillance – as is the case when the government uses questionable
policies, like those famously put forth in the Patriot Act, to secretly harvest information without warrants –
and as sousveillance, as is the case for Wikileaks, which mines data from the government.
v
A full-color version of this chapter, with accompanying audio, is viewable at
http://www.slideshare.net/JenniferEgan/rockandroll97-2004cppt
vi
The metaphor of the observer’s blind spots mirrors a suitably symmetrical fact about the eye: our eyes
have their own literal blind spots that are created in the small space where the back of the eyeball connects
to occipital nerves. It is one of our brain’s more amazing trick’s that it “fills in” these blind spots by
assembling together peripheral visual information. In this sense, we observers metaphorically do what the
eyeball literally does.
vii
George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson have adopted the phrase “prosumer” from economics – where the
term typically refers to process of consuming the products one has had a hand in creating – to apply to the
ways in which people create identities for themselves online. In this way, the prosumer identity is one
wherein the subject contributes to a social network like Facebook and internalizes much of what she
contributes. In this way, identity is truly a discursive process, wherein the subject creates a narrative about
herself, produces that narrative by making it public, and then internalizes that creation.
viii
As October 24, 2011, Wikileaks has been effectively shut down by coordinated effort between major
credit card companies, banks, and payment services who have, for how long, denied the organization access
to its donations and funds. Even so, Wikileaks remains a paradigmatic example of the way that the
networked fourth estate can work to liberate and disseminate information.
ix
I should note that contrary to claims that all 250,000 cables were actually published – another component
of the media’s demonization of Assange – a small fraction of them were published, many of which were
redacted to protect specific people named in them.
x
It should be noted that the Espionage Act of 1917 does not apply to non-Americans, and thus it cannot be
used to prosecute Assange.
xi
See Bill Keller’s article “Dealing with Assange and the Wikileaks Secrets,” New York Times (26 Jan
2011).
xii
FOX News unsurprisingly attacked the video saying that significant details were removed, such as the
presence of a ground-to-missile rocket launcher. A comparison of the two videos shows that this is clearly
not the case; however, it does appear that the helicopter crew initially mistook the Reuters photographer’s
camera as a weapon. Both versions do show that, amongst the group of people who were fired on, there
were two individuals with AK-47s.
xiii
Amnesty International publicly described the conditions of Manning’s imprisonment as exceedingly and
unnecessarily harsh and punitive. Later, in April 2011, approximately 295 scholars came forward in
support of an initiative to declare Manning’s imprisonment a violation of his Constitutional Rights. As a
result, the Pentagon transferred Manning to a medium-security facility in Kansas.
xiv
In January 2011, Egyptian citizen Gamal Ibrahim famously named his newborn daughter “Facebook” to
honor the social media site’s role in the Egyptian revolution.
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